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ABSTRACT  
This dissertation consists of three essays which utilize automated traffic enforcement data 
to investigate the existence of police discrimination in issuing speeding tickets and potential 
crime reduction as a secondary effect of using such programs.   
In the first chapter, I use tickets issued by automated traffic enforcement cameras as a 
measure of the population of speeders to compare with police-issued tickets.  The novel dataset 
has an advantage over previous literature because data collection was not a result of suspected 
police bias.  I find that a ticketed individual is more likely to be African-American and more 
likely to be female when ticketed by police as opposed to an automated camera.  Though this 
implies some form of discrimination based on gender and race, it cannot be determined whether 
police are engaging in statistical or preference-based discrimination. 
Next, I extend the research question to determine whether the differential treatment of 
women and African-Americans by police should be characterized as preference-based or 
statistical discrimination.  I use a detailed individual level dataset which follows individuals 
through the court process from receipt of a speeding ticket to trial.  It seems that police are not 
engaging in statistical discrimination, because women and African-Americans are no more likely 
to immediately pay a speeding ticket.  In fact, since African-Americans are actually more likely 
to attend a trial, police are targeting individuals who will utilize more court resources: 
contradictory to one motive of statistical discrimination.  Individuals behave differently based on 
which judge they are assigned, but judges do not seem to be issuing fines discriminatorily.   
The final chapter aims to answer a different question regarding automated traffic 
enforcement: do automated traffic programs reduce crime?  Many cities and companies which 
implement the automated systems cite crime reduction as a byproduct of adoption.  They claim 
xi 
 
that these programs actually reduce crime rates by enabling police to focus on more serious 
offenders, increasing the marginal productivity of police.  This is the first research to rigorously 
investigate these claims, and I find some supportive evidence, however, it seems that these 
companies may be exaggerating the extent of this effect.   
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
  
In 1994 New York became the first city in the United States to implement an automated 
traffic enforcement system in an attempt to decrease the number of traffic accidents resulting 
from red-light running.  Today there are over 500 cities and counties utilizing speed or red-light 
traffic camera enforcement (Insurance Institute of Highway Safety, 2010).  This technology has 
sparked a heated controversy regarding its legality, which is strikingly evident due to the 
existence of many passionate websites and countless newspaper articles covering city adoption 
of these techniques.
1
  In fact, fifteen states since 1995 have outlawed its use.  Opponents claim 
the cameras are an invasion of privacy.  Advocates of these programs rely on statistics that show 
the most dangerous accidents decrease when the cameras are utilized, despite that in some cities 
less dangerous rear-end collisions do increase as drivers slam on their brakes to avoid running a 
red light.
2
 
This dissertation analyzes automated traffic enforcement in a different way, instead of 
analyzing its impact on traffic violations, I first use automated enforcement data to investigate 
police discrimination in issuing speeding tickets.  I also investigate unproven claims by program 
manufacturers that the programs reduce crime. 
Since automated speed cameras issue tickets objectively, their tickets can be compared to 
police-issued tickets to measure differences in the proportion of speeding tickets issued to gender 
                                                 
1
 There are hundreds of examples, but here are a select few: New York Times article, which appeared in print on 
August 8,2010:  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/us/08traffic.html?_r=1&scp=16&sq=Cleveland&st=nyt 
ABC news article, August 23, 2010 by Vic Lee: 
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/peninsula&id=7625213 
CBS news article, December 20, 2010 taken from Chicago AP: 
http://cbs2chicago.com/local/red.light.cameras.2.1198531.html 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-05-13-traffic-cameras_N.htm?csp=obinsite 
2
 For examples of such studies see http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersection/redlight/research/ and Rajiv Shah at the 
University of Illinois at Chicago http://www.rajivshah.com/index.html 
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and racial groups.  By comparing the proportion of women and African-Americans who receive 
tickets from police officers to those who receive tickets from an automated source, it is possible 
to determine whether police use gender or race as a determinant in issuing speeding tickets.  I 
find that police consider gender and race when deciding to ticket speeders.  This result holds 
even when accounting for potential endogeneity of the location of officers and automated 
sources, and when considering a number of different specifications. 
Police may be disproportionately issuing speeding tickets to women and African-
Americans because they enjoy issuing tickets to these groups of individuals, or as a result of 
statistical discrimination.  If police enjoy issuing tickets to women and/or African-Americans, 
they derive an additional non-monetary benefit by ticketing these individuals, which is 
considered preference-based discrimination.  Differential treatment based on gender (or race) is 
considered statistical discrimination if police officers use gender (or race) as a proxy for a 
relevant characteristic which is difficult to observe.  For example, perhaps police frequently 
ticket women because, on average, they are more likely to pay a speeding ticket fine instead of 
going to court to contest it (Blalock et al. 2007).  If police officers believe that women (or 
African-Americans) are less likely to contest a ticket, they may disproportionately issue tickets to 
these individuals in order to avoid the resulting additional costs (court costs for example). 
The motives for discrimination cannot be determined in the first paper, however, 
evidence of its existence is provided.  The second paper analyzes individual behavior in the court 
system to provide evidence regarding the type of discrimination police engage in when issuing 
speeding tickets and is the first to follow individuals through the court process, from speeding 
ticket to trial.  If women and African-Americans are more likely to pay their ticket fine as 
opposed to asking for a trial, they may be targeted by police because the associated marginal cost 
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is lower for issuing tickets to these individuals.  This would imply that police engage in 
statistical discrimination, as opposed to preference-based discrimination.  By following all 
individuals who received a speeding ticket, it is possible to determine if behavior differs by race 
or gender in regards to who is more or less likely to fight a speeding ticket in court.  I also 
investigate judge behavior in fine issuance, and find no economically significant evidence of 
discriminatory behavior based on gender or race. 
Due to the uniqueness of the data, these papers provide a distinct advantage over previous 
literature.  Observing the entire population of speeders is nearly impossible when analyzing the 
speeding behavior of a whole city, however, automated camera tickets are given to every 
speeding car that passes in front of the camera.  Therefore, the automated tickets provide an 
entirely objective measure of the speeding population in a given location, which has not 
previously been used in this type of analysis.  Also, the police data was collected without prior 
knowledge of the police department and contains every ticket issued by police officers during the 
sample period.  Data in the police discrimination literature is typically obtained as a result of a 
lawsuit investigating racial bias, but the present dataset was not obtained in this manner.  Also, 
the automated camera system analyzed here was installed to improve traffic safety, with no 
consideration of other types of crime reduction or investigation of negative police behavior. 
   Although the purpose of automated traffic camera technology is to improve traffic 
safety, many companies and cities cite another selling point: they claim that the traffic programs 
actually decrease crime rates.  For example, the red-light cameras website for Boulder, Colorado 
explains that the automated technology “achieves these safety benefits without having to 
dedicate extra police resources to enhance traffic enforcement.  Instead, police officers can 
devote their time to other priorities, including focused law enforcement, neighborhood problem 
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solving, and crime prevention.”3  These automated traffic systems are not implemented with the 
intention of reducing crime, but crime may be impacted if having an automated traffic system 
allows police to concentrate on more serious offenders.  In this way, the automated system may 
reduce crime by increasing the marginal productivity of police officers.  This is the first paper to 
investigate these claims. 
Using a city level panel, I investigate the effect of red light camera systems on nine 
different crime rates: violent crimes including murder and nonegligent manslaughter, forcible 
rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and property crimes including burglary, larceny, and motor 
vehicle theft.  I find that red light camera programs in general decrease some crime rates, but if 
the red light camera program is overseen by the police department there is a stronger crime 
reduction for certain types of crime.  Non-violent crimes (property crimes, motor vehicle theft, 
and larceny) seem to be impacted the most, perhaps because police can be more visible in the 
right areas to deter criminals.   
 There is an extensive literature which attempts to explain factors that influence crime as 
well as the effect of perceived deterrence measures on crime rates, but, my analysis does not 
suffer from a problem generally present in identifying a causal relationship: simultaneity 
between crime rates and deterrence measures (Levitt 1996).  Because the policy being analyzed 
did not begin in an effort to reduce crime, this simultaneity does not exist.  Instead, red light 
programs can be thought of as exogenous to crime, since they are implemented by cities 
concerned about driving safety.  Nevertheless, I account for potential endogeneity.  
                                                 
3
 http://www.bouldercolorado.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10671&Itemid=3536 
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CHAPTER 2: MAN VS. MACHINE: AN INVESTIGATION OF SPEEDING 
TICKET DISPARITIES BASED ON GENDER AND RACE 
2.1. Introduction 
Since the seminal work of Becker (1957), which created the theoretical foundation of 
economics of discrimination, researchers have empirically investigated the existence of 
discrimination in a variety of settings ranging from wages to murder trials.
4
  A recent line of 
research along these dimensions is the investigation of racial and gender bias in motor vehicle 
searches and ticketing for driving violations.  This research explores differential treatment by 
police officers, which is costly to innocent individuals of a targeted race or gender (Durlauf 
2006).  Although researchers have primarily focused on determining whether the high proportion 
of African-American vehicle searches and tickets issued for traffic violations are a result of 
discrimination, there also exists research which investigates gender discrimination in police 
behavior.  Some researchers find evidence of racial and/or gender discrimination (Antonovics 
and Knight 2009, Blalock et al. 2007, Makowsky and Stratmann 2009), while others report 
evidence of no discriminatory behavior by law enforcement officers (Knowles et al. 2001, 
Persico and Todd 2007, Grogger and Ridgeway 2006).   
This paper exploits data from automated speed detection to measure differences in the 
proportion of speeding tickets issued to gender and racial groups in Lafayette, Louisiana.  By 
comparing the proportion of women and African-Americans who receive tickets from police 
officers to those who receive tickets from an automated source, it is possible to determine if 
police use gender or race as a determinant in issuing speeding tickets.  I find that police consider 
                                                 
4
 For example, Munnell et al. (1996) control for credit worthiness, labor characteristics, race, gender, age, job 
history, and neighborhood characteristics in identifying the impact of race on mortgage rejection rates.  Argys and 
Mocan (2004) investigate the impact of race and gender on death row commutation by controlling for characteristics 
of the criminal and crime, as well as the governor’s party affiliation, race, and gender. 
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gender and race when deciding to ticket speeders.  In the majority of specifications both effects 
are statistically and economically significant.  This result holds even when accounting for 
potential endogeneity of the location of officers and automated sources. 
There is no history of legal action taken against the police department in Lafayette, 
however, the issue of racial profiling within Louisiana has recently become of interest in the 
media.  For instance, a 2009 report by the American Civil Liberties Union claims there is 
widespread racial profiling in Louisiana, and House Representative Rickey Hardy of Lafayette 
began pushing a bill requiring police to track the race of individuals stopped for traffic violations 
in 2010 (Pierce 2010).  This suggested bill shows that there is a growing concern about the 
behavior of police officers in Lafayette, LA.   
Police may be disproportionately issuing speeding tickets to women and African-
Americans because they enjoy issuing tickets to these groups of individuals, or because they are 
statistically discriminating against them.  If police enjoy issuing tickets to women and/or 
African-Americans, they derive an additional non-monetary benefit by ticketing these 
individuals, which is considered preference-based discrimination.  Proof of the existence of 
preference-based discrimination is the only way a court will overturn a specific practice by 
police (Durlauf 2005).  Differential treatment based on gender (or race) is considered statistical 
discrimination if police officers use gender (or race) as a proxy for a relevant characteristic 
which is difficult to observe.  For example, perhaps police frequently ticket women because, on 
average, they are more likely to pay a speeding ticket fine instead of going to court to contest it 
(Blalock et al. 2007).   
Police officers have a strong incentive to issue tickets which will result in revenues for 
the city, because the city determines the budget of the police department (Makowsky and 
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Stratmann 2009).  If police officers believe that women (or African-Americans) are less likely to 
contest a ticket, they may disproportionately issue tickets to these individuals in order to avoid 
the resulting additional costs.  One additional cost occurs when police officers stop and ticket a 
speeder, because they must spend time writing the ticket, and thus miss other speeders that pass.  
If women are less likely to contest a speeding ticket, it is economically feasible to issue tickets to 
women, because doing so decreases the chance that the officer will have to go to court (which 
would increase the marginal cost of issuing such a ticket).  Similarly, police could target women 
or African-Americans if they believe these drivers are more dangerous or if they believe these 
drivers will be more likely to change their future behavior as a result.  In the context of this 
analysis, it is impossible to distinguish between tastes versus revenue maximizing police 
behavior; however, the first-order issue is whether or not these types of behaviors exist at all.  
Though taste for discrimination cannot be ruled out, later I present evidence that police behave 
rationally in that they issue tickets more frequently to those who speed more than 15 miles an 
hour over the limit (rather than those who were only traveling 5-14 miles an hour above the 
speed limit), which is associated with higher fines. 
Due to the uniqueness of the data, this paper provides a distinct advantage over previous 
literature.  Observing the entire population of speeders is nearly impossible when analyzing the 
speeding behavior of a whole city, however, automated camera tickets are given to every 
speeding car that passes in front of the camera.  Therefore, the automated tickets provide an 
entirely objective measure of the speeding population in a given location, which has not 
previously been used in this type of analysis.  Also, the police data was collected without prior 
knowledge of the police department and contains every ticket issued by police officers during the 
sample period.  Data in this realm of literature is typically obtained as a result of a lawsuit 
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investigating racial bias, but there has not been legal action taken against the police department 
in Lafayette, Louisiana regarding discrimination or racial profiling.  Also, the automated camera 
system being used in Lafayette was installed to improve traffic safety, with no consideration of 
other types of crime reduction or investigation of negative police behavior. 
The next section provides details of existing literature on discrimination in vehicle stops, 
searches, and ticketing.  The data and data collection are described in detail in Section 2.3, 
followed by an in depth discussion of the validity of using automated camera tickets as a 
measure of the speeding population to be compared to police-issued tickets.  Section 2.5 
discusses the methodology of estimation.  Next, Section 2.6 describes the results of the analysis, 
followed by robustness checks in Section 2.7.  Section 2.8 explores potential endogeneity by 
using propensity score analysis and also exploiting changes in daylight, similar to Grogger and 
Ridgeway (2006).  Lastly, the conclusion is in Section 2.9. 
2.2. Literature 
The initial focus of the police behavior literature was to determine whether the greater 
number of vehicle searches with African-American drivers is a result of preference-based 
discrimination, statistical discrimination, or both.  One well-known example is the work of 
Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001), who use traffic stop and search data to investigate whether 
the proportion of vehicle searches that result in finding drugs differs between races.  If the 
proportion of “successful” vehicle searches differs between races, then police are likely 
prejudiced.  The data, taken from a highway in Maryland, illustrate equal success rates for 
searches of motor vehicles driven by blacks and whites, thus implying that police engage in 
statistical, not preference-based discrimination.  These results imply that once a car has been 
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stopped, police are more likely to search if the driver is African-American because on average, it 
is more likely that they will find drugs or contraband.   
Expanding on the methodology used by Knowles et al. (2001), Antonovics and Knight 
(2009) develop a test to more rigorously determine whether police officers act in accordance 
with statistical discrimination or preference-based discrimination.  The authors assume that if 
statistical discrimination is the only cause of racial disparities in the rate of vehicle searches by 
police, there should be no difference in the rate of searches when the officer’s race is taken into 
account.  However, using data from the Boston Police Department, the analysis concludes that if 
the officer’s race is different than the offender’s race, the driver’s vehicle is more likely to be 
searched.  This implies that preference-based discrimination is more likely the explanation for 
racial disparity in vehicle searches.  
 One major issue facing researchers is to find an appropriate measure of the population of 
offenders to compare to the group who are ticketed, searched, or stopped by police.  Grogger and 
Ridgeway (2006) are able to estimate the population at risk of being stopped by police by using 
the concept of a “veil of darkness.”  During the daytime, when race is visible, it is possible that 
police use the race of the driver as a determinant of whether or not to stop a car.  At night it is 
unlikely that police can distinguish between different races, and therefore presumably make 
traffic stops based on actual offenses without regard to the driver’s race.  Using this rationale, if 
the race distribution of drivers stopped at night is different than the distribution stopped during 
the day; this would be evidence that police engage in racial profiling.  A direct comparison of the 
two distributions assumes that driving patterns, driving behavior, and police exposure are the 
same during the day and night.  Since it is unlikely that all driving conditions are identical 
between day and night, Grogger and Ridgeway (2006) exploit information from daylight savings 
10 
 
time.  This provides a way to control for driving patterns, because some times during the day will 
be light during daylight savings time and dark during the rest of the year, while individuals’ 
work schedules (and police patrol schedules) differ by time of day and not by darkness.  Grogger 
and Ridgeway (2006) do not find significant evidence of racial profiling in Oakland, California.  
A similar methodology is used in Section 2.8, to examine the validity of using automated 
cameras as the population measure for police-issued tickets. 
 Although researchers have generally focused on differential treatment and outcomes by 
race, the same investigations can be applied to gender.  One such study by Blalock et al. (2007), 
investigates gender bias by police officers in ticketing traffic offenders.  The authors surveyed 
students at Cornell University and elsewhere, asking individuals if they believed a woman was 
more, less, or equally likely to receive a ticket than a man if both were stopped for speeding 12 
miles over the limit.  The majority of individuals responded that women are less likely to receive 
a speeding ticket than men.  Interestingly, using data from five locations, the authors find that in 
two of the locations men were more likely to receive speeding tickets, but in the other three 
women were actually more likely to receive speeding tickets.  The results are similar when the 
offense is related to vehicle maintenance (non-working headlight, etc.), implying that police are 
more likely to ticket women than men, since women tend to receive more tickets in the majority 
of locations analyzed.  Persico and Todd (2007) generalize the application of their own method 
using motor vehicle stop and search data, and find no gender discrimination by police.
5
  
 Makowsky and Stratmann (2009) focus more generally on what factors police officers 
consider when issuing speeding tickets and fines.  Massachusetts law allows police officers to 
use discretion in deciding whether to issue a warning or ticket to cars stopped for speeding as 
                                                 
5
 Persico and Todd (2007) focus mainly on racial discrimination, but also investigate gender discrimination.  Again, 
they find no evidence of racial discrimination. 
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well as in determining the amount of the fine if a ticket is issued.  Though state law describes a 
formula to be used when issuing speeding fines, officers generally deviate from this formulation.  
According to their results, police officers are more likely to issue fines and to issue larger fines to 
individuals who are travelling at higher speeds, and also those who are less likely to contest their 
ticket.  If a ticket is contested, police officers must spend time in court and face the risk that no 
revenue will be collected from the issued ticket.  In general, individuals from other cities or 
states are less likely to return for their court date because of the higher opportunity cost of doing 
so.  Similarly, police officers are more likely to issue fines in areas where a tax increase was 
recently defeated by voters and they are less likely to fine drivers in areas where tourism is a 
large source of revenue.  There is evidence that Hispanics are more likely to be fined, but there is 
no difference in fines issued to African-American drivers, which may be a product of widespread 
knowledge of the study and data collection by the police department (Makowsky and Stratmann 
2009).  Females are less likely to receive a fine than males and the likelihood of a fine decreases 
with age. 
 In most of the existing literature on this topic, analyses are based necessarily on post-
lawsuit data (Grogger and Ridgeway 2006, Blalock et al. 2007, Knowles et al. 2001, Persico and 
Todd 2007, and Makowsky and Stratmann 2009).  In many instances, the public has suspected 
unfair treatment of African-Americans and as a result filed lawsuits against the city or police 
department.  Typically, data collection on police behavior begins after the lawsuit is filed.  A 
complication may arise if police officers are aware of the lawsuit and change their behavior 
because of the repercussions of issuing tickets or conducting vehicle searches based on the 
drivers’ race.  Due to this potential change in police behavior, studies which employ post-lawsuit 
data provide a lower-bound estimate of the extent of racial/gender profiling.  That is, if police 
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officers change their behavior in order to avoid punishment or stigma, the results obtained from 
the analysis of post-behavioral change data will reflect a lower amount of racial or gender bias 
than truly exists.  The dataset used in this paper has a distinct advantage because the data were 
collected after the speeding tickets were given, with no prior knowledge by police officers. 
Another common issue in the literature on traffic stops is nonreporting (Grogger and 
Ridgeway 2006, Knowles et al. 2001, Persico and Todd 2007), which occurs when the data is 
collected by police officers as they issue tickets or stop vehicles, but they do not record all 
incidents.  This issue mainly arises in conjunction with post-lawsuit data, because police officers 
are asked to record all stops, not only the ones which result in a ticket.  These studies generally 
report results which are conditional upon being stopped (likelihood of being issued a speeding 
ticket, given that you are stopped by the police, for example), and therefore problems with 
interpreting these results arise if the population of stops is not reported.  Audit studies have 
found a large discrepancy between actual stops and reported stops, especially in initial data 
collection, where up to 70% of stops were not recorded (Grogger and Ridgeway 2006).  The 
benefit of the data used in the present study is that the nonreporting problem is not an issue 
because I have the universe of all issued tickets and since the results are not conditional upon 
being stopped. 
When using stop and search data, some form of statistical discrimination likely plays a 
role in police behavior.  If police use race as a proxy for carrying drugs or weapons, they may be 
more likely to pull over an individual of a certain race with the intention of searching the car.  In 
other words, the official reason for police to stop a car may be for a violation, but in reality the 
police suspect there is some contraband in the vehicle.  If speeding is used as an excuse to stop 
cars suspected of carrying contraband, more African-Americans will be issued speeding tickets 
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due to this type of profiling and not as a result of racial bias.  However, police are less likely to 
use speeding as a reason to pull over a driver and search the vehicle than they are to use visible 
vehicle maintenance issues or the observation of a driver or passenger without a seatbelt, 
specifically in high crime areas.  Police consider speeding a serious offense in and of itself, and 
assume that vehicle maintenance issues are more strongly correlated with likelihood to carry 
illegal substances or weapons.  Furthermore, drug crimes and gun violence are not a critical 
concern for the city of Lafayette, so this type of statistical discrimination should not play a major 
role in stops within the city.
6
 
One potential data issue that is not present in other literature arises because Lafayette is a 
relatively small city, where the majority of officers are white males.  If police officers happen to 
stop individuals they know personally (e.g. another white male), and let them go without a ticket, 
the results may create an impression of race or gender bias when it is actually a result of 
corruption, based on personal relationships.  Even if this was the case, the effect should be minor 
since the city is large enough that police officers do not know everyone.  Also, the magnitude of 
the results here are substantial enough that it is unlikely that they are driven by this type of 
behavior. 
 This paper focuses specifically on speeding tickets.  Speeding tickets given by automated 
cameras in Lafayette, Louisiana provide a benchmark of the population of speeders, to which 
police-given tickets can be compared.  Though the exact type of discrimination cannot be 
determined, this study can explore whether discrimination by police occurs in issuing speeding 
tickets, and will provide a theory of why this discrimination may exist. 
                                                 
6
 The Lafayette Police Department provided the information in the preceding paragraph through personal 
communication; specific behavior within the city of Lafayette, excluding highways. 
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2.3. Data Source and Descriptive Statistics 
Lafayette began implementing automated speed cameras in October 2007, with the help 
of Redflex, the company who created and helps to run these programs across the U.S. and 
Australia.  The dataset is compiled of speeding tickets given by the automated cameras and all 
speeding tickets given by the Lafayette Police Department.  Specific details of the data and how 
they were collected are in the following subsections. 
2.3.1. The City of Lafayette 
Lafayette, Louisiana is a city in southern Louisiana with a population of 133,985, about 
60 miles west of Baton Rouge (Census 2000).  About 65% of Lafayette residents are white and 
about 30% African-American.  Lafayette encompasses five zip codes, 70501, 70503, 70506, 
70507, and 70508.  Each of these areas has quite different characteristics.  Specifically, 69.2% of 
70501 residents are African-American, as opposed to 70503 and 70508, where less than 10% of 
residents are African-American (Census 2000).  The gender composition throughout the city 
does not vary significantly between zip codes, ranging from 47.5% male to 48.8% male (Census 
2000).  However, income disparity seems to follow a similar pattern as the city’s racial 
composition.  Per capita income in the northern area of the city, where there are many more 
African-American residents, is the lowest, at $12,873, while in the other areas it is higher than 
$25,000 (Census 2000).  Since the socio-economic characteristics of some of Lafayette’s zip 
codes are drastically different, and some are very similar, throughout the remaining paper these 
zip codes are grouped as follows: 70501 and 70507 compose Area 1, 70503 and 70508 comprise 
Area 2, and 70506 is Area 3. 
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2.3.2. Lafayette City Police Issued Tickets 
The Lafayette City Court database contains every misdemeanor ticket given by an officer 
in the Lafayette police department within the city limits.
7
  The database includes information on 
the ticketed individual, the badge and name of the police officer who wrote the ticket, time, 
place, legal speed limit, and speed traveled.  Information specific to the offender is taken from 
the driver’s license and by the officer’s observation.  More specifically, name, gender, age, and 
home address are printed on Louisiana licenses, but race is not.  Officers must individually 
determine the race of the driver, and this information is provided in the dataset.  The 
interpretation by the officer is reliable because officers generally ask each speeder about their 
race.  Also, for those drivers with multiple offenses, the personal information about the speeder 
is cross-checked when entered into the database.   
The majority of officers in the Lafayette Police Department are white males.  Even more 
strikingly, less than 3% of tickets were given by officers who are not white males.  Due to lack 
of variation of officer characteristics it is not useful to control for the officer’s race or gender. 
There are two different types of police officers who issue speeding tickets; traffic officers 
and patrol officers.  Though the data do not specify the difference between these officers, in 
some instances, it is obvious that the officer on duty was sent specifically to target speeders 
because he/she gives numerous tickets in the same location in a short period of time.  
Supervisors tell these traffic officers where to locate; within either north Lafayette or south 
Lafayette.  More specifically, when complaints have been filed about speeders in specific 
neighborhoods or areas within this north/south distinction, traffic officers are told to focus on 
                                                 
7
 In the Lafayette City Court computer database, speeding violations are specifically coded as 86-incident number.  
When a speeding ticket is reduced to a lesser charge, it is coded as a speeding ticket amended to something else 
(seatbelt violation for example).  Tickets given outside of the city limits or given by State Troopers in the city limits 
are not in this database.    
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these areas for the duration (or the majority) of their shift.  Although traffic officers issue the 
most speeding tickets, on occasion a patrol officer will observe someone speeding in their area, 
and give a ticket.  Also, there are occasions where patrol officers have complaints in their 
respective patrol areas about speeders, and thus are sent to focus on speeding in these areas for a 
certain shift.  These patrol officers are sent out to north, south, east, or west Lafayette for each 
shift.  Tickets given by patrol officers who are not targeting speeders are obviously more 
sporadic because of the nature of their assignments. 
Police officers use discretion in issuing speeding tickets, but Lafayette City Court sets 
fines.  This is vital, especially in reference to existing research where police motives in issuing 
tickets may also affect the fine amounts.  Therefore, differences in fines are not relevant in police 
behavior. 
2.3.3. Automated Tickets 
Lafayette Consolidated Government, and not the police department, made the decision to 
implement the Redflex program
8
 and oversee its technology in an attempt to improve traffic 
safety.  The speed cameras are available in two forms: a fixed camera at traffic lights to catch 
both speeders and vehicles that run red lights, and also in “speed vans” which park at different 
locations throughout the city to catch speeders.  The program began in October 2007 with two 
speed vans giving citations at about 35 different locations in Lafayette.   
Though the automated ticketing system still continues today, the sample period used in 
this paper only extends to February 2008.  Over the sample period, October 2007 to February 
2008, the speed vans gave citations at 64 different locations.  The Department of Traffic and 
Transportation, a department within Lafayette Consolidated Government, determined acceptable 
                                                 
8
 The police department did not take control of the program until months after the sample period considered for this 
analysis. 
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locations from accident statistics and individual requests for vans to be placed in specific areas 
with a speeding problem.  Once the requested locations were verified to be safe for a van 
location, they were added to the list, and continue to be added and removed over the entire 
sample.  On a particular day and at specific times, the vans are told to locate at randomly selected 
locations from the overall list. 
In December of 2007, automated cameras were placed at four traffic lights in Lafayette.  
By February of 2008, there were seven stoplight cameras.  These cameras were installed at the 
intersections with the highest crash ratings, based on an analysis of about 30,000 crashes 
(Lafayette Consolidated Government).   
The cameras on the vans and traffic lights are completely automatic, and take 
photographs whenever they detect a car that is traveling faster than the speed limit.  As soon as 
the cameras detect a speeder, four photographs are taken: one of the driver, one of the car’s 
license plate, and two of the general area of the car at the time of the violation.  Once an 
individual has been “caught” by the speed cameras, the photos are electronically sent to a vendor 
in charge of compiling information based on the license plate of the car.  The vendor then 
assembles the information in the Redflex website, the database for Lafayette Consolidated 
Governments’ records of tickets.  Once the violation is finalized a paper ticket is issued to the 
car’s registered owner (the assumed driver of the car). 
The Redflex database contains every ticket given by automated traffic light cameras as 
well as those tickets given by speed vans.  The ticket is sent to the registered owner of the car, 
who is assumed to be the photographed driver.  Lafayette Consolidated Government officials 
estimate that about five to ten percent of the time, the person driving is not the car’s registered 
owner.  When someone is issued a ticket, but they were not actually driving, they have two 
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options: pay the ticket anyway, or refute the ticket by naming the actual driver of the car.  When 
a ticket is refuted, it is reissued to the individual who was named as the driver.  It is more 
common for individuals to just pay the ticket instead of arguing, especially instances where a 
young person was driving a parent’s car, etc.9   
The information available from the automated tickets is: name and home address of the 
registered owner of the vehicle, location, time and date of the ticket, legal speed limit, and speed 
traveled.  There are also four pictures on each ticket, most importantly, two of the driver,
10
 from 
which gender and race can be inferred.  Since automated tickets are easier to give and require 
less manpower, they are issued much more frequently than police tickets.  During the period of 
October 2007 to February 2008 the average number of automated tickets is 3,100 per month. 
2.3.4. Data 
 The sample includes every speeding ticket issued between 6:00 A.M. and 6:59 P.M. from 
October 2007 to February 2008.  The police portion of the data includes every ticket issued by a 
Lafayette city police officer within the city limits.  Since the number of automated tickets had to 
be handled record by record, and each individual’s characteristics had to be manually inferred, a 
15% random sample was chosen from the population of automated tickets.  Because of little or 
no visibility of individual drivers at night, only daytime tickets are used in the main analysis so 
that race and gender can be identified.  In a later analysis, a longer time period of police-issued 
tickets are utilized, to take advantage of differences in visibility in a similar manner to Grogger 
and Ridgeway (2006). 
                                                 
9
The information in the preceding paragraph was provided through personal communication with Tony Trammel, 
Director of the Department of Traffic and Transportation.  Instances when a ticket was refuted can be observed in 
the data because a letter is added to the citation number every time the ticket is contested and reassigned.  This 
occurs rarely, in about 7% of the sample. 
10
 One is a close up of the driver’s seat, the other taken from a further distance which has the entire front of the car in 
view. 
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Table 2.1 lists descriptive statistics of all ticket data.  About 26% of ticketed drivers are 
African-American and 46% are female.  Half of the tickets are given in Area 1, the area with a 
higher proportion of African-American residents.  The average ticketed driver was traveling 
about 51 miles an hour, with 79% of ticketed drivers speeding between 5 and 15 miles over the 
legal limit.  
To provide a sense of the differences between tickets given by police and the automated 
system, Table 2.2 lists descriptive statistics broken down by area and source of ticket.  Police 
issue a significantly higher proportion of speeding tickets to African-Americans than the 
automated sources in Area 1.  In the other areas, police issue the same proportion of speeding 
tickets to African-Americans as the automated sources.  However, there is an obvious difference 
in the proportion of tickets issued to women by automated cameras compared to police officers.  
In Areas 1 and 3 this difference is statistically significant; where police give 51% and 58% of 
tickets to women, respectively, but automated sources give about 40% in both areas. 
2.3.5. Motivation for Police Behavior 
Merely because police issue a disproportionate amount of tickets to women and African-
Americans does not mean that they are engaging in discriminatory behavior.  Perhaps there is 
another difference in how tickets are issued, such as the cost of issuing tickets.  The automated 
cameras can easily issue tickets to every car that passes, but police must spend time to issue a 
ticket, and while issuing tickets they must let other speeders pass unpunished.   
Table 2.2 illustrates this more clearly by looking at the means of the speed-related 
variables.  For instance, the variables which measure how fast an individual was traveling (Less 
than 10 Miles Over, 11-15 Miles Over, 16-20 Miles Over and More Than 20 Miles Over) 
illustrate an important difference between the automatically issued tickets and police tickets: the  
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Table 2.1:  Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Police 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the ticket was given by 
a police officer, 0 otherwise. 
2,817 .36 .48 
Automated 
Dummy Variable (=1) if ticket was given by an 
automated camera, 0 otherwise. 
2,817 .64 .48 
African-
American 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the ticketed driver was 
African-American, 0 otherwise. 
2,408 .26 .44 
Female Dummy Variable (=1) if the ticketed driver was 
female, 0 otherwise. 
2,431 .46 .50 
Area 1 Dummy Variable (=1) if ticket was given in 
Area 1 (zip codes 70501 and 70507), 0 
otherwise. 
2,799 .50 .50 
Area 2 Dummy Variable (=1) if ticket was given in 
Area 2 (zip codes 70503 and 70508), 0 
otherwise. 
2,799 .20 .40 
Area 3 Dummy Variable (=1) if ticket was given in 
Area 3 (zip code 70506), 0 otherwise. 
2,799 .30 .46 
HalfMth 1 Dummy Variable (=1) if violation was given in 
the first half of the month, 0 otherwise. 
2,817 .49 .50 
RushHour Dummy Variable (=1) if violation was given 
between 7:00 and 8:59 AM or 5:00 and 6:59 PM, 
0 otherwise. 
2,817 .30 .46 
Legal Speed The speed limit where the ticket was given. 2,795 38.87 9.06 
Less than 
10 Miles 
Over 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver was traveling 
10 miles or less over the limit, 0 otherwise. 2,795 .41 .49 
11-15 Miles 
Over 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver was traveling 
11-15 miles over the limit, 0 otherwise. 
2,795 .38 .48 
16-20 Miles 
Over 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver was traveling 
16-20 miles over the limit, 0 otherwise. 
2,795 .17 .38 
More Than 
20 Miles 
Over 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver was traveling 
21 or more miles over the limit, 0 otherwise. 
2,795 .04 .21 
Speed Trav The speed the driver was traveling when given a 
ticket. 
2,795 51.23 8.77 
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Table 2.2:  Means and Standard Deviation, by Area and Ticket Type 
 Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 
 Police Automated Police Automated Police Automated 
African-
American 
.38** 
(.49) 
[401] 
.32 
(.47) 
[796] 
.14 
(.35) 
[231] 
.14 
(.34) 
[257] 
.21 
(.41) 
[346] 
.21 
(.41) 
[359] 
Female .51** 
(.50) 
[402] 
.39 
(.49) 
[802] 
.55 
(.50) 
[228] 
.50 
(.50) 
[256] 
.58** 
(.49) 
[349] 
.40 
(.49) 
[376] 
Legal Speed 
Limit 
29.48** 
(7.07) 
[398] 
41.84 
(5.13) 
[1009] 
36** 
(4.01) 
[225] 
39.43 
(8.91) 
[325] 
30.81** 
(7.47) 
[343] 
47.38 
(7.86) 
[482] 
Less than 10 
Miles Over 
.01** 
(.09) 
[398] 
.56 
(.50) 
[1009] 
.04** 
(.19) 
[225] 
.72 
(.45) 
[325] 
.03** 
(.18) 
[343] 
.65 
(.48) 
[482] 
11-15 Miles 
Over 
.37 
(.48) 
[398] 
.38 
(.49) 
[1009] 
.38** 
(.49) 
[225] 
.24 
(.43) 
[325] 
.61** 
(.49) 
[343] 
.30 
(.46) 
[482] 
16-20 Miles 
Over 
.49** 
(.50) 
[398] 
.05 
(.22) 
[1009] 
.43** 
(.50) 
[225] 
.03 
(.16) 
[325] 
.31** 
(.46) 
[343] 
.04 
(.19) 
[482] 
More than 21 
Miles Over 
.14** 
(.34) 
[398] 
.01 
(.08) 
[1009] 
.16** 
(.36) 
[225] 
.01 
(.10) 
[325] 
.05** 
(.22) 
[343] 
.01 
(.10) 
[482] 
Speed Trav 46.33** 
(7.62) 
[398] 
52.61 
(6.62) 
[1009] 
52.54** 
(4.94) 
[225] 
48.72 
(9.96) 
[325] 
45.79** 
(8.37) 
[343] 
57.47 
(9.37) 
[482] 
Half Month 1 .41** 
(.49) 
[403] 
.49 
(.50) 
[1009] 
.49 
(.50) 
[231] 
.56 
(.50) 
[325] 
.57** 
(.50) 
[349] 
.44 
(.50) 
[482] 
RushHour .56** 
(.50) 
[403] 
.24 
(.42) 
[1009] 
.09** 
(.28) 
[231] 
.30 
(.46) 
[325] 
.38** 
(.49) 
[349] 
.27 
(.45) 
[482] 
Standard deviations are in (parentheses).  The number of observations is in [parentheses]. * 
denotes a significant difference between the automated and police means at a 10% level, ** 
denotes significance at a 5% level. 
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majority of automated tickets are issued at lower severities of speeding.
11
  Conversely, most 
police issued tickets are given in the 16-20 Miles Over range.  Merely 8% of all police issued 
tickets are given to motor vehicles traveling only 5-10 miles above the speed limit.  Police stop 
and ticket individuals who are traveling at higher speeds because the cost of stopping speeders is 
the same regardless of speed, but the marginal benefit is greater for more severe offenders.  
Individuals who receive tickets for higher speeds must pay a higher fine,
12
 which results in 
higher revenues for the City of Lafayette, and in turn, likely a higher budget for the police 
department (Makowsky and Stratmann 2009).  
 Figures 2.1 and 2.2 further illustrate the different ticket issuing behaviors of police and 
automated sources.  In Figure 2.1, the tendency for police officers to ticket higher speeders is 
easily observable, as the majority of tickets seem to be issued between 13 and 17 miles over the 
limit.  Tickets issued for speeders traveling between 15 and 17 miles over the limit are associated 
with significantly higher fines than tickets issued for violations of 5 to 14 miles over the limit, 
which provides some incentive for officers to focus on more extreme speeders.  Some may argue 
that police officers ticket higher speeders because they are more dangerous, however, there is 
unlikely to be a difference in the level of danger between speeders traveling 14 miles over the 
limit and 15.  Despite this fact, the number of tickets issued by police to speeders jumps as the 
speeding severity changes from 14 miles over to 15 miles over.  Along these lines, Garrett and 
Wagner (2009) use annual data from North Carolina counties to show that police issue 
significantly more tickets in years following a decline in revenue, which also illustrates the 
importance of fiscal concerns when issuing tickets. 
                                                 
11
 Though, note that neither police officers nor the automated system issue tickets to speeders traveling 5 miles or 
less over the speed limit. 
12
 Lafayette City Court bases fines on the severity of the speeding violation, however, individuals who have received 
prior traffic violations or committed the violation in a school or construction zone will have higher fines all else 
equal. 
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Figure 2.1:  Relative Frequency of Police-Issued Tickets by Speed Over Limit 
 
 
Figure 2.2:  Relative Frequency of Automatic-Issued Tickets by Speed Over Limit 
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Figure 2.2 illustrates the relative frequency of speeding tickets issued by speed over the 
limit for the automated cameras (speed vans and traffic lights).  In Figure 2.2, the majority of 
tickets are issued to drivers traveling between 8 and 10 miles over the limit, 5-9 miles less than 
police-issued tickets.  This difference in police officer behavior from the automated ticket 
“behavior” implies that police use different criteria when issuing speeding tickets than automated 
cameras.   
2.4. Validity of Automated Tickets as a Measure of the Population 
2.4.1. Automated versus Police-Issued 
 In order for the automated issued tickets to provide a valid comparison group to police 
issued tickets, both ticketing sources must measure the same driving (speeding) population.  
Police observe the population of speeders, but are only able to ticket a select number, while the 
automated cameras ticket the entire population of speeders objectively.  If police do not observe 
the same population, any difference in ticketing may be the result of the different population of 
speeders and not due to a difference in ticketing behavior.  There are some procedural 
differences that need to be considered, but overall, the populations being measured are shown to 
be comparable.  I first provide convincing descriptive evidence below, and then in Section 2.8 
more explicitly account for endogeneity concerns with propensity score matching and 
exploitation of police visibility using daylight savings time. 
 The first step to show the equivalence of the police-observed population and the 
automated-observed population is to understand the locating procedures of both ticketing 
sources.  If police have the freedom to patrol where they please, they may choose to target areas 
where certain groups travel.  For example, if police have a preference for ticketing African-
Americans, and locate where more African-Americans travel, more African-Americans will 
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receive tickets.  If the automated tickets are not given in those specific areas, the amount of 
tickets issued to African-Americans by police would be higher in comparison to automated 
tickets in other areas, but this would reflect the differential exposure rates, not police 
discrimination.
13
 
In the case of tickets issued by police, the data only specify the location of the violation, 
but not how or why the officer was located there.  As discussed in the data section, both patrol 
officers and traffic officers are told which areas of Lafayette to locate in for their shifts.  There is 
always an officer in each area of the city.
14
  Therefore, how police are located to give tickets 
should not be influenced by preferences to ticket a specific type of individual, because they are 
told in which areas to locate for each shift.   
 As previously discussed, the automated cameras come in two forms: fixed cameras at 
traffic lights and mobile vans.  Although the mobile automated cameras are randomly assigned to 
a location during the day, the locations themselves are not completely random.  First of all, only 
areas where it is safe to place a van can be placed on the master list.  In this context, “safe” is 
used only in reference to van parking; streets with no shoulder or sidewalk may be considered 
“unsafe” because there is a significant risk of danger from passing traffic merely by parking 
                                                 
13
 Another scenario may initially seem plausible as well, motivated by the difference in means of speed limit by 
ticketing type, as seen in Table 2.2.  Since automated cameras ticket on streets with a higher average speed limit 
than police, perhaps these automated cameras are being placed on busier roads used for commuting, while police are 
locating in neighborhoods and school areas, where there are other safety concerns besides speeding.  If this is the 
case, and women and African-Americans are more likely to travel in neighborhoods, while men and whites are more 
likely to travel on the busy commuting routes, then the results herein are being driven by this fact and not police 
discrimination.  This scenario cannot be the driving force of these results however, because the neighborhoods and 
school zones where police are locating are public schools with a majority of white students, and white 
neighborhoods.  Therefore, if different ticketing populations were the true source of the differential ticketing, whites 
would receive more tickets from police than automated sources, the opposite of the present findings.  Though there 
is not as simple of an explanation regarding gender, it is unlikely that this type of selection could be driving the 
entire result. 
14
 The Lafayette Police Department provided the information in the preceding paragraph through personal 
communication. 
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there.
15
  However, this should not be a major issue.  Redflex states that its mobile cameras can be 
used, “on suburban streets, as well as on higher-speed thoroughfares, either by parking in a safe 
position on the roadway or nearby for added safety” (Redflex, 2010).  Since safe locations 
include different types of roads, there should not be a problem with only using “safe” locations.  
Similarly, it is feasible that police will also search for speeders in a “safe” spot, despite the fact 
that this is not explicitly stated in police procedure. 
 The other source of non-randomness in speed van locations is that the initial acceptable 
list comprised areas known to have speeding problems; and as such, tended to be busier streets 
instead of neighborhood roads.  Similarly, because the goal of this program was to reduce 
speeding, the areas that would have the most impact on speeders tended to be busier city streets, 
as compared to neighborhood roads.  This can be seen in Table 2.2, where the majority of tickets 
issued by automated sources are issued on streets with relatively high speed limits.  Over time, 
because individuals could request a van be placed in their neighborhood, these neighborhood 
locations were added to the list, but the number of tickets issued on busier streets is much larger 
than the number of tickets issued on streets with lower legal speed limits. 
 Police also locate on busy streets, but they tend to focus more on ticketing speeders in 
neighborhoods, and specifically near schools.  In school zones, the legal speed a car can travel is 
much lower than larger city streets.  This is one reason why the average speed limit for police 
issued tickets is less than the mean speed for automated issued tickets.  Police locate in 
neighborhoods, but generally on streets with high traffic volume; streets with low speed limits 
                                                 
15
 The important distinction here is that vans or police officers may still choose to locate in high crime areas, if those 
areas also suffer from speeding drivers. 
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that are used by a large number of travelers.  This does not affect the validity of the comparison, 
because vans locate nearby these same areas.
16
  
The ideal measure of the speeding population that police observe would be to consider 
drivers at the exact locations where police issue tickets, but this is not feasible for multiple 
reasons.  The most obvious of these reasons is that if automated sources and police chose to 
locate at the exact same locations, they would not be maximizing speed-deterrence.  If a police 
officer is traveling to a designated spot to target speeders, and upon arriving sees a mobile van, 
he/she will most likely travel to a nearby street, or nearby block.  In the sample, as can be seen 
from Figure 2.3, there are some instances where an automated camera and police officer ticketed 
a speeder in the exact same location, however, it is more common for tickets to be issued nearby, 
generally within a block or two.  This does not create a bias, because individuals who drive in 
neighborhoods also must drive on the busier city streets where vans are located nearby.   
 Figure 2.3 shows the city of Lafayette, with dots representing the frequency of tickets 
issued by each ticketing source, at specific locations.  Empty dots represent police-issued tickets, 
the darkest filled dots represent speed van issued tickets, and lighter filled dots show locations 
where there are fixed traffic light cameras which issue tickets.  The dots are sized proportionately 
to the frequency of tickets that were issued at that location.
17
  For example, in many instances 
only one ticket is issued in a location and these dots are the smallest on Figure 2.3.  Similarly, 
there are relatively few locations where more than 100 tickets are issued during the range of data 
collection for the sample.  This generally occurs when tickets are issued by automated sources, 
especially traffic light cameras, but there are a few police issued locations where this is also true.   
                                                 
16
 When school zones are excluded from the analysis, the police coefficient is actually larger than before. 
17
 Size of the bubbles was determined based on the equation:  Size = (Frequency of Tickets Issued / Maximum 
Frequency of Tickets Issued at One Location). 
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Figure 2.3:  Overall Sample of Tickets 
 
The western portion of the map, which includes zip codes 70506 and 70503, illustrates a 
fairly equal coverage of mobile vans and police officers.  This is extremely close to the ideal of 
having speeding tickets issued by automated sources and police officers in the exact same 
locations.  Since there are automated vans and police officers in near proximity to one another, it 
is feasible to assume that both ticketing sources are observing the same population of speeders, 
when controlling for time of day, day of the week, etc.   
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In other areas of the city this statement needs more supportive evidence than the map 
alone.  The northern portion of the map, above Interstate 10, is zip code 70507, where the only 
source of automated tickets is one traffic light camera at the northern city limit.  The rest of the 
speeding tickets issued in this area are issued by police.  Because this area of the city has a large 
number of African-American residents, it is no surprise that speeding tickets issued in this zip 
code will be issued disproportionately to African-Americans.  Since there are unusually few 
automated tickets issued in this area, there is not an accurate measure of the speeding population, 
and thus, excluding this area from the remaining analysis is necessary.  The exclusion of this area 
does not impact the validity of the results, because this results in a sample size reduction of only 
77 tickets.  Similarly, this is a relatively small portion of the overall city with the bulk of the area 
being residential.  The main commercial areas and majority of city neighborhoods are south of 
Interstate 10.  For these reasons, the remaining analysis will not include tickets issued in the zip 
code of 70507. 
Though there is a greater discrepancy between police and automated ticket locations of 
the remaining zip codes, 70501 and 70508, tickets are still issued within blocks of each other.  
The vans and police officers issue tickets in the same neighborhoods, or a police officer may 
issue tickets within a neighborhood while a van issues tickets on a nearby street where those 
residents must travel to get home.  Therefore, automated tickets remain a valid measure of the 
speeding population. 
Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 provide the same evidence as Figure 2.3, but they exclude tickets 
issued by traffic light cameras.  Figure 2.4 is the overall ticket sample, while Figures 2.5 and 2.6 
show tickets only where race or gender is observable.  These four maps show that police tickets 
and tickets generated by automated sources are issued in nearly identical locations. 
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Figure 2.4:  Overall Sample of Tickets Excluding Traffic-Light Issued Tickets 
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Figure 2.5: Tickets Used in the Race Estimation Sample 
Figure 2.6: Tickets Used in the Gender Estimation Sample 
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2.4.2. Automated Tickets: Vans and Traffic Light Cameras 
If drivers behave differently at traffic lights, then using traffic light cameras as a 
comparable measure of the speeding population will not be accurate.  Perhaps individuals are 
more cautious and slow down when crossing an intersection, while they speed on other stretches 
of the same road.  Similarly, residents of Lafayette are generally aware of which intersections 
have a traffic light camera, so it is possible that individuals change their driving behavior in these 
areas in order to avoid a fine.
18
  If women and African-Americans are more adverse to receiving 
and paying a fine, then they may avoid intersections with traffic cameras or may be more 
cautious and drive more slowly in these areas.  If this is the case, a low proportion of automated 
tickets given to African-Americans and women may reflect this change in behavior, rendering 
the comparison between police tickets and automated tickets invalid.   
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 illustrate that drivers do behave differently when driving past a speed 
van camera and a traffic light camera.  While the majority of speed van issued speeding tickets 
are issued to individuals driving between 6 and 16 miles over the limit, more than 60% of the 
traffic light issued speeding tickets are given to drivers traveling between 8 and 10 miles over the 
limit.   
Functionally, speed vans provide a more accurate comparison to police officers.  Speed 
vans move around Lafayette randomly and individuals cannot predict their locations, nor are they 
significantly easier to identify than a police car.  Therefore, drivers should behave in the same 
manner around police cars and speed vans.  For the reasons listed above, it seems likely that 
driver behavior around speed vans is more similar to their behavior around police officers than 
their behavior at intersections with traffic light cameras. 
                                                 
18
 As in Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004), where they find individuals do alter behavior in order to avoid an increase in 
a fine for running a red light.  It is not hard to imagine this same behavior in order to avoid a speeding ticket.  
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Figure 2.7:  Relative Frequency of Speed Van-Issued Tickets by Speed Over Limit 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8:  Relative Frequency of Traffic Light Camera-Issued Tickets by Speed Over 
Limit 
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The estimation methods and results are discussed in the following sections, but due to the 
differences between traffic light cameras and police issued tickets, traffic light tickets are not 
included in the main specifications.
19
   
2.5. Methods 
 The ideal way to investigate if police give speeding tickets differentially based on gender 
or race is to have information on the entire population of speeders, then to compare the 
population of speeders with those who are ticketed.  If the racial and gender composition of 
speeders who are ticketed by police is different than the racial and gender composition of the 
entire population of speeders, police are treating individuals differently based on gender and/or 
race.  However, observing the entire population of speeders is costly, and nearly impossible 
when looking at the speeding behavior of a whole city.  Alternatively, because the automated 
tickets are given to every speeding car that crosses in front of the camera, the automated ticket 
system provides a measure of the speeding population in a given location.  This also provides an 
advantage over previous literature, where the population measures are not completely 
objective.
20
  If police do not consider race or gender when they issue tickets, then the proportion 
of tickets issued to certain sub-groups of the population (such as females or African-Americans) 
should not differ between tickets issued by police and tickets issued by vans or light cameras.   
I will use individual level tickets to investigate police behavior in issuing speeding 
tickets.  Thus, the estimation will pose the question: Given that the driver was caught speeding 
and issued a ticket, is the probability of being black (or female) the same regardless of the  
 
                                                 
19
 When traffic light cameras are included, the results are qualitatively the same.  These can be provided upon 
request. 
20
 For example, Grogger and Ridgeway use tickets issued at night as a population measure, but police can likely still 
observe car type, which may be correlated with race.  Therefore, this may not be a completely objective measure of 
the population. 
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ticketing source, that is 
  (     |             )     (     |                )? 
The analysis will be performed at the individual level, with the dependent variable a 
dummy equal to 1 if the ticketed individual is African-American and 0 otherwise (or 
female/male).  The advantage of the individual-level analysis is that the richness of the data will 
allow for control of most factors that police may use to decide whether or not to ticket an 
individual, such as severity of the speed violation, the speed limit where the ticket was given, as 
well as other determinants of ticketing, which include the day of the week, and the location of 
the infraction.  The specification is depicted by Equation (1) 
(1)         
            
where    is equal to 1 if the recipient is black, and zero otherwise (or equal to 1 if the 
recipient is female and 0 otherwise),    includes specific characteristics of the violation, and      
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ticket was given by a police officer and 0 otherwise (if the 
ticket was given by an automated source).  In this specification, if the coefficient of the dummy 
variable for a police-given ticket ( ) is positive and statistically significant, this implies that race 
(or gender) does play a role in a police officer’s decision to pull over and ticket a speeder. 
2.6. Results 
Table 2.3 shows the results of estimating Equation (1), using only tickets issued by police 
officers and speed vans.  Each column presents the marginal effects estimated for each zip code 
individually.  There is no significant effect of police for African-American tickets, but it is more 
likely that a ticketed individual will be female if the ticket was issued by police for two zip 
codes.  Conclusions should not be drawn immediately from this analysis, because the sample  
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Table 2.3:  Probit Marginal Effects by Individual Zip Code 
 Dependent Variable: African-
American 
Dependent Variable: Female 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Area 70501 70503 70506 70508 70501 70503 70506 70508 
Police .143 
(.095) 
-.014 
(.083) 
.056 
(.067) 
-.011 
(.068) 
.142 
(.101) 
.275* 
(.141) 
.221** 
(.080) 
.010 
(.109) 
HalfMonth 1 -.012 
(.044) 
-.174** 
(.071) 
.035 
(.034) 
-.006 
(.040) 
-.028 
(.047) 
.132 
(.112) 
.019 
(.042) 
.070 
(.062) 
Rush Hour -.011 
(.051) 
.272** 
(.087) 
.030 
(.037) 
.020 
(.059) 
-.032 
(.053) 
.039 
(.103) 
.013 
(.045) 
.122 
(.080) 
LegalSpeed .002 
(.004) 
-.004 
(.004) 
.002 
(.002) 
.008** 
(.003) 
-.003 
(.004) 
.002 
(.006) 
-.002 
(.003) 
-.007 
(.005) 
11-15 Miles 
Over 
-.017 
(.072) 
-.030 
(.055) 
.016 
(.051) 
.082 
(.073) 
.046 
(.079) 
-.241** 
(.099) 
-.065 
(.063) 
.063 
(.103) 
16-20 Miles 
Over 
-.037 
(.082) 
- .036 
(.066) 
.093 
(.088) 
.032 
(.091) 
-.283 
(.180) 
-.050 
(.079) 
-.008 
(.123) 
More than 
20 Miles 
Over 
-.047 
(.104) 
- -.043 
(.102) 
.125 
(.122) 
.060 
(.121) 
- -.167 
(.120) 
-.039 
(.137) 
Tuesday -.002 
(.070) 
.109 
(.146) 
.081 
(.070) 
-.008 
(.063) 
.012 
(.075) 
.114 
(.163) 
-.071 
(.073) 
.010 
(.100) 
Wednesday .041 
(.076) 
.059 
(.132) 
-.014 
(.058) 
.010 
(.063) 
-.016 
(.077) 
.081 
(.170) 
-.148** 
(.065) 
-.093 
(.094) 
Thursday .088 
(.083) 
.139 
(.185) 
-.027 
(.067) 
.095 
(.088) 
-.022 
(.082) 
.280 
(.166) 
-.112 
(.079) 
-.140 
(.107) 
Friday .112 
(.082) 
- .057 
(.064) 
-.002 
(.067) 
.127 
(.081) 
.183 
(.206) 
-.075 
(.070) 
.019 
(.101) 
Saturday .071 
(.131) 
.171 
(.155) 
.091 
(.085) 
-.099 
(.049) 
.059 
(.129) 
.045 
(.164) 
.081 
(.089) 
-.082 
(.134) 
Sunday .181 
(.126) 
.044 
(.169) 
.129 
(.093) 
-.047 
(.099) 
.025 
(.128) 
-.202 
(.188) 
-.185** 
(.084) 
.101 
(.164) 
N 527 143 619 324 532 157 636 319 
ln L -323.8 -50.9 -315.8 -127.6 -352.1 -98.6 -413.9 -214.0 
BIC 735.24 156.38 721.60 336.04 792.14 263.01 918.24 508.76 
The reported values are the marginal effects, estimated using individual-level data.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.  * denotes significance at a 10% level, and ** denotes 
significance at a 5% level.  For 70503, 16-20 Miles Over, More than 21 Miles Over, and Friday 
all were African-American drivers when these dummies equal 0, so 15 observations are dropped 
from Column II.  In Column VI, More than 21 Miles Over all were male drivers, so 2 
observations are dropped. 
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sizes are small and many of the control variables are collinear.  However, even this initial table 
provides some evidence that police may be targeting women when issuing speeding tickets. 
Table 2.4 provides results using a larger sample of tickets, beginning with zip codes 
where ticket location is the most similar between police and automated sources.  The entries are 
marginal effects; and robust standard errors, clustered by area, are reported in parentheses.  The 
areas are broken down into their respective zip codes, as previously defined,
21
 and each column 
successively increases the zip codes included in estimation.  The police coefficient is positive 
and significant in the first three columns, where African-American is the dependent variable, 
implying that the probability of being African-American is higher if the ticket was given by a 
police officer than if it was given by an automated source.  All columns control for area fixed 
effects, whether the ticket was given in the first half of the month, whether the ticket was issued 
during morning or evening rush hour, the legal speed limit where the ticket was issued, severity 
of the speeding violation (11-15 Miles Over, 16-20 Miles Over, and More than 20 Miles Over), 
and day of the week fixed effects. 
Columns I-III progressively include larger sample areas of issued tickets.  Column I only 
includes tickets issued in areas with the greatest overlap of ticket locations for police and speed 
vans.  Column II includes an additional zip code which also contains ticket locations that are 
very similar, followed by Column III which includes all zip codes except for 70507, where no 
automated van tickets are issued.  Restricting the area significantly decreases the sample size, but 
in all specifications the marginal effect for the police dummy variable remains positive and 
significant. 
 
                                                 
21
 Area 1 is 70501, Area 2 is 70503 and 70508, and Area 3 is 70506.  Recall that Lafayette has an additional zip 
code, 70507, which is not included due to a lack of adequate ticketing by the automated sources. 
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Table 2.4:  Probit Marginal Effects Using Limited Areas, Progressing From Most Similar 
Ticket Locations by Police and Automated Sources 
 Dependent Variable: 
African-American 
Dependent Variable: Female 
Area 
70506 and 
70503 
70506, 
70503, and 
70508 
70506, 
70503, 
70508, and 
70501 
70506 
and 
70503 
70506, 
70503, and 
70508 
70506, 
70503, 
70508, and 
70501 
 I II III IV V VI 
Police .062** 
(.003) 
.046** 
(.005) 
.083** 
(.025) 
.217** 
(.007) 
.158** 
(.015) 
.137** 
(.028) 
Area 1 . 
 
. .099** 
(.011) 
. . -.054** 
(.004) 
Area 2 -.058** 
(.015) 
-.056** 
(.005) 
-.062** 
(.003) 
.051** 
(.025) 
.052** 
(.002) 
.050** 
(.001) 
HalfMonth 1 .011 
(.036) 
.005 
(.035) 
-.005 
(.024) 
.051 
(.045) 
.053 
(.035) 
.028 
(.033) 
Rush Hour .068 
(.062) 
.066* 
(.039) 
.050 
(.037) 
.022* 
(.012) 
.039 
(.032) 
.016 
(.030) 
LegalSpeed .002** 
(.000) 
.004* 
(.002) 
.003** 
(.001) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.004** 
(.000) 
-.004** 
(.001) 
11-15 Miles 
Over 
-.007 
(.031) 
.014** 
(.001) 
-.004 
(.015) 
-.109 
(.067) 
-.078** 
(.029) 
-.050 
(.035) 
16-20 Miles 
Over 
.009 
(.036) 
.024** 
(.008) 
-.003 
(.025) 
-.103 
(.080) 
-.105 
(.067) 
-.078 
(.053) 
More than 20 
Miles Over 
-.059** 
(.026) 
.005 
(.040) 
-.013 
(.024) 
-.240* 
(.112) 
-.181** 
(.028) 
-.114 
(.071) 
Tuesday .059** 
(.022) 
.036 
(.034) 
.016 
(.024) 
-.032 
(.057) 
-.014 
(.051) 
-.019 
(.031) 
Wednesday -.038 
(.029) 
-.026** 
(.000) 
-.001 
(.024) 
-.114** 
(.056) 
-.116** 
(.043) 
-.092** 
(.039) 
Thursday -.021** 
(.009) 
.027 
(.047) 
.045 
(.033) 
-.009 
(.146) 
-.041 
(.052) 
-.047 
(.032) 
Friday .029 
(.038) 
.021 
(.032) 
.047 
(.030) 
-.040 
(.056) 
-.025 
(.068) 
.018 
(.062) 
Saturday .081** 
(.004) 
.037 
(.033) 
.064** 
(.033) 
.038 
(.045) 
.014 
(.060) 
.026 
(.053) 
Sunday .083* 
(.052) 
.046 
(.070) 
.097 
(.068) 
-.200** 
(.017) 
-.163** 
(.045) 
-.120* 
(.061) 
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Table 2.4 continued 
N 777 1101 1628 795 1114 1646 
ln L -375.68 -510.20 -838.22 -520.78 -741.94 -1100.08 
BIC 758.02 1027.41 1691.23 1048.25 1490.89 2214.97 
The reported values are the marginal effects, estimated using individual-level data.  Robust 
standard errors, clustered by area, are in parentheses.  * denotes significance at a 10% level, and 
** denotes significance at a 5% level.   
 
The area controls are both significant, as expected, due to the racial composition of the 
city.  In Column 3, Area 1 is positive and statistically significant, implying that African-
Americans receive more tickets and reflecting the fact that Area 1 has a large number of African-
American residents.  Conversely, there are relatively few African-American residents in Area 2 
(less than 10%), and the estimated coefficient for Area 2 is statistically significant and negative 
in all specifications.   
HalfMonth 1 is added to test conventional wisdom that police ticket differentially 
depending on the time of month, but is not significant in any specification.  In a similar vein, if 
the population of speeders caught by police differs by time of day, the regression equation should 
include measures of time to ensure the police coefficient is not capturing this effect.  I use a 
dummy variable, RushHour, to control for time differences, which is equal to 1 if the ticket is 
given between 7:00 am and 8:59 am or 5:00 pm and 6:59 pm, and 0 otherwise.  The impact of 
RushHour is only significant in Column II.   
The next control is legal speed limit.  As previously discussed, some tickets are given on 
busy city roads, and others on neighborhood streets, so this control will help to further specify 
driving patterns.  LegalSpeed is statistically significant, but is close to zero.   
The controls for severity of the violation are a range of dummy variables (11-15 Miles 
Over, 16-20 Miles Over, More than 20 Miles Over) which are equal to one if the violation was 
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within the range and 0 otherwise.  These controls are not consistently significant in any 
specification. 
Day of the week fixed effects are included to further control for driving patterns.  
Saturday is positive and significant in Columns I and III, though no other day fixed effects are 
consistently significant.  
Overall, the results using the largest sample area indicate that, all else the same, it is 
about 8 percentage points more likely that the recipient of a police-given speeding ticket is black, 
as opposed to the recipient of a speed van issued ticket.   
The latter three columns of Table 2.4 present the results where the dependent variable is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the violator is female and 0 if the violator is male.  The initial probit 
estimation, where the sample zip codes include 70506 and 70503, estimates the marginal effect 
of police to be .217, and is statistically significant at a 5% level.  The magnitude of this result 
should be interpreted with caution, due to the relatively small sample.  In Columns V and VI, 
with the larger sample area, the police coefficient remains statistically significant at the 5% level, 
while its magnitude decreases to .137.
22
   
Area controls are consistently significant, but the signs are reversed from the race 
specification.  The coefficient for Area2 is positive and significant, while Area1 is negative and 
significant.  Since the proportion of females who reside in different areas does not differ greatly 
between zip codes, this implies that either women speed less in Area 1, or perhaps fewer women 
travel in this area. 
                                                 
22
 One concern is that 70506 and 70503 may be driving these results.  However, even when these zip codes are 
excluded, the coefficient on the police dummy is smaller, but still significant (.044 at a 5% level).  These zip codes 
include commercial as well as residential areas, similar to the other zip codes in this analysis, so it is unclear why 
there would be a difference in ticketing based on gender in the area. 
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RushHour is still insignificant in most specifications.  LegalSpeed is again very close to 
zero, but is negative and significant in all specifications.  The variables controlling for severity of 
the violation (11-15 Miles Over, 16-20 Miles Over, and More than 20 Miles Over) are negative 
in all specifications, with 11-15 Miles Over and More than 20 Miles Over statistically significant 
in all but Column VI.  The only day of the week variables that are significant are Wednesday and 
Sunday, in all three columns.   
The police coefficient of the model including the larger area indicates that conditional on 
being issued a ticket, the probability of a speeding ticket being received by a female is about 14 
percentage points higher when the ticket was issued by a police officer.  Since there are no 
significant advantages to reducing the sample area, the remaining tables will include tickets 
issued in 70506, 70503, 70508, and 70501.
23
 
2.7. Robustness Tests 
 The previous results illustrate that police officers use race and gender as determining 
factors in issuing speeding tickets.  This section aims to more completely control for travel 
differences and severity of speed violations, to ensure that neither are driving the results 
discussed in the previous section.  The next section will address other avenues to illustrate the 
validity of the comparison group and results obtained in the previous section.   
When only using speeding tickets where the driver was speeding 15 miles or more over 
the speed limit, the results are interestingly similar to those that include all tickets, as can be seen 
                                                 
23
 All specifications were also run using police tickets and both sources of automated tickets, results of which can be 
provided upon request.  In general, the police coefficient decreases compared to the specifications which do not 
include traffic light camera tickets, implying that women and African-Americans actually receive even fewer tickets 
from speed vans than from both automated sources combined.  This could mean that men and whites are more likely 
to adjust behavior when aware of an automated camera (or that men and whites drive comparably slower through 
intersections).  Using both automated sources does not change the overall finding that the probability of a ticketed 
speeder being a woman or African-American is higher for tickets issued by police officers, in any specification.  
Similarly, specifications were run excluding tickets issued in December, since this month may be different due to 
holidays, etc.  The results are unchanged. 
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in Table 2.5.  The police coefficient for both the race and gender specification is still positive, 
but is only statistically significant in the gender specification.  In the race specification, the 
police coefficient is much smaller in magnitude than before.  This does loosely coincide with 
Blalock et al.’s (2007) finding that police are less likely to be concerned with gender and race 
when drivers are behaving exceedingly dangerously.  These findings imply that police are less 
concerned with the race of individuals who drive excessively fast.  It is unclear why there is no 
similar effect for the gender specifications, but implies that the difference in ticketing between 
police and automated sources regarding gender is much stronger.  Controlling for month fixed 
effects does not significantly alter the results; as can be seen in Columns II and IV of Table 2.5.   
Since driving patterns may differ by race or gender based on the time of day the ticket 
was issued (Grogger and Ridgeway 2006, Blalock et al. 2007), Table 2.6 reports probit marginal 
effects with hourly controls instead of just the RushHour dummy variable.  The additional hour 
dummy variables are: 6:00 to 8:59 AM, 9:00 to 11:59 AM, 12:00 to 2:59 PM, 3:00 to 5:59 PM, 
and 6:00 to 6:59 PM.  Adding hourly controls still results in estimates that, if ticketed by a police 
officer, it is about 7.5 percentage points more likely that the driver is African-American than if 
ticketed by an automated source.  Similarly, if ticketed by a police officer, it is about 14 
percentage points more likely that the driver is female than if ticketed by an automated source. 
While driving patterns are important, it is also vital to control for exposure to police and 
area characteristics.  There are four precincts in Lafayette, which is where police officers are told 
to locate for a specific shift.  This means that in areas of high crime, there may be more police 
officers patrolling, therefore, the individuals driving in these areas have a higher likelihood of 
speeding past a police officer.  By using police precincts as the location control, this type of  
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Table 2.5:  Probit Marginal Effects Using Only High Speeders  
(Violations over 15 miles an hour) 
Variable African-American Female 
Police .031 
(.039) 
.032 
(.054) 
.138** 
(.015) 
.135** 
(.021) 
Area 1 .101** 
(.009) 
.097** 
(.011) 
-.053** 
(.007) 
-.055** 
(.006) 
Area 2 -.100** 
(.002) 
-.097** 
(.011) 
-.022 
(.020) 
-.026** 
(.005) 
HalfMonth 1 -.019 
(.024) 
-.018 
(.024) 
.101** 
(.026) 
.100** 
(.019) 
RushHour -.007 
(.007) 
-.006 
(.008) 
.054** 
(.025) 
.056** 
(.025) 
LegalSpeed .002 
(.002) 
.002 
(.002) 
.002 
(.002) 
.002 
(.002) 
More than 20 
Miles Over 
-.015 
(.032) 
-.009 
(.031) 
-.037 
(.039) 
-.031 
(.055) 
Tuesday .031 
(.066) 
.033 
(.064) 
-.009 
(.057) 
-.001 
(.062) 
Wednesday -.018 
(.075) 
-.014 
(.066) 
-.170 
(.113) 
-.160 
(.116) 
Thursday .028 
(.094) 
.028 
(.101) 
-.063 
(.098) 
-.060 
(.092) 
Friday .081 
(.070) 
.085 
(.058) 
-.010 
(.113) 
-.005 
(.118) 
Saturday -.124** 
(.046) 
-.123** 
(.039) 
-.257* 
(.129) 
-.251 
(.138) 
Sunday -.045 
(.045) 
-.050** 
(.024) 
-.169 
(.137) 
-.188 
(.138) 
Month FE 
No Yes No Yes 
N 494 494 494 494 
ln L -264.93 -264.36 -332.70 -331.64 
BIC 542.27 541.13 677.81 675.69 
The reported values are the marginal effects, estimated using the individual-level data.  Robust 
standard errors, clustered by area, are in parentheses.  * denotes significance at a 10% level, and 
** denotes significance at a 5% level.  Month fixed effects were not significant except for 
October (at a 5% level) and February (at a 10% level) in Column IV. 
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Table 2.6:  Probit Marginal Effects With Hourly Controls 
Variable African-American Female 
Police .084** 
(.029) 
.072** 
(.035) 
.138** 
(.020) 
.146** 
(.016) 
Area 1 .099** 
(.011) 
.114** 
(.010) 
-.056** 
(.004) 
-.043** 
(.011) 
Area 2 -.071** 
(.010) 
-.067** 
(.013) 
.060** 
(.009) 
.068** 
(.014) 
HalfMonth 1 -.008 
(.025) 
-.005 
(.026) 
.029 
(.034) 
.032 
(.033) 
Rush Hour .009 
(.071) 
.004 
(.071) 
-.064 
(.065) 
-.081 
(.083) 
LegalSpeed .003** 
(.001) 
.003* 
(.001) 
-.003** 
(.000) 
-.003** 
(.001) 
11-15 Miles Over .001 
(.017) 
.015 
(.032) 
-.051 
(.033) 
-.037 
(.033) 
16-20 Miles Over .003 
(.025) 
.020 
(.042) 
-.082 
(.054) 
-.066 
(.049) 
More than 20 Miles 
Over 
-.005 
(.031) 
.008 
(.040) 
-.116* 
(.068) 
-.099 
(.072) 
Tuesday .015 
(.024) 
.008 
(.022) 
-.017 
(.030) 
-.024 
(.022) 
Wednesday -.002 
(.023) 
-.008 
(.023) 
-.091** 
(.038) 
-.096** 
(.034) 
Thursday .039 
(.030) 
.034 
(.026) 
-.043 
(.036) 
-.048 
(.030) 
Friday .046 
(.032) 
.042 
(.037) 
.022 
(.067) 
.021 
(.065) 
Saturday .067** 
(.035) 
.061 
(.041) 
.031 
(.043) 
.029 
(.038) 
Sunday .105* 
(.065) 
.109* 
(.067) 
-.124* 
(.062) 
-.121** 
(.055) 
9:00-11:59 AM -.018 
(.108) 
-.023 
(.107) 
-.122 
(.121) 
-.139 
(.133) 
12:00-2:59 PM -.032 
(.104) 
-.035 
(.106) 
-.088 
(.091) 
-.107 
(.105) 
3:00-5:59 PM -.033 
(.078) 
-.039 
(.080) 
-.070 
(.056) 
-.089 
(.071) 
 6:00-6:59 PM .235** 
(.108) 
.219** 
(.123) 
-.092 
(.096) 
-.120 
(.097) 
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Table 2.6 continued 
Month FE No Yes No Yes 
N 1628 1628 1646 1646 
ln L -834.59 -832.27 -1098.34 -1096.74 
BIC 1683.97 1679.32 2211.49 2208.28 
The reported values are the marginal effects, estimated using individual-level data.  Robust 
standard errors, clustered by area, are in parentheses.  * denotes significance at a 10% level, and 
** denotes significance at a 5% level.  Month FE were not significant except for October (at 10% 
level) in Column IV. 
 
effect will be eliminated.  Table 2.7 provides the results of this estimation, and the police 
coefficient is still positive, significant, and nearly the same magnitude as earlier estimations.  
Thus, even controlling for more specific areas, there is still evidence that if an individual 
received a speeding ticket from a police officer as opposed to a speed van, it is more likely that 
the individual is black or a female, all else the same. 
I also restrict the samples to investigate whether these gender and racial differences in 
receiving tickets persist within a specific group.  In Table 2.8 I list estimates which only use a 
specific sample of tickets from the population.  Column I includes only tickets given to women, 
with the dependent variable a dummy equal to one if the woman is African-American and 0 
otherwise.  The police coefficient is positive, but it is no longer significant at conventional levels.  
Of tickets given to women, police do not seem to ticket differentially based on race.  In Column 
II, only tickets given to males are included, and the police coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant.  This suggests that when ticketing men, police are more likely to ticket African-
Americans as compared to automated sources, relative to ticketing whites.     
Columns III and IV of Table 2.8 use a dummy equal to 1 if the violator is female and 
equal to 0 otherwise as the dependent variable, but restrict the sample based on race.  Only those 
tickets given to African-Americans are used in the regression reported in Column III, and only  
  
46 
 
Table 2.7:  Probit Marginal Effects: Using Police Precincts as Location Controls 
Variable African-American Female 
Police .085** 
(.023) 
.072** 
(.027) 
.138** 
(.019) 
.146** 
(.020) 
Precinct 2 -.107** 
(.016) 
-.122** 
(.007) 
.057** 
(.004) 
.042** 
(.013) 
Precinct 3 -.167** 
(.015) 
-.177** 
(.011) 
.125** 
(.013) 
.117** 
(.004) 
Precinct 4 -.034 
(.023) 
-.038* 
(.019) 
.011 
(.013) 
.008 
(.016) 
HalfMonth 1 -.008 
(.026) 
-.005 
(.027) 
.029 
(.028) 
.033 
(.027) 
RushHour .008 
(.085) 
.004 
(.083) 
-.063 
(.041) 
-.081 
(.054) 
LegalSpeed .003** 
(.001) 
.004** 
(.001) 
-.004** 
(.001) 
-.003** 
(.001) 
11-15 Miles Over .005 
(.020) 
.020 
(.032) 
-.052 
(.033) 
-.037 
(.032) 
16-20 Miles Over .003 
(.022) 
.020 
(.037) 
-.082 
(.052) 
-.067 
(.045) 
More than 20 
Miles Over 
-.004 
(.042) 
.009 
(.050) 
-.117** 
(.057) 
-.100* 
(.057) 
Tuesday .016 
(.025) 
.009 
(.019) 
-.019 
(.048) 
-.026 
(.045) 
Wednesday -.002 
(.035) 
-.008 
(.032) 
-.091 
(.056) 
-.097* 
(.054) 
Thursday .041 
(.026) 
.036 
(.024) 
-.044 
(.041) 
-.050 
(.035) 
Friday .045* 
(.028) 
.041 
(.032) 
.023 
(.061) 
.022 
(.058) 
Saturday .063* 
(.040) 
.057 
(.042) 
.032 
(.067) 
.030 
(.065) 
Sunday .096* 
(.057) 
.100* 
(.061) 
-.121** 
(.058) 
-.118** 
(.052) 
9:00-11:59 AM -.017 
(.110) 
-.021 
(.106) 
-.121 
(.106) 
-.138 
(.114) 
12:00-2:59 PM -.030 
(.111) 
-.032 
(.109) 
-.088 
(.068) 
-.106 
(.080) 
3:00-5:59 PM -.030 
(.078) 
-.035 
(.077) 
-.069 
(.045) 
-.088 
(.057) 
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Table 2.7 continued 
6:00-6:59 PM .236** 
(.099) 
.221** 
(.119) 
-.094 
(.083) 
-.122 
(.083) 
Month FE No Yes No Yes 
N 1628 1628 1646 1646 
ln L -834.18 -831.75 -1097.81 -1096.14 
BIC 1690.54 1685.69 2217.84 2214.49 
The reported values are the marginal effects, estimated using individual-level tickets.  Robust 
standard errors, clustered by precinct, are in parentheses.  * denotes significance at a 10% level, 
and ** denotes significance at a 5% level.  Month FE were not significant except for October (at 
a 10% level) in Column IV. 
 
tickets given to individuals who are not African-American are employed in the regression for 
Column IV.  Column III implies that African-American women are about 9 percentage points 
more likely to receive a ticket from a police officer as African-American men, compared to the 
likelihood of receiving a ticket from an automated source.  However, the coefficient is not 
estimated with precision, possibly because of the small sample size (n=359).  Column IV 
illustrates that it is more likely for a white
24
 individual to be female if the ticket was issued by a 
police officer.  In summary, controlling for gender, a ticketed driver is still more likely to be 
African-American if ticketed by the police, and controlling for being non-African-American, a 
ticketed driver is more likely to be female if ticketed by police. 
2.8. Investigating Endogeneity 
2.8.1. Utilizing Daylight Savings Time  
Next, I explore a slightly different approach, to provide suggestive evidence that the 
automated cameras are a valid population measure and comparison group to the police-issued 
cameras.  Similar to Grogger and Ridgeway (2006), I restrict the estimation sample to police- 
                                                 
24
 The comparison group to African-American tickets is actually all other races; however, in Lafayette about 97% of 
the ticketed population is white or African-American. 
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Table 2.8:  Probit Marginal Effects Estimated Using Restricted Samples 
Dep. Variable: African-American Female 
Sample Used: Female Tickets Male Tickets AA Tickets White Tickets 
Variable     
 I II III IV 
Police .059 
(.079) 
.101** 
(.034) 
.087 
(.100) 
.151** 
(.029) 
Area 1 .115** 
(.011) 
.111** 
(.022) 
-.046 
(.034) 
-.053** 
(.013) 
Area 2 -.089** 
(.015) 
-.078** 
(.026) 
.054 
(.039) 
.059** 
(.014) 
HalfMonth 1 -.050* 
(.027) 
.030 
(.028) 
-.054 
 (.038) 
.057** 
(.023) 
RushHour -.048* 
(.025) 
.048 
(.123) 
-.233 
(.171) 
-.051 
(.063) 
LegalSpeed .003* 
(.002) 
.003 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.001) 
-.003* 
(.002) 
11-15 Miles 
Over 
-.035 
(.046) 
.033 
(.033) 
-.077** 
(.018) 
-.030 
(.035) 
16-20 Miles 
Over 
-.028 
(.075) 
.042** 
(.020) 
-.101 
(.062) 
-.048 
(.070) 
More than 20 
Miles Over 
-.029 
(.059) 
-.015 
(.062) 
-.047 
(.105) 
-.113* 
(.061) 
Tuesday .094** 
(.036) 
-.067** 
(.031) 
.174** 
(.069) 
-.070** 
(.024) 
Wednesday .042** 
(.020) 
-.071** 
(.031) 
.069 
(.045) 
-.127** 
(.024) 
Thursday .050 
(.040) 
.003 
(.031) 
.049 
(.064) 
-.064** 
(.028) 
Friday .043 
(.061) 
.035 
(.070) 
.069 
(.186) 
.017 
(.026) 
Saturday .065 
(.111) 
.053** 
(.019) 
.057 
(.135) 
.004 
(.026) 
Sunday .098 
(.132) 
.096* 
(.054) 
-.112 
(.204) 
-.132** 
(.042) 
9:00-11:59 AM -.097** 
(.038) 
.072 
(.166) 
-.340 
(.197) 
-.087 
(.116) 
12:00-2:59 PM -.143** 
(.052) 
.096 
(.156) 
-.386** 
(.118) 
-.039 
(.110) 
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Table 2.8 continued 
Dep. Variable: African-American Female 
Sample Used: Female Tickets Male Tickets AA Tickets White Tickets 
Variable     
 I II III IV 
3:00-5:59 PM -.111* 
(.050) 
.037 
(.101) 
-.283** 
(.066) 
-.029 
(.087) 
6:00-6:59 PM .173 
(.133) 
.234* 
(.147) 
-.217** 
(.069) 
-.078 
(.087) 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 774 831 359 1246 
ln L -387.72 -416.49 -234.67 -827.24 
BIC 788.74 846.42 481.11 1668.73 
The reported values are the marginal effects, estimated using individual-level data.  Robust 
standard errors, clustered by area, are in parentheses.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, 
and ** denotes significance at the 5% level.   Month Effects were not significant except October 
and February in Column II (both at a 10% level of significance), and October and February in 
Column IV (both at a 5% level of significance). 
 
issued tickets between 6:00 AM and 7:59 AM, and between 5:00 PM and 6:59 PM.  I 
supplement my dataset with sunrise and sunset data taken from the U.S. Naval Base.  As a result 
of daylight savings time, some tickets are issued in the dark while some are issued in daylight, 
even though the clock time of the issued ticket is the same.  In other words, in November the sun 
sets around 5:30 PM, but in October the sun sets around 6:30 PM.  This means that someone who 
received a ticket in November at 6:00 PM received a ticket when it was dark outside, and the 
police officer likely could not see inside the vehicle (and thus, could not determine race or 
gender of the driver).  However, if another driver was ticketed at 6:00 PM in October, when it 
was light outside, police officers could see inside the vehicle.   
Assuming that police officers have no driver visibility and cannot observe race or gender 
when it is dark outside, any difference in issuance to African-Americans or women when it is 
light as compared to when it  is dark implies that police officers do consider race or gender in 
issuing tickets. Utilizing daylight savings time allows for keeping time of day constant, while 
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providing the ability to compare tickets issued in light to those issued in the dark.  A control, 
Morning, is also added in case there are differences in driving patterns during the morning and 
evening hours (Morning=1 if the ticket was issued between 6:00 and 7:59 and 0 if it was issued 
between 5:00 and 6:59).  All other controls are the same as previous tables. 
The coefficient of interest is Daylight Visibility, which equals 1 if it is light outside (if the 
ticket was issued on that day after the sun rose and before it set), and 0 if it is dark outside (if the 
ticket was issued on that day before the sun rose or after it set).  Table 2.9 provides means and 
standard deviations of this new control variable in terms of gender and race, independently as 
issued by police and automated sources.  Since automated cameras are assumed to measure the 
population of speeders at a given location, regardless of whether it is light or dark outside, we 
can compare the proportion of these tickets to those issued by police officers, to determine if 
there is a difference in issuing based on visibility.   
Table 2.9:  Daylight Visibility Means and Standard Deviation of Daylight Controls 
 =1, visibility =0, no visibility 
 Police Automated Police Automated 
African- 
American 
.285 
(.452) 
[263] 
.274 
(.448) 
[106] 
.267 
(.458) 
[15] 
.263 
(.452) 
[19] 
Female 
.551* 
(.498) 
[265] 
.385* 
(.489) 
[109] 
.333 
(.488) 
[15] 
.474 
(.513) 
[19] 
Recall that only a subset of police issued tickets are being used: those issued between 6:00 AM 
and 7:59 AM and those issued between 5:00 PM and 6:59 PM.  Standard deviations are in 
(parentheses).  The number of observations is in [parentheses].  * denotes a significant difference 
between tickets issued by police and those issued by automated sources, at a 5% level. 
 
Initially, if we look only at tickets issued during daylight hours, when drivers are visible 
to police, it is obvious that ticketing behavior is different between police and automated sources.  
Police issue a greater proportion of tickets to African-Americans as well as women, though this 
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raw difference is only significant for gender.  These rough results coincide with the earlier 
findings of this paper.  Conversely, during dark hours when there is no visibility, the proportion 
of tickets issued to women and African-Americans by police and automated sources are very 
similar.  Since this difference only arises when there is visibility of drivers, this implies that 
police are using some subjective criteria once observing the speeding driver to determine 
whether or not to issue a ticket.
25
  Recall that only tickets issued between 6:00 AM and 7:59 AM 
and 5:00 PM and 6:59 PM are included in these estimates, and so it is unlikely that these results 
are driven by differences in driving patterns.  Though these statistics are extremely useful for 
analyzing trends in the raw data, a more thorough approach needs to be used to provide more 
reliable results.    
 The regression results including daylight controls are presented in Table 2.10, which 
support the previous results and imply that African-Americans and females are more likely to 
receive a ticket from a police officer only when race or gender is visible.  If the same exercise is 
performed using only automated issued tickets, the coefficient on Daylight Visibility is not 
significant, as can be seen in Table 2.11.  Since automated sources are objective there should be 
no difference in ticketing by race or gender merely because it is light as opposed to dark.
26
   
 The coefficient on Daylight Visibility is significant only when considering police issued 
tickets, and these findings coincide with results when automated cameras are used as the 
comparison to police-issued tickets, providing supportive evidence that the automated cameras 
can be used as a valid comparison group.  The next sub-section more rigorously explores the use 
of automated tickets as a population measure by utilizing propensity score estimation techniques. 
                                                 
25
 It has been discussed that police may still infer gender or race based on the car model, type, or even color.  
Therefore, police may still be able to consider these factors, though at a lesser influence. 
26
 This analysis can be performed by zip code, but the sample size for some are too small to estimate.  However, 
those where the sample is large enough produce similar results as when aggregated.  These results are available upon 
request. 
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Table 2.10:  Probit Marginal Effects: Investigating the Effect of Daylight on Police-Issued 
Tickets 
Variable African-American Female 
Daylight .155** 
(.059) 
.173** 
(.059) 
.311** 
(.129) 
.364** 
(.139) 
Morning Light -.017 
(.220) 
-.079 
(.204) 
.111 
(.112) 
.107 
(.132) 
Area 1 .185** 
(.040) 
.209** 
(.048) 
-.117** 
(.050) 
-.120** 
(.050) 
Area 2 -.012 
(.054) 
-.025 
(.072) 
-.042 
(.114) 
-.081 
(.095) 
HalfMonth 1 -.038 
(.035) 
-.026 
(.027) 
.049 
(.038) 
.051 
(.047) 
Rush Hour - - -.311 
(.163) 
-.356* 
(.122) 
LegalSpeed .008** 
(.002) 
.008** 
(.002) 
.016* 
(.009) 
.017* 
(.009) 
11-15 Miles Over -.148** 
(.041) 
-.137** 
(.061) 
.083 
(.152) 
.129 
(.185) 
16-20 Miles Over -.151 
(.106) 
-.138 
(.117) 
.083 
(.213) 
.128 
(.242) 
More than 20 
Miles Over 
-.109 
(.114) 
-.092 
(.146) 
.131 
(.137) 
.160 
(.137) 
Tuesday -.122 
(.132) 
-.142 
(.129) 
.121 
(.169) 
.098 
(.169) 
Wednesday -.143 
(.118) 
-.162 
(.117) 
.116 
(.147) 
.097 
(.161) 
Thursday -.097 
(.092) 
-.127 
(.077) 
.076 
(.134) 
.036 
(.185) 
Friday .027 
(.098) 
.005 
(.093) 
.175 
(.158) 
.167 
(.166) 
Saturday - - - - 
Sunday - - - - 
Month FE No Yes No Yes 
N 258 258 265 265 
ln L -144.89 -144.00 -173.53 -171.66 
BIC 300.90 299.10 358.22 354.48 
The reported values are the marginal effects, estimated using individual-level tickets.  Robust 
standard errors, clustered by area, are in parentheses.  * denotes significance at a 10% level, and 
** denotes significance at a 5% level.  Month FE were not significant except for February (at a 
5% level) in Column II. 
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Table 2.11:  Probit Marginal Effects: Investigating the Effect of Daylight on Automated-
Issued Tickets 
Variable African-American Female 
Daylight -.173 
(.165) 
-.105 
(.111) 
-.027 
(.125) 
-.057 
(.134) 
Morning Light .178* 
(.104) 
.162 
(.112) 
.082 
(.091) 
.024 
(.114) 
Area 1 .271** 
(.024) 
.247** 
(.061) 
-.281** 
(.015) 
-.366** 
(.048) 
Area 2 .043 
(.058) 
.022 
(.065) 
.047 
(.053) 
-.040 
(.042) 
HalfMonth 1 .018 
(.087) 
-.013 
(.083) 
.228** 
(.109) 
.227* 
(.128) 
Rush Hour - - .146 
(.357) 
.116 
(.406) 
LegalSpeed .002 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.006) 
-.015** 
(.003) 
-.194** 
(.005) 
11-15 Miles Over .022 
(.086) 
.078 
(.118) 
-.153** 
(.039) 
-.164* 
(.089) 
16-20 Miles Over - - - - 
More than 20 
Miles Over 
- - - - 
Tuesday -.059 
(.123) 
.005 
(.110) 
.166** 
(.005) 
.310** 
(.046) 
Wednesday .020 
(.146) 
.055 
(.168) 
-.119 
(.084) 
-.031 
(.107) 
Thursday .311** 
(.103) 
.375** 
(.099) 
.185** 
(.029) 
.304** 
(.046) 
Friday -.161 
(.108) 
-.164 
(.078) 
.017 
(.034) 
.098** 
(.050) 
Saturday -.012 
(.223) 
.113 
(.206) 
.170 
(.122) 
.317 
(.202) 
Sunday .109 
(.186) 
.110 
(.215) 
-.028 
(.209) 
.005 
(.180) 
Month FE No Yes No Yes 
N 119 119 126 126 
ln L -63.06 -61.65 -67.68 -65.47 
BIC 135.68 132.86 145.03 140.61 
The reported values are the marginal effects, estimated using individual-level tickets.  Robust 
standard errors, clustered by area, are in parentheses.  * denotes significance at a 10% level, and 
** denotes significance at a 5% level.  Month FE were not significant except for October, 
November, and February (at a 5% level) in Column IV. 
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2.8.2. Propensity Score Estimation 
 As previously mentioned, police and automated cameras do not always ticket in the exact 
same location.  Although the preceding sections begin to justify the use of automated tickets as a 
comparison group to police issued tickets, this section aims to more explicitly show that the 
previous findings are valid by implementing a propensity score estimator.  The underlying issue 
is one of selection: if police choose to locate in areas that are different than automated sources, 
the different proportions of tickets issued to African-Americans and women may merely be the 
result of selection bias.  If we think of receiving a ticket from a police officer as the “treatment,” 
where we are interested in the gender and race of the ticketed driver, the propensity score 
estimator provides a method of comparing similar automated and police ticketed speeders.  
Specifically, by estimating the propensity score (the likelihood a driver is ticketed by the police 
based on violation and location characteristics) the selection problem is less severe.
27
   
The first step is to estimate the propensity score using a logit model where the dependent 
variable equals 1 if the ticketed driver was African-American.  The propensity score is a function 
of relevant covariates (area dummies, 11-15 Miles Over the Limit, 16-20 Miles Over the Limit, 
More than 21 Miles Over, day of the week dummies, 9:00 to 11:59 AM, 12:00 to 2:59 PM, 3:00 
to 5:59 PM, and 6:00 to 6:59 PM, and month dummies), where conditional on the propensity 
score, they are independent of treatment (Mocan and Tekin (2006)).   
 Once the propensity score is estimated, there are numerous methods to estimate a 
nonparametric regression to determine the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT).  I 
employ nearest neighbor matching with and without replacement, along with radius caliper 
matching.  First of all, nearest neighbor matching matches individuals ticketed by police with 
                                                 
27
 Notice however, this is not an end-all solution: if there are unobservable individual driver attributes which are 
correlated with the likelihood to be ticketed by the police as well as correlated with the likelihood that an individual 
is African-American or a woman, standard problems of biased coefficients remain. 
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individuals ticketed by automated sources based on their propensity score; the observations with 
the closest propensity score are matched.  Nearest neighbor matching with replacement means an 
untreated (automated-issued) individual can be matched more than once, but nearest neighbor 
matching without replacement limits the use of an automated ticketed individual as a match only 
once.  Since estimation without replacement may depend on the order of the data (Dehejia and 
Wahba 2002), I follow convention and order the data randomly, as well as in ascending and 
descending propensity score order.  The results remain consistent, as can be seen in Table 2.12.  
The estimates using nearest neighbor matching with replacement are no longer significant for 
African-Americans, but are still significant when gender is the dependent variable.   
 
Table 2.12:  Propensity Score Matching Estimates 
 Without Replacement With Replacement Radius Matching 
 Random Ascending Descending n=1 n=5 n=10 
Caliper, 
δ=0.001 
Caliper, 
δ=0.01 
Female 
.150** 
(.063) 
922 
.150** 
(.063) 
922 
.150** 
(.063) 
922 
.215 
(.188) 
946 
.375** 
(.139) 
1029 
.343** 
(.113) 
1112 
.294** 
(.048) 
394 
.273** 
(.109) 
1219 
African-
American 
.081** 
(.039) 
920 
.081** 
(.039) 
920 
.081** 
(.039) 
920 
.049 
(.044) 
950 
-.097 
(.233) 
1045 
.009 
(.051) 
1134 
.068** 
(.013) 
441 
.053 
(.045) 
1238 
Standard errors are bootstrapped 500 times.  Coefficients are marginal effects of police issued-
tickets, clustered by area.   
 
Lastly, I employ radius matching, using two different calipers (range of propensity 
scores).  Radius matching uses all automated ticket observations in a specified propensity score 
range to match police ticketed observations, and the results are overall similar to previous 
columns.  The effect for race loses significance in some specifications, but women consistently 
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are more likely to be ticketed by police officers than automated cameras.  This further supports 
results in previous sections.   
2.9. Conclusion 
 This paper aims to explain whether police issue speeding tickets differently to individuals 
based on their race or gender.  I find that in the city of Lafayette, Louisiana, the probability of a 
ticketed driver being a woman or African-American is significantly higher if the ticket was 
issued by a police officer versus an automated source.  Since automated sources issue speeding 
tickets to every speeding car that passes, this implies that gender and race play a role when police 
decide whether to ticket a speeding driver.  Even when controlling for additional factors like 
severity of the speeding violation, time of day, actual speed limit, and day of the week, the 
results remain the same.  Also, when different location controls are used to more specifically 
control for driving patterns and police exposure, the results are still very similar. 
 This methodology has not been used previously to study police behavior and differential 
treatment in receiving speeding tickets based on gender and race.
28
  As a result of the specific 
type of analysis, this paper does not suffer from common issues in this realm of literature.  The 
city implemented the automated camera system to improve safety and decrease the number of 
crashes caused by red light runners, and was not intended for any use involving investigation of 
police bias.  Also, these data were not collected as a result of a lawsuit, and therefore police had 
no incentive to alter their behavior.  Another problem in some existing literature is the use of 
police reported stops, which can often mean some actual stops are not recorded.  However, the 
present data set includes all speeding tickets given during the sample time period.  Every 
                                                 
28
 Another study mentioned in Grogger and Ridgeway (2006), done by the Montgomery County Police Department 
(2002), used photographic stoplight enforcement to measure the at risk population of speeders.  However, this study 
could not be accessed, so it is uncertain how closely their methodology relates to the current work. 
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instance when a police officer wrote a ticket is included and police cannot misreport their 
actions. 
 This paper also has a large advantage over existing literature because it employs a 
completely objective measure of the speeding population.  For the most part, vans and police 
officers are located either very close to each other (on the same street or city block), or they are 
within a few blocks of each other.  This suggests that police officers and vans are not 
differentially located to deliberately target different sub-populations.  This provides a distinct 
advantage in that after controlling for incident and street characteristics, any differences between 
automated and police issued tickets arise from the subjective nature of police tickets.  
Despite concerns about automated sources being an inexact measure of the population of 
speeders observed by police, I employ numerous techniques to illustrate that the automated 
sources do provide a valid population measure.  Suggestive evidence using maps of Lafayette 
and extensive regression controls for location and driver behaviors, as well as propensity score 
estimates and manipulation of daylight visibility all provide the same conclusion: police officers 
ticket a larger proportion of African-Americans and women than automated sources.  However, 
the gender effect is larger, and more consistent throughout all methods. 
 The probability of a ticketed driver being African-American or female is significantly 
higher when the speeding ticket is given by a police officer in contrast to an automated source, 
thus implying that police use gender and race as a determining factor in issuing a speeding ticket.  
Despite the fact that we cannot determine whether the differential treatment is a result of 
preference-based discrimination or statistical discrimination, the results still illustrate some type 
of discrimination, which has potential welfare implications. 
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For example, assume that police ticket African-Americans at a higher rate not because of 
a taste for discrimination, but because police believe that African-Americans are less likely to 
contest a speeding ticket.  This would mean that higher penalties are levied on African-
Americans than whites despite the fact that they have the same offending (speeding) intensity.  
Given that the incomes of African-Americans are less than half that of whites in this population 
of speeders,
29
 this would constitute a regressive tax based on unequal treatment.  Further research 
is necessary to investigate whether differential contesting rates can explain police behavior, or if 
preference-based discrimination is really the cause of the disparities between tickets issued by 
police officers and automated sources. 
  
                                                 
29
 Based on the zip code analysis previously discussed. 
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CHAPTER 3: DO DRIVER DECISIONS IN TRAFFIC COURT MOTIVATE 
POLICE DISCRIMINATION IN ISSUING SPEEDING TICKETS? 
3.1. Introduction 
Discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, and/or religion has been a focus of 
extensive research since Becker (1957).  Relatedly, researchers have also focused more 
specifically on verifying that “Justice is Blind” is applied in practice in the U.S. court system 
(Mustard, 2001; Schanzenbach, 2005; Anwar, Bayer, and Hjalmarsson, 2010).  Court 
discrimination has been investigated using judge and jury characteristics and sentencing 
decisions, but the present work is the first to follow individuals through each stage of the court 
process from receiving a speeding ticket, to pre-trial meetings with the prosecutor, and finally to 
the trial itself.   
In addition to court discrimination, researchers have investigated police discrimination in 
vehicle searches as well as ticket issuing, where some identify evidence of statistical or 
preference-based discrimination (Antonovics and Knight 2009, Makowsky and Stratmann 2009), 
but others find no such evidence (Grogger and Ridgeway 2006, Knowles et al. 2001, for 
example).  Quintanar (2011) provides evidence of racial and gender discrimination by police in 
issuing speeding tickets, but does not identify whether police are engaging in statistical or 
preference-based discrimination.  The present paper extends Quintanar (2011) by analyzing 
individual behavior in the court system to provide evidence regarding the type of discrimination 
police engage in when issuing speeding tickets. 
This paper follows individuals through the court process who received a speeding ticket 
in Lafayette, Louisiana between August 2007 and February 2008.  Lafayette is a city in southern 
Louisiana with a population of 133,985, about 60 miles west of Baton Rouge.  About 65% of 
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Lafayette residents are white and about 30% African-American.
 30
  Quintanar (2011) used 
automated traffic enforcement as a measure of the population to compare against police-issued 
speeding tickets.  Controlling for location and violation characteristics as well as a host of other 
determinants, police issued a higher proportion of speeding tickets to women and African-
Americans, as opposed to the proportion issued to those groups by automated sources.  This 
result implies that police use race and gender as determinants in the decision of whether or not to 
ticket an individual, but in that paper’s context it was not determined if police were engaging in 
preference based discrimination or statistical discrimination.   
While previous research has investigated police discrimination in traffic offenses, ranging 
from vehicle stop and search to maintenance and speeding violations, these studies generally 
employ police ticket data without considering individual responses to those tickets.  For instance, 
Makowsky and Stratmann (2009) investigate the impact of police preferences in issuing speeding 
tickets and assigning speeding fines: specifically, whether their motives as agents of the 
government influence who receives speeding tickets.
31
  The authors find that police are more 
likely to issue speeding tickets to individuals traveling at high speeds and those who have a high 
opportunity cost of fighting the ticket, and therefore, those individuals who are less likely to 
contest their speeding ticket.  They identify opportunity cost in terms of distance from the 
driver’s residence to the courthouse.  Makowsky and Stratmann (2009) provide evidence that 
police officers in Massachusetts are not race and gender blind: Hispanics and men in general 
were more likely to be fined when stopped.   Females are less likely to receive a fine than males 
                                                 
30
 Census 2000 and American Community Survey 2005-2009. (http://factfinder.census.gov)  
31
 Police officers in Massachusetts are able to decide who to issue speeding tickets to, as well as how much their fine 
should be.  This is different from the law in Louisiana, where the police officer has the discretion to issue tickets, but 
a fine schedule determines the speeding ticket fine for drivers. 
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and the likelihood of a fine decreases with age.  These findings provide insight into relevant 
variables for this type of analysis. 
In existing studies, with the exception of Quintanar (2011), data issues arise due to police 
knowledge of data collection as well as nonreporting.  If police know that a study on differential 
treatment is being conducted, they may alter their behavior to avoid punishment.  Similarly, data 
are collected as a stipulation of a lawsuit in the majority of previous studies.  Police may be 
asked to record stops, searches, and/or tickets issued; however, if they only report a portion of 
actual incidents, the measure of the population will be biased (Grogger and Ridgeway 2006, 
Makowsky and Stratmann 2009, Knowles et al. 2001, Knowles and Todd 2007, etc.).  These 
issues are not relevant in the current work, because the data were collected without any prior 
knowledge of the study by the police department, and the dataset is comprised of the entire 
population of issued speeding tickets.  Also, the research design in this paper is unique because 
the dataset includes not only police issued tickets, but also each driver’s response to those tickets 
throughout the court system. 
This is the first paper to follow individuals through the court process, from speeding 
ticket to trial, which investigates whether individual behavior supports the theory of statistical 
discrimination by police.  If women and African-Americans are more likely to pay their ticket 
fine as opposed to asking for a trial, they may be targeted by police because the associated 
marginal cost is lower for issuing tickets to these individuals.  The court process in dealing with 
a speeding ticket is specified by law, though individuals are able to make a series of choices 
when determining how to proceed.  By following all individuals who received a speeding ticket, 
it is possible to determine if behavior differs by race or gender in regards to who is more or less 
likely to fight a speeding ticket in court. 
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This paper develops a deeper understanding of the decisions made by individuals and 
prosecutors in dealing with a speeding ticket.  Discrimination within the court system has been 
the focus of extensive research; at all stages from initial police contact, to the jury determinance 
of guilt, to sentencing for those found guilty of a crime (Mustard, 2001; Schanzenbach, 2005; 
Anwar, Bayer, and Hjalmarsson, 2010).  Though the United States criminal justice system is 
founded on the idea of justice being race and gender blind, current research is inconclusive as to 
whether that is true in practice.  While other studies have investigated discrimination in court 
more broadly, this is the first to employ such information as a motive for police discrimination, 
as well as the first to follow individual decisions in dealing with a speeding ticket.
32
 
3.2. Modeling the Court Process 
 The court procedure for speeding tickets is explicitly defined by the law, but ticketed 
individuals are in some ways able to decide how to navigate the process.  Court protocol can be 
defined as four decision stages: some of which are reliant on the individual, while others depend 
on prosecutor discretion (the representative of the court).  The best way to understand this 
process is to first examine each stage individually. 
3.2.1. Stage 1: Driver Decision to Attend Initial Hearing 
A driver’s first decision is whether to pay the fine associated with their speeding violation 
or to attend an initial hearing (called an arraignment).  Each individual has the option to pay their 
ticket fine without attending a hearing either by mail or at payment windows located at the 
Lafayette City Courthouse.  Though it is relatively easier to pay a ticket fine by mail than to 
attend a hearing, individuals may choose to attend an arraignment to try and get a reduced charge 
(a deal) from the prosecutor.   A ticketed driver will choose to attend an arraignment if they 
                                                 
32
 Other researchers have followed individual or prosecutorial decisions through different stages of the court process 
for assaults and other crimes (eg. Wooldredge et al. 2004, Kingsnorth et al. 1998, and Leiber and Mack 2003). 
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believe there is a positive net benefit of doing so.  For each individual,  , this unobservable net 
benefit of contesting can be defined as the difference between the expected value of the benefit 
of attending a hearing minus the expected cost of paying the ticket:   
  
   (                       
  (      )(           )).  (1) 
and the equation for expected benefit of attending a hearing can be defined as: 
     [                       
 ] 
  [(        )(           )               ],  (2) 
where the subscript   (  =1, 2, 3, 4) is implemented to denote a decision stage, since 
expected action in future stages is now relevant and        is the probability of not receiving a 
deal from the prosecutor in the next stage.  The error term,    ,  is assumed to be distributed 
standard normal. 
Individual drivers can determine the amount of their fine,            , by calling 
Lafayette City Court.  Though the schedule of fines is not published, fine amounts are based on 
the severity of the violation, other violation characteristics, and the driving history of the ticketed 
individual (the number of previous moving violations or other infractions).  All of this 
information is available in the data and will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3.3.
33
   
The net benefit of contesting also depends on the probability of not receiving a deal from 
the prosecutor in the next stage and the driver’s opportunity cost of fighting the ticket.  If 
individuals believe that they have a very high chance of not receiving a deal, they will be less 
likely to choose to fight their ticket.  This probability depends on variables which the individual 
                                                 
33
 It is important to note that what is observed in the data is the fine amount paid by the driver.  Therefore, if an 
individual chooses to attend an arraignment, it is impossible to determine what the fine would have been if they had 
instead chosen to pay the fine initially by mail.  Though this is a limitation of the data, lack of knowledge of the fine 
at alternative stages of the court process does not affect the investigation of the existence of discrimination, since we 
are merely interested in individual choices at each stage, and we are aware when an individual receives a deal from 
the prosecutor. 
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driver assumes are relevant to the prosecutor’s decision: severity of the violation, the driver’s 
driving record, and perhaps even personal characteristics.  Relatedly, individuals who have a 
higher opportunity cost, i.e. those who earn higher wages, are going to face a lower expected net 
benefit of contesting a ticket.   
The reduced form of equation (1) is: 
         
            (3) 
             
                    
where the vector    includes individual specific and violation related variables which 
influence the net benefit of contesting, and     is an error term, which will be explained in detail 
later. 
Recall that the true net benefit of contesting (  
 ) is unobservable, and we only observe 
each individual’s decision (  ) once they have considered this expected benefit.  In the first 
stage, individuals either choose to attend an arraignment (     ) or they choose to pay by mail 
or at a ticket window (     ), where     is each individual’s decision in Stage 1. 
3.2.2. Stage 2: Prosecutor Decision Not to Grant a Deal at Initial Hearing 
 The second stage of the court process is the prosecutor’s decision to grant a deal or not to 
grant a deal.  In this context, a deal is either a reduction in the cited severity of the ticket (eg. 
travelling between 16 and 20 miles over the limit instead of more than 21 miles over the limit) or 
the speeding ticket is amended to a non-moving violation (not wearing a seatbelt for example).
34
  
Notice that this decision is only relevant if the ticketed individual chose to contest the ticket and 
                                                 
34
 Some drivers receive a more extreme type of deal: a dropped charge.  These drivers are likely different from the 
remaining sample in unobservable ways.  Prosecutors have an unlimited amount of discretion and are more likely to 
drop charges of individuals that they are personally connected with, as well as a few “fluke” cases where the police 
officer made a mistake in writing the ticket.  These individuals are dropped from the sample for these reasons. 
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attend a hearing (if      ).  Those drivers who paid by mail or at a ticket window are no longer 
observed in the data.   
Prosecutors grant the majority of deals for two main reasons: to give “good” drivers a 
break or to convince someone with other, more serious offenses to pay their fine without 
attending a trial.
35
  Good drivers have zero or few prior violations and their ticket was for a 
relatively minor speeding violation.  These drivers are not seen as major threats to public safety, 
and thus the prosecutor is less likely to be concerned with enforcing a strong punishment.  At the 
other extreme, severe violators with multiple tickets may be more willing to pay all of their fines 
if they receive some sort of deal for one violation.  For example, a driver who received a ticket 
for speeding and a ticket for driving without insurance at the same traffic stop has the right to go 
to trial for both tickets.  The prosecutor may make a deal with the driver: agree to pay both 
tickets in exchange for a lesser penalty associated with the speeding ticket.  In this way, the 
prosecutor can avoid the costs associated with a trial, while still obtaining ticket revenue for the 
city.   
The probability that an individual will continue to fight their ticket in the next stage also 
may influence the prosecutor’s decision.  The prosecutor’s goal as a member of the court is to 
punish the guilty without punishing the innocent at the lowest possible cost to society 
(Reinganum 1988).  Therefore, on the margin the prosecutor will prefer to grant a deal to those 
drivers he considers likely to attend trial, in order to reduce the costs to the court.
36
  These 
prosecutorial decisions are entirely discretionary, and there are no rules or regulations regarding 
                                                 
35
 This information was obtained through personal communication with individuals employed by Lafayette City 
Court, and who are directly involved in traffic court. 
36
 This probability will play a larger role for less severe offenders, because more severe offenders will require a 
higher punishment, and thus the prosecutor may not care if those offenders continue to trial.  However, the severity 
of the crime is controlled for explicitly. 
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how deals should be granted.
37
  For these reasons, it is assumed that the general prosecutor’s 
decision is based on violation as well as individual-specific characteristics about the driver (  ), 
as well as the probability that the individual will continue to contest their ticket in the following 
stage (      ): 
    
                    (4) 
Notice that the probability that the individual will contest their ticket again in the 
following stage is driven by the same violation and driver specific variables mentioned 
previously for Stage 1: the potential net benefit of contesting in terms of a reduced fine.  Similar 
to the equation describing the structural model of driver’s decision, equation (4) above defines 
the structural model of prosecutorial decision in Stages 2 and 4.  This formulation leads to the 
following characterization of the prosecutor’s decision for Stage 2:  
             
            (5) 
              
                    
     is only observed if      . 
where        means that the individual did not receive a deal from the prosecutor 
(       means the individual did receive a deal).  Again,    is a vector of the relevant 
personal and violation attributes of the ticketed individual.  The data explicitly specify when an 
individual receives a deal from the prosecutor as opposed to when the driver continues on within 
the court process without a deal.  Similarly, if a driver pays their ticket, the data will specify 
whether they did so after receiving a deal from the prosecutor. 
                                                 
37
 This information was obtained through personal communication with individuals employed by Lafayette City 
Court and who are directly involved in traffic court. 
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3.2.3. Stage 3: Driver Decision to Request a Trial 
 The remaining two stages of the court process follow exactly from Stages 1 and 2.   After 
Stage 2, those individuals who did not receive a deal have another decision to make: ask for a 
trial or “give up” and pay their fine.  This decision defines Stage 3.  Again, ticketed drivers 
weigh the cost of the ticket with the expected benefit of attending another hearing.  This decision 
is modeled in the same manner as equation (3): 
             
            (6) 
             
                    
    is only observed if       
 where       if the individual decides to go to court for a trial, and       if the 
individual pays their fine without attending an additional hearing.   
Though this decision is very similar to the decision made at Stage 1, one main difference 
is the structure of an arraignment versus a trial.  Trials are much longer processes than 
arraignments: numerous cases are heard at arraignments where general details are discussed.  
However, trials focus on the details of one case, and much more time is spent investigating those 
details.  Relatedly, individuals who choose to attend trial must have some experience with the 
court system, judge, and prosecutor, since they all attended an arraignment in Stage 1. 
3.2.4. Stage 4: Prosecutor Decision to Grant a Deal at Trial 
 Lastly, individuals reach Stage 4 if they chose to attend a hearing initially, did not receive 
a deal from the prosecutor, and then decided to continue fighting their ticket.  Analogous to 
Stage 2, the prosecutor has the opportunity to grant deals to some of these individuals.  Stage 4, 
the final prosecutor decision, is modeled following equation (5), where        if the 
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individual did not receive a deal from the prosecutor and        if they did receive a lesser 
sentence: 
             
            (7) 
             
                    
     and     are only observed if      . 
 Now that the theoretical model is established, a closer look at     is in order.  If the four 
stages are independent, the model may be estimated by using four independent probit equations 
(Greene 2008).  However, if the error terms between stages are related through unobservable 
variables, the model needs to account for any selection bias driving some individuals and not 
others deeper into the court process.  If such a correlation across error terms exists, coefficients 
estimated by independent probit models will be biased.   
3.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.3.1. Data 
Lafayette City Court keeps a computerized log of misdemeanor charges, which includes 
all speeding tickets issued by a Lafayette City Police Officer within the city limits.  The data 
were collected directly from this record and include information about the speeding violation 
itself, as well as choices made by both the driver and prosecutor throughout the court process.  
The explanatory variables (some driver characteristics are primary variables of interest) used 
throughout this analysis can be grouped into four categories: driver characteristics, violation 
specifics, court-related variables, and socioeconomic characteristics.  Driver characteristics 
include: race, gender, age, age squared, and the number of moving violations in the past year.   
Quintanar (2011) found that African-Americans and women receive proportionately more 
speeding tickets from police officers than they do from automated sources.  This paper uses 
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identical ticket data, appended with driver and prosecutor choices through the court process to 
test whether those findings are the result of statistical discrimination or tastes for 
discrimination.
38
  Race and gender are the main variables of interest: a negative, significant 
coefficient on these variables in Stages 1 or 3 would provide supportive evidence for statistical-
discrimination by police in issuing speeding tickets.  A negative coefficient implies that African-
Americans (women) are less likely to fight their speeding ticket, and instead, are more likely to 
pay their fine upfront, by mail or at a ticket window.  Therefore, police ticket individuals who are 
more likely to pay their fines instead of attending court, saving the court time and money. 
If the marginal effect of being female or African-American was positive, the data would 
be in opposition to the statistical discrimination story, and would instead provide support for 
preference-based discrimination.  A positive coefficient implies that women and/or African-
Americans are more likely to fight their speeding tickets by attending an arraignment or trial, and 
thus police are targeting individuals who are likely to consume more judicial and court resources.  
This implies that police are targeting these groups for some other reason, which may be a 
preference for ticketing these individuals.  Potential other explanations for this type of 
discrimination are discussed in Section 3.5.  Age is included because previous studies have found 
an impact of age on police and judge behavior (Makowsky and Stratmann, 2009).  The 
remaining driver characteristic is more specific to the court system: the number of prior moving 
violations that the driver has on his/her record.  Prosecutors will likely be harsher on individuals 
with a history of committing traffic violations than those who have a clean record.  If individuals 
are aware of these prosecutorial behaviors, they will take this into account when making 
decisions.  
                                                 
38
 Quintanar only uses ticket data from October 2007 to Feburary 2008, but here the sample also includes tickets 
issued in August 2007 and September 2007. 
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An important violation characteristic is the severity of the speeding violation, which is 
coded in ranges of 5 miles per hour over the limit: 5 to 10 miles over the limit, 11 to 15 miles 
over the limit, 16 to 20 miles over the limit, and the omitted category of more than 21 miles over 
the limit.  A more severe speeding violation carries a higher fine, and thus a greater potential 
benefit for ticketed drivers if they are successful in receiving a deal from the prosecutor.  
However, it is likely that prosecutors are harsher on drivers with more severe violations, since 
these violators are more dangerous.  It is also known whether the ticket was issued in a school 
zone.   
Some drivers receive another ticket as well as a speeding ticket during the traffic stop; for 
example, they may receive a ticket for no insurance in addition to a ticket for speeding 10 miles 
over the limit.  These additional tickets may indicate to the prosecutor that this driver is more 
dangerous, conditional upon the severity of that additional ticket, thus increasing the likelihood 
of not receiving a deal. 
There is one court-related variable relevant to driver and prosecutorial decisions 
throughout the court process: an indicator for which judge is assigned to the case.  Each driver is 
assigned to one of two traffic court judges when they are issued a ticket.  Generally drivers are 
not aware of which judge they have been assigned until they attend an arraignment.  However, 
they could theoretically phone the courthouse and obtain that information.  If the two judges 
behave differently, judge assignment may impact decisions made by both the ticketed driver and 
the prosecutor.
39
   
Lastly, socioeconomic variables linked to the driver’s home zip code include: log per 
capita income, percent of individuals whose education level is a high school degree up to some 
                                                 
39
 To protect the anonymity of the judges, I call this variable “Judge A.”  This variable equals 1 for one of the two 
judges and 0 for the other.  The letter “A” is not an identifiable piece of information. 
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college, percent of individuals whose education level is a college degree or higher, miles from 
the Lafayette City Courthouse to the home zip code, and more specific controls for the length of 
time it takes to drive to the courthouse.
 40
  These controls provide information about the 
individual’s socioeconomic status as well as proxy for the opportunity cost of contesting a 
speeding ticket.     
A total of 1,707 tickets were issued between August 2007 and February 2008, however, 
the sample used in the present study excludes some of these tickets because the drivers are 
different in unobservable ways.  Individuals who choose jail time or are allowed to perform 
community service instead of paying their fine (12), those who receive the maximum deal from 
the prosecutor (54), and individuals who never pay or take care of their speeding tickets are not 
included in the estimation sample (23). 
First of all, individuals have the option to serve time in jail instead of paying their ticket 
fine; one day in jail is equivalent to $10.  Although few individuals choose this method of 
“payment,” those that do must be very different than the average ticketed driver and must have a 
very low opportunity cost of time.  Relatedly, only one individual was allowed to perform 
community service instead of paying a fine, and the motives for this allowance are unclear.  
Individuals who receive the maximum deal from the prosecutor, a completely dropped charge, 
are likely able to avoid a penalty after receiving a ticket as a result of personal relationships or 
political status.  Even if these deals are not a result of political status or friendships, the reason 
for a dropped charge is not included in the data and cannot be defined.  Lastly, drivers who never 
pay their ticket fine are dropped from the sample because they do not adequately follow the court 
policies and procedures, and the majority has warrants out for their arrest.  Including these 
                                                 
40
 These socioeconomic variables were collected from the 2000 Census Demographic Profile Highlights by zip code.  
Miles to the courthouse and minutes from the courthouse were collected using Google maps from the home zip code 
to the Lafayette City Courthouse address: 105 E. Convent Street Lafayette, LA 70501.  
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drivers may bias the results since a number of important unobservable influences cannot be 
controlled for.  Dropping these four types of drivers results in a final sample size of 1,618 tickets.  
3.3.2. Court Process and Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 3.1 displays the choices made in the sample of 1,618 speeding ticket cases and 
illustrates the sample size at each decision stage, as defined in Section 3.2.  The majority of 
individuals (67%) choose to pay their fines initially by mail or at the ticket windows.   Of those 
who do not pay at the window at Stage 1, few individuals receive a deal at arraignment (8%).  
Those who do not get a deal then face Stage 3; they must decide if they would like to keep 
fighting their ticket by attending a trial or if they would rather “give up” and pay the fine.  Most 
individuals stop fighting the ticket and pay their fine (89%).  Again, in the last stage, the majority 
of individuals do not receive a deal from the prosecutor (72%).   
Table 3.1 lists the variable definitions along with their means and standard deviation.  
Approximately half of the ticketed drivers are female, whereas only 27% are African-
American.
41
  The average driver is 31 years old.  The majority of drivers were traveling between 
11 and 15 miles over the speed limit when ticketed, and about 38% of tickets were issued for 
speeding in a school zone.  Very few drivers received other tickets in addition to the speeding 
ticket when they were stopped, and the majority of drivers had not received a speeding ticket in 
the past year (a mean of .471 prior violations).  A little less than half of drivers are assigned to 
Judge A.
42
   
                                                 
41
 In 2000 the fraction of African-Americans in Lafayette was 28.5% (Census Bureau fact sheet for Lafayette, LA).  
In 2009, it was 31.1%, therefore, the 27% is only slightly lower than the underlying population (American 
Community Survey 2005-2009 estimates). 
42
 Judge A is a fictional identifier of one judge versus the other and is not an abbreviation for the name of the judge.  
Though all drivers are assigned to one of the two traffic court judges when issued a ticket, individuals are not aware 
of their assignment until they attend an arraignment hearing. 
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In Sample: 
Receive Ticket 
100% 
1618 
Did Not Pay at the Window 
33% 
538 
No Deal at Arraignment 
92% 
493 
Went to Trial 
11% 
53 
No Deal at or Before Trial 
72% 
38 
Received a Deal at or Before 
Trial and Paid Fine 
28% 
15 
Pay Ticket 
89% 
440 
Received a Deal at 
Arraignment and Paid Fine 
8% 
45 
Pay at the Window 
67% 
1080 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Decision Tree 
The figure above illustrates choices of 1,618 individuals through the court process, once receiving a speeding ticket.  Stages are 
denoted at relevant decision nodes, and each box contains a description of the choice made as well as two numbers: the percentage of 
the sample choosing that option and the sample size.   
Stage 1: 
Driver Decision to 
Attend Initial Hearing 
Stage 2: 
Prosecutor Decision to 
Grant a Deal 
Stage 3: 
Driver Decision to 
Request a Trial 
Stage 4: 
Prosecutor Decision to 
Grant a Deal  
(At or Before Trial) 
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Table 3.1:  Definitions, Means, and Standard Deviation 
Variable Definition Observations 
Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
African- 
American 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver is African-
American, 0 otherwise. 
1609 .267 
(.443) 
Female Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver is female, 0 
otherwise. 
1614 .505 
(.500) 
Age Age in years of the driver at the date the ticket 
was issued. 
1612 31.214 
(12.766) 
Age Squared Age in years of the driver, squared. 1612 1137.193 
(996.873) 
Past Violations The number of speeding tickets the driver has 
received in the past year. 
1618 .471 
(.997) 
Five to 10 
Miles Over 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver was traveling 
between 5 and 10 miles over the speed limit, 0 
otherwise. 
1530 .034 
(.181) 
Eleven to 15 
Miles Over 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver was traveling 
between 11 and 15 miles over the speed limit, 0 
otherwise. 
1530 .472 
(.499) 
Sixteen to 20 
Miles Over 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver was traveling 
between 16 and 20 miles over the speed limit, 0 
otherwise. 
1530 .393 
(.489) 
More than 21 
Miles Over 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver was traveling 
more than 21 miles over the speed limit, 0 
otherwise. 
1530 .101 
(.302) 
School Zone Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver was speeding 
in a school zone, 0 otherwise. 
1617 .379 
(.485) 
Another Less 
Severe Ticket 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver received 
another, less severe ticket, at the time of the 
speeding ticket, 0 otherwise. 
1618 .062 
(.242) 
Another More 
Severe Ticket 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver received 
another, more severe ticket, at the time of the 
speeding ticket, 0 otherwise. 
1618 .030 
(.171) 
Judge A Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver was assigned 
to Judge A, 0 if they had Judge B. 
1618 .462 
(.499) 
Lafayette 
Resident 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver’s home zip 
code is within Lafayette city limits, 0 otherwise. 
1615 .593 
(.491) 
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Table 3.1 concluded 
Variable Definition Observations 
Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
High School/Some 
College 
The fraction of people in the driver’s home 
zip code who graduated from high school or 
has some college, but no degree. 
1601 .539 
(.052) 
College Degree or 
Higher 
The fraction of people in the driver’s home 
zip code who graduated from college, or 
higher. 
1601 .236 
(.133) 
Log Per Capita 
Income 
Log of per capita income for the home zip 
code of the driver. 
1601 9.787 
(.286) 
Miles from 
Courthouse 
Miles from the Lafayette City Courthouse 
based on the home zip code of the driver. 
1609 19.304 
(55.985) 
45-90 Min. Drive to 
Court 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver’s home 
zip code is 45-90 minutes away from the 
Lafayette City Courthouse, 0 otherwise. 
1618 .057 
(.232) 
> 90 Min. Drive to 
Court 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver’s home 
zip code is more than 90 minutes away 
from the Lafayette City Courthouse, 0 
otherwise. 
1618 .052 
(.222) 
 
 
Table 3.2 presents means and standard deviation of the control variables for each stage of 
the court process.  Some major differences can be seen in the average number of African-
Americans and women who remain at Stage 4; the proportion of African-Americans increases as 
the stages progress, while the percentage of women decreases.  More severe violators comprise a 
larger proportion of drivers as they progress from Stage 1 to Stage 3, and drivers who received 
other tickets in addition to their speeding ticket are more prevalent once we reach Stage 4.   
The raw data suggest that police are not statistically discriminating against women or 
African-Americans on the basis of likelihood to fight a ticket, since women seem to be just as 
likely as men to pay their tickets immediately, but less likely to attend trial.  Conversely, 
African-Americans actually seem to be more likely to contest their ticket at both stages. 
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Table 3.2:  Means and Standard Deviation by Stage 
Variable Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
 =1 if Driver 
Attends 
Arraignment, =0 if 
Pays 
=1 if No Deal, 
=0 if Deal 
=1 if Driver 
Attends Trial, 
=0 if Pays 
=1 if No Deal, 
=0 if Deal 
African- American .259 
(.438) 
.344 
(.476) 
.364 
(.482) 
.469 
(.507) 
Female .518 
(.500) 
.502 
(.501) 
.492 
(.500) 
.406 
(.499) 
Age 31.178 
(12.678) 
30.451 
(12.326) 
30.395 
(11.973) 
35.531 
(13.464) 
Age Squared 1132.69 
(988.001) 
1078.913 
(974.818) 
1066.865 
(927.798) 
1438.094 
(1003.986) 
Past Violations .468 
(.976) 
.496 
(1.077) 
.523 
(1.110) 
.5 
(1.459) 
Five to 10 Miles 
Over 
.035 
(.183) 
.026 
(.160) 
.022 
(.147) 
.094 
(.296) 
Eleven to 15 Miles 
Over 
.469 
(.499) 
.273 
(.446) 
.266 
(.442) 
.313 
(.471) 
Sixteen to 20 Miles 
Over 
.393 
(.489) 
.547 
(.498) 
.561 
(.497) 
.406 
(.499) 
More than 21 Miles 
Over 
.103 
(.304) 
.154 
(.361) 
.151 
(.358) 
.188 
(.397) 
School Zone .395 
(.489) 
.605 
(.489) 
.632 
(.483) 
.313 
(.471) 
Another Less 
Severe Ticket 
.060 
(.238) 
.091 
(.288) 
.091 
(.288) 
0 
(0) 
Another More 
Severe Ticket 
.025 
(.155) 
.069 
(.253) 
.073 
(.261) 
0 
(0) 
Judge A .457 
(.498) 
.466 
(.499) 
.475 
(.500) 
.656 
(.483) 
Lafayette Resident .603 
(.489) 
.587 
(.493) 
.581 
(.494) 
.531 
(.507) 
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Table 3.2 concluded 
Variable Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
 =1 if Driver 
Attends 
Arraignment, =0 
if Pays 
=1 if No Deal, 
=0 if Deal 
=1 if Driver 
Attends Trial, 
=0 if Pays 
=1 if No Deal, 
=0 if Deal 
High School/Some 
College 
 
.539 
(.052) 
.540 
(.050) 
.541 
(.049) 
.541 
(.051) 
College Degree or 
Higher 
.238 
(.133) 
.221 
(.128) 
.215 
(.124) 
.206 
(.127) 
Log Per Capita 
Income 
9.791 
(.286) 
9.748 
(.274) 
9.734 
(.266) 
9.716 
(.283) 
Miles from 
Courthouse 
17.393 
(48.548) 
16.951 
(57.374) 
16.916 
(58.916) 
21.219 
(38.862) 
45-90 Min. Drive to 
Court 
.056 
(.229) 
.053 
(.224) 
.049 
(.216) 
0 
(0) 
>90 Min. Drive to 
Court 
.041 
(.199) 
.036 
(.188) 
.038 
(.191) 
.094 
(.296) 
N 1495 494 451 32 
Means and standard deviations are estimated based on the sample from Tables 3.3A and 3.3B for 
consistency.  Two controls predict success perfectly for Stage 4: Another Less Severe Ticket and 
Another More Severe Ticket.  For all individuals who receive another ticket in addition to their 
speeding ticket, they do not receive a deal from the prosecutor in Stage 4. 
 
Statistical discrimination implies that police would target drivers who are more likely to pay their 
tickets outright, thereby avoiding court costs associated with trials.  However, more rigorous 
analyses must be conducted to test for statistical discrimination than merely considering simple 
means. 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Probit Models Assuming Independent Error Terms 
The initial analysis of court behavior is presented in Tables 3.3A and 3.3B: where the 
entries are marginal effects for Stages 1-4 estimated by independent probit equations.  This 
specification is valid if the error terms are not correlated across equations.  It is reasonable, as an 
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initial investigation, to assume that each decision is independent, since individuals make choices 
at Stages 1 and 3 while prosecutors make decisions at Stages 2 and 4.  Similarly, an individual 
may use completely different criteria in deciding whether to fight their ticket in Stage 1 and 
Stage 3, especially if they view trials and arraignments as two distinct events.  If this is the case, 
the error terms for these equations should not be correlated.  Supportive evidence of 
independence will be provided in a later sub-section.   
In Tables 3.3A and 3.3B, all equations control for driver characteristics, violation 
characteristics, and court-related variables.  The second and fourth columns add controls for 
socioeconomic characteristics.  The signs of the coefficients for a majority of controls coincide 
with theoretical predictions, although some driver characteristics and court-related variables are 
insignificant.   
In Stage 1 African-Americans are consistently more likely to fight the ticket, while there 
is no effect based on gender or age.  This contradicts the proposition that police statistically 
discriminate against African-Americans and women because they might be more likely to pay a 
speeding ticket (Quintanar, 2011).  According to these results, African-Americans are less likely 
to pay their tickets and women behave no differently than men.  Police cannot be statistically 
discriminating based on likelihood to pay tickets since they are ticketing individuals who are not 
more likely to pay their fines.  Therefore, the results found in Quintanar (2011) cannot be based 
on statistical discrimination and may indicate police are ticketing individuals due to preference 
based discrimination.  Potential other discrimination stories will be explored later in the paper. 
 Drivers committing less severe violations are less likely to fight their tickets than their 
speedy counterparts (the omitted category represents those individuals traveling more than 21 
miles over the limit).  However, drivers who were ticketed in a school zone were much more 
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Table 3.3A: Probit Model Assuming Independent Errors Between Decision Stages  
 Stage 1  Stage 2  
 =1 if Driver Attends Arraignment, =0 if Pays =1 if No Deal, =0 if Deal  
African-American .166** 
(.031) 
.141** 
(.033) 
 .060** 
(.019) 
.044** 
(.016) 
 
Female -.015 
(.026) 
-.012 
(.026) 
 -.028 
(.020) 
-.024 
(.018) 
 
Age .001 
(.006) 
-.001 
(.006) 
 .006 
(.004) 
.005 
(.003) 
 
Age Squared -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
 -.000* 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
 
Past Violations .015 
(.013) 
.017 
(.013) 
 .029* 
(.014) 
.027* 
(.014) 
 
5 to 10 Miles Over -.182** 
(.052) 
-.184** 
(.051) 
 -.036 
(.072) 
-.032 
(.066) 
 
11 to 15 Miles Over -.361** 
(.037) 
-.362** 
(.037) 
 -.021 
(.034) 
-.007 
(.029) 
 
16 to 20 Miles Over -.098** 
(.039) 
-.096** 
(.039) 
 .015 
(.031) 
.020 
(.028) 
 
School Zone .329** 
(.026) 
.329** 
(.026) 
 .092** 
(.029) 
.073** 
(.025) 
 
Another Less Severe Ticket .152** 
(.059) 
.151** 
(.059) 
 -.029 
(.052) 
-.035 
(.051) 
 
Another More Severe Ticket .635** 
(.048) 
.634** 
(.050) 
 .052 
(.019) 
.042 
(.017) 
 
Judge A .013 
(.026) 
.017 
(.026) 
 .028 
(.020) 
.021 
(.018) 
 
Lafayette Resident  -.003 
(.043) 
  -.014 
(.031) 
 
High School/Some College 
 
 -.060 
(.332) 
  .566** 
(.256) 
 
College Degree or Higher  -.064 
(.519) 
  .713** 
(.383) 
 
Log Per Capita Income  -.075 
(.211) 
  -.366** 
(.155) 
 
Miles from Courthouse  .000 
(.000) 
  .000 
(.000) 
 
45-90 Min. Drive to Court  -.058 
(.051) 
  -.109* 
(.079) 
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Table 3.3A continued 
 Stage 1  Stage 2  
 =1 if Driver Attends 
Arraignment, =0 if Pays 
 =1 if No Deal, =0 if Deal  
>90 Min. Drive to Court  -.089 
(.072) 
  .042 
(.016) 
 
N 1511 1495  500 494  
ln L -770.19 -757.12  -129.15 -117.41  
The coefficients are marginal effects.  The models are estimated with robust standard errors. 
 
Table 3.3B: Probit Model Assuming Independent Errors Between Decision Stages 
 Stage 3 Stage 4 
 =1 if Driver Attends Trial, =0 if Driver Pays  =1 if No Deal, =0 if Deal 
African-American .042* 
(.027) 
.053** 
(.029) 
 .453* 
(.203) 
.207 
(.269) 
 
Female -.026 
(.024) 
-.025 
(.023) 
 -.145 
(.213) 
-.211 
(.248) 
 
Age .003 
(.005) 
.004 
(.005) 
 .087 
(.077) 
.047 
(.077) 
 
Age Squared -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
 -.001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
 
Past Violations -.009 
(.013) 
-.007 
(.012) 
 .162 
(.181) 
.309 
(.209) 
 
5 to 10 Miles Over .185* 
(.153) 
.206* 
(.155) 
 .473** 
(.124) 
.308 
(.222) 
 
11 to 15 Miles Over .018 
(.040) 
.026 
(.039) 
 .394 
(.210) 
.168 
(.244) 
 
16 to 20 Miles Over .005 
(.035) 
.006 
(.033) 
 .534** 
(.206) 
.194 
(.277) 
 
School Zone -.117** 
(.034) 
-.119** 
(.033) 
 .231 
(.240) 
.463 
(.195) 
 
Another Less Severe 
Ticket 
.073 
(.057) 
.068 
(.054) 
 - -  
Another More Severe 
Ticket 
.157** 
(.080) 
.168** 
(.083) 
 - -  
Judge A .052** 
(.024) 
.051** 
(.024) 
 .088 
(.229) 
.083 
(.248) 
 
Lafayette Resident  -.043 
(.039) 
  .172 
(.468) 
 
High School/Some 
College 
 
 .248 
(.279) 
  5.910* 
(3.088) 
 
College Degree or Higher  .620 
(.454) 
  5.711 
(5.223) 
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Table 3.3B continued 
 Stage 3  Stage 4  
 =1 if Driver Attends Trial, =0 if 
Driver Pays  
 =1 if No Deal, =0 if Deal  
Log Per Capita Income  -.223 
(.191) 
  -2.164 
(2.129) 
 
Miles from Courthouse  -.000 
(.000) 
  .022 
(.024) 
 
45-90 Min. Drive to 
Court 
 -.050 
(.026) 
  -  
>90 Min. Drive to Court  .099 
(.100) 
  -.892 
(.165) 
 
N 455 451  32 32  
ln L -127.73 -124.60  -15.24 -14.23  
Probit marginal effects are listed, with robust standard errors.  Two controls predict success 
perfectly for Stage 4: Another Less Severe Ticket and Another More Severe Ticket.  For all 
individuals who receive another ticket in addition to their speeding ticket, they do not receive a 
deal from the prosecutor in Stage 4.  The control for living 45-90 minutes from the courthouse is 
dropped due to collinearity in Stage 4. 
 
likely to attend an arraignment to fight the ticket.  Individuals who received another ticket at the 
traffic stop where they were cited for speeding were consistently more likely to attend an 
arraignment, which is logical since those individuals have more to gain by attempting to receive 
a deal from the prosecutor.  In Stage 1, no socioeconomic controls were significant and neither 
was the judge indicator.  It can be noted that the judge control should not be significant in this 
stage, since drivers are not aware which judge they are assigned to until they attend an 
arraignment.   
Stage 2 results are similar to Stage 1, though their interpretation is quite different.  The 
marginal effect of being African-American is positive and significant, which implies that 
African-Americans are more likely to not receive a deal from the prosecutor than drivers of other 
races.  There is no significant difference between the likelihood of men and women to receive a 
deal.  This provides little insight into the investigation of statistical discrimination.  However, 
African-Americans should be less likely to fight their tickets if they know they have a smaller 
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likelihood of receiving a deal.  This finding does not necessarily imply discrimination by 
prosecutors, but could instead be a result of different rates of asking by African-Americans and 
individuals of other races.  The present study cannot distinguish between these two scenarios. 
While it is reasonable to assume that individuals in Stages 1 and 3 who have higher 
incomes are less likely to fight a ticket due to higher opportunity costs of time, the influence of 
higher incomes on prosecutors’ decisions is less clear.  Prosecutors may be harsher on those with 
higher incomes because these individuals are more able to afford their fines, or because the 
prosecutor believes these individuals are more likely to continue to speed.  Conversely, 
prosecutors may treat wealthy individuals more leniently, which likely results from political 
status or influence within the court.  This effect is generally insignificant in the estimation 
results, but when significant it seems that prosecutors are actually more likely to grant deals to 
individuals from wealthier neighborhoods. 
Table 3.3B presents the results for Stages 3 and 4.  In Stage 3, the marginal effect of 
being African-American remains positive and significant, though it is much smaller in magnitude 
(.053 as opposed to .141).  Therefore, African-Americans are still more likely to choose to fight 
their speeding ticket but racial disparity in behavior is smaller.  This could be a result of the 
differences between attending an arraignment and attending a trial.  Once more, gender and age 
are insignificant.  These results again contradict the theory that police statistically discriminate 
based on likelihood to contest.   
One interesting difference in Stage 3 is that the coefficient on Judge A is positive and 
statistically significant.  Individuals who are assigned to Judge A are more likely to ask for a 
trial.  In later sections I explore whether this occurs in response to differential fines assigned by 
the judges, or if it is due to some other unobservable difference between the two judges.   
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In Stage 4, the coefficient on African-American is positive, but only significant in the 
regression with fewer controls.  This implies that African-Americans are more likely not to 
receive a deal at trial, but again, could result from prosecutorial discrimination or a difference in 
asking.  It is important to note that controls in Stage 4 are generally consistent with theoretical 
predictions; however, the sample size is only 32 so not much should be inferred from these 
results.  They are provided for completeness.   
3.4.2. Independent Probit Models Including Probability of Continuing in the Next Stage 
Recall that the court process is defined in four stages: two as “driver choice” and two as 
“prosecutor choice.”  However, the meaning attributed to these titles needs clarification: each 
stage may not necessarily be independent, and theoretically they each could have a forward-
looking component.   For instance, in Stage 1 a driver’s decision of whether to fight their ticket 
or pay immediately may be impacted by the likelihood of their receiving a deal in the following 
stage.  This forward-looking component can be defined simply as the probability of a driver 
continuing on in the court process in the next stage (for instance, in Stage 1, the probability of 
continuing on in the court process in the next stage is the likelihood that the driver does not 
receive a deal in Stage 2).  There is a simple way to test whether predicted “performance” in the 
next stage is a factor in the decision made in the present stage. 
These probabilities of continuing are estimated conditionally, beginning with Stage 4.  A 
probit model for Stage 4 is estimated and used to predict likelihood of not receiving a deal for the 
entire sample.  Next, a probit model for Stage 3 is estimated including the predicted likelihood of 
not receiving a deal in Stage 4.  If this predicted probability in Stage 3 is statistically significant, 
it implies that individuals decide whether to attend a trial in part based on the likelihood of 
receiving a deal in Stage 4.  These results are then used to predict the likelihood of a driver 
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fighting their ticket in Stage 3, for the entire sample.  This procedure is continued for the 
remaining stages.   
Theoretically, the coefficient on the probability of continuing should be negative for 
driver decision stages (Stage 1 and Stage 3).  Expanding upon the above example of Stage 1’s 
probability of continuing, an individual who has a very high likelihood of not receiving a deal in 
Stage 2 (a very high probability of continuing in the next stage) should be less likely to fight 
their ticket because of the high likelihood that they are wasting their time.  Conversely, someone 
who has a low probability of not receiving a deal should be more likely to fight their ticket, 
because there is a large chance they will get a reduced charge. 
In Stage 2, the prosecutor decision stage, the relationship between the probability of 
continuing in the next stage and likelihood of not receiving a deal in the current stage may be 
negative or irrelevant.  If prosecutors are concerned with minimizing court costs and their own 
time costs, they will be more willing to grant a deal to an individual who seems likely to 
continue fighting their ticket in Stage 3 (Reinganum 1988).  Therefore, if the probability of 
continuing on through Stage 3 is large (the driver is very likely to fight the ticket and go to trial), 
then the prosecutor is going to be less likely to not grant a deal to the driver in Stage 2 (the 
probability of continuing will be negative).  However, if the prosecutor’s motives to avoid 
spending resources in court are outweighed by their desire to punish the guilty, they will be 
unwilling to grant deals based on the likelihood of a driver fighting their ticket.  This could still 
result in a negative probability of continuing in the next stage, but the probability should be 
insignificant. 
Table 3.4 provides marginal effects for this model estimated as independent probit 
equations by stage, including the predicted probability of continuing for each individual in the  
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Table 3.4:  Independent Probit Model, Including Probability of Continuing in the Next 
Stage 
          Stage 1    Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
 
=1 if Driver Attends 
Arraignment, =0 if Pays 
=1 if No Deal, =0 
if Deal 
=1 if Driver Attends 
Trial, =0 if Pays 
=1 if No Deal, =0 if 
Deal 
African-American .159** 
(.039) 
 .039** 
(.017) 
 .066** 
(.031) 
 .207 
(.269) 
 
Female -.023 
(.028) 
 -.020 
(.019) 
 -.035 
(.023) 
 -.211 
(.248) 
 
Age .001 
(.006) 
 .004 
(.004) 
 .006 
(.005) 
 .047 
(.077) 
 
Age Squared -.000 
(.000) 
 -.000 
(.000) 
 -.000 
(.000) 
 -.001 
(.001) 
 
Past Violations .024 
(.016) 
 .030** 
(.014) 
 .001 
(.012) 
 .309 
(.209) 
 
5 to 10 Miles Over -.194** 
(.049) 
 -.070 
(.111) 
 .255** 
(.168) 
 .308 
(.222) 
 
11 to 15 Miles Over -.365** 
(.037) 
 -.011 
(.029) 
 .041 
(.040) 
 .168 
(.244) 
 
16 to 20 Miles Over -.088** 
(.040) 
 .018 
(.027) 
 .021 
(.030) 
 .194 
(.277) 
 
School Zone .356** 
(.037) 
 .089** 
(.038) 
 -.076** 
(.032) 
 .463 
(.195) 
 
Another Less Severe 
Ticket 
.133** 
(.061) 
 -.039 
(.053) 
 .129** 
(.071) 
 -  
Another More 
Severe Ticket 
.642** 
(.048) 
 .037 
(.022) 
 .267** 
(.107) 
 -  
Judge A .026 
(.028) 
 .015 
(.021) 
 .050** 
(.023) 
 .083 
(.248) 
 
Lafayette Resident -.005 
(.043) 
 -.008 
(.031) 
 -.053 
(.038) 
 .172 
(.468) 
 
High School/Some 
College 
 
.196 
(.437) 
 .550** 
(.255) 
 .478* 
(.270) 
 5.910* 
(3.088) 
 
College Degree or 
Higher 
.212 
(.594) 
 .630* 
(.373) 
 .995** 
(.469) 
 5.711 
(5.223) 
 
Log Per Capita 
Income 
-.230 
(.264) 
 -.332** 
(.148) 
 -.379* 
(.196) 
 -2.164 
(2.129) 
 
Miles from 
Courthouse 
.000 
(.000) 
 .000 
(.000) 
 .000 
(.000) 
 .022 
(.024) 
 
45-90 Min. Drive to 
Court 
-.091 
(.059) 
 .090 
(.076) 
 -.042 
(.029) 
 -  
>90 Min. Drive to 
Court 
-.070 
(.078) 
 .041 
(.017) 
 -.002 
(.054) 
 -.892 
(.165) 
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Table 3.4 continued 
 Stage 1     Stage 2  Stage 3  Stage 4  
 
=1 if Driver Attends 
Arraignment, =0 if Pays 
 
=1 if No Deal, 
=0 if Deal 
 
=1 if Driver Attends 
Trial, =0 if Pays 
 =1 if No Deal, 
=0 if Deal 
 
Predicted 
Probability of 
Continuing Next 
Stage 
-.261 
(.279) 
 .106 
(.170) 
 -.142** 
(.056) 
 N/A  
N 1495  494  451  32  
ln L -756.65  -117.26  -122.15  -14.23  
   For Stage 4 estimates, the controls for receiving another less or more severe ticket are excluded     
   because they perfectly predict success.  Probability of success in Stage 4 is forced to equal 1 if    
   these variables equal one. 
 
following stage.  The overall results are similar to findings from Tables 3.3A and 3.3B.  African-
Americans are more likely to fight their ticket in both Stage 1 and 3, while they are more likely 
to not receive a deal in Stage 2.  Again, gender and age are insignificant in all stages.   
 In Stages 1 and 3, the sign of the probability of continuing is negative, consistent with 
theory, although estimated imprecisely for Stage 1.  This probability is only significant in Stage 
3, implying that drivers consider their likelihood of receiving a deal at trial, but may not really 
use this information when deciding whether to attend an arraignment.  It may also be the case 
that drivers at Stage 3, since they have more information about the prosecutor than they did at 
Stage 1, have a better understanding of how prosecutors decide to grant deals and thus are better 
able to predict their likelihood of success in the next stage.   
Stage 2 provides slightly different results than the driver decision stages; the probability 
of continuing in the next stage is insignificant and positive.  These results imply that prosecutors 
are not influenced by driver behavior, and instead issue deals based on violation and 
socioeconomic characteristics as seen in Tables 3.3A and 3.3B. 
Though the probabilities are consistent with theory, note that each is estimated using an 
out of sample prediction.  For example, individuals who choose to attend a trial are observed in 
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Stage 3, and the probability of attending trial is estimated by using this subsample.  This 
probability is predicted for all individuals in Stage 2, even those who choose not to attend trial 
and were no longer observed in the data in Stage 3.  These drivers made the decision to pay their 
ticket instead of attending trial because they had a low expected benefit of continuing on in the 
court process, but their predicted probabilities will be based on the sample of individuals who 
had high expected benefits of contesting.  This over-estimation as well as the fact that these 
probabilities are measured with error results in estimates which suffer from attenuation bias. 
3.4.3. Assuming Correlated Error Terms: A Selection Model 
As previously mentioned, independent probit estimates are appropriate only if the 
driver/prosecutor decision is unrelated to the decision made in the previous stage, or if each 
stage’s error term is uncorrelated.  This section aims to investigate the accuracy of this 
assumption, by estimating a model of selection where the equations are in essence linked 
together through a selection equation.  This specification is relevant if for example, an 
unobserved driver characteristic impacts the driver’s decision not to pay at the window and is 
also correlated with a control in the prosecutor’s decision to grant a deal at arraignment. 
Table 3.5 relaxes the assumption of independent error terms between stages: assuming 
first that the error terms for Stages 1 and 2 are related, and secondly assuming Stages 2 and 3 are 
related.  This estimation strategy, linking two subsequent stages instead of the entire model, has 
been employed extensively in the criminology literature to investigate sentencing for numerous 
crimes: sexual assault offenders, intimate assault, juvenile crimes (Wooldredge and Thistlewaite 
2004 and Kingsnorth et al. 1998, for example).   
The following is the specification employed in Table 3.5 for Stages 1 and 2, which 
merely links equations (3) and (5): 
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Selection Model for Stages 1 and 2      (8) 
      
              
   
             Selection equation 
     (   ) 
     (   ) 
    (       )    
The basic controls, which were employed in previous tables, are also included in     and 
   : violation and driver characteristics, as well as socioeconomic variables.  However, forced 
arraignment, driver is from a small city, in state, eligible for driving class, and received ticket in 
home zip code are used as instruments to aid identification of the selection model.  A likelihood 
ratio test of independent equations is performed, and estimates for   are presented (for Stages 1 
and 2 as well as Stages 2 and 3).  In both model specifications the null of     cannot be 
rejected.   
Forced arraignment and driver is from a small city are excluded from Stage 2 to aid in 
identification of the selection model.  By law, individuals ticketed for travelling more than 25 
miles over the limit or those ticketed in a school zone for traveling more than 10 miles over the 
limit must attend an arraignment and are ineligible to pay their tickets by mail or at a ticket 
window.  A dummy variable, forced arraignment, is included in Stage 1 to control for this lack 
of choice.  By Stage 2, being forced to attend an arraignment has no further impact on outcomes, 
because court procedure is not mandated past the first stage.  Relatedly, conditional on the 
prosecutor knowing an individual was speeding in a school zone or was travelling more than 10 
miles over the limit, the fact that the individual was required to attend an arraignment should not 
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influence the prosecutor’s decision.  Also, there is no reason to believe that individuals will use 
this requirement as a factor in deciding to attend trial (therefore is irrelevant in Stages 2-4). 
Driver is from a small city is an indicator for whether the driver is from a city with fewer 
than 10,000 residents.  Ticketed drivers from small cities may have different beliefs about how 
courthouses function than individuals from large cities.   For instance, drivers from small cities 
may know their own court officials, and thus may be less intimidated by courts in general 
(especially since Lafayette, though not very small, is not considered a big city).  This could 
influence the driver’s initial belief about success in fighting a ticket, and they may be more likely 
to attend the initial arraignment.   
Prosecutors have information about where drivers are from, however, it is unlikely they 
know (or care) how many residents a city has.  Conversely, the prosecutor is more likely to be 
influenced by distance that the driver must travel and not by the size of the city itself.  There is 
no theoretical reason why this variable should impact the prosecutor’s decision in Stage 2.  Upon 
reaching Stage 3 of the court process, drivers have had some experience with Lafayette city court 
to make an informed decision on whether to attend a trial, and where they are from should no 
longer be relevant.   
Stages 2 and 3 are linked in the same way as Stages 1 and 2 (see equation (8)).  I employ 
the following instruments: in state, eligible for driving class, and received ticket in home zip 
code.  In state is an indicator for whether a driver has a license from Louisiana.  This instrument 
can be excluded from Stage 3 because; conditional on travel time to court (already included in 
the model) individuals should not base the decision to attend trial on the state they live in.  
However, since police are more likely to ticket out of state drivers (Makowsky and Stratman, 
2009), prosecutors may consider the state where the driver’s license is issued at the initial 
  
90 
 
arraignment.  Though in state is important in Stage 2, there is no theoretical reason it needs to be 
included in Stage 3.   
Received ticket in home zip code is an indicator equal to 1 if the driver was ticketed in the 
zip code where they live.  This can only equal one for residents of Lafayette, since all tickets are 
issued within the city limits.  However, residents of Lafayette may also receive tickets in zip 
codes other than where they live.  If prosecutors are more forgiving or harsh to individuals who 
were speeding in a very familiar area, being ticketed in their own zip code may impact the 
driver’s likelihood of receiving a deal (Stage 2).  Otherwise, it is unlikely that individuals 
fighting a speeding ticket are going to decide whether or not to attend a trial (Stage 3) merely 
based on being ticketed in their own zip code versus another.   
In Louisiana, an individual has the option to take a defensive driving course once a year 
to “erase” a speeding ticket from their record, and in so doing, avoid associated insurance 
increases resulting from the violation.  Only drivers who were ticketed for traveling less than 25 
miles over the limit and who have not received another violation in the past year are eligible to 
take this course (eligible for driving class).  This control defines an important motive in deal 
issuance, because according to representatives of the court, prosecutors are known to grant deals 
to ineligible individuals to enable them to take the driving course.  For example, assume an 
individual who was ticketed for traveling 26 miles over the limit receives a lesser charge of 
traveling 24 miles over the limit.  This driver will now be eligible to take a defensive driving 
course.  Therefore, eligible for driving class is important in Stages 1 and 2.  By Stage 3, 
eligibility for driver course will have been accounted for at arraignment and no longer should 
affect an individual’s decision to go to trial. 
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Table 3.5 presents estimates of the selection models estimated by full information 
maximum likelihood, where Columns II and IV list conditional marginal effects.  First, looking 
at Columns I and II, where Stages 1 and 2 are assumed to be related, African-Americans are still 
significantly less likely to pay at the window initially, and more likely not to receive a deal in 
Stage 2, though this difference is no longer statistically significant.  This does not change the 
interpretation of the main result, which is that police are not statistically discriminating against 
African-Americans based on likelihood to contest.  However, the lack of significance in Stage 2 
differs from previous results.  Recall that the significant racial effect found in earlier 
specifications could be a result of a difference in asking or prosecutorial discrimination, which is 
still the case here, except that the Stage 2 marginal effects are calculated based on the conditional 
likelihood.  There is no difference when considering gender or age.   
Stages 2 and 3 provide very similar results as can be seen in Tables 3.3A and 3.3B.  
African-Americans are more likely not to receive a deal in Stage 2, and are more likely to 
continue to trial in Stage 3.  There is still no significant difference in comparing the behavior of 
women to the behavior of men in dealing with their tickets and age controls remain insignificant 
as well.  Therefore, even controlling for selection effects, evidence for statistical discrimination 
by police on the basis of likelihood to contest a speeding ticket cannot be supported. 
Besides the marginal effects estimates, estimates for rho are also presented.  For both 
selection models, rho is insignificant, and the null hypotheses of the likelihood ratio test of 
independent equations cannot be rejected.  Though this does not rule out correlation between the 
errors, this provides suggestive evidence that the previous estimates assuming independence may 
not be biased.  If the error terms are not related, it is appropriate to estimate the process by 
individual probits as in Tables 3.3A and 3.3B (Greene 2008).     
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Table 3.5: Probit Selection Model Assuming Correlated Errors Between Decision Stages 
 I II III IV 
 Selection Model: 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
Selection Model: 
Stage2 
Stage 3  
African-American .150** 
(.035) 
.050 
(.031) 
.036* 
(.019) 
.060** 
(.028) 
Female -.009 
(.027) 
-.038 
(.031) 
-.022 
(.018) 
-.024 
(.023) 
Age -.001 
(.005) 
.006 
(.005) 
.004 
(.003) 
.005 
(.005) 
Age Squared -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
5 to 10 Miles Over -.083 
(.074) 
.009 
(.087) 
.001 
(.046) 
.189 
(.151) 
11 to 15 Miles Over -.338** 
(.041) 
.049 
(.061) 
.013 
(.024) 
.017 
(.038) 
16 to 20 Miles Over -.067 
(.045) 
.076 
(.053) 
.041 
(.029) 
.005 
(.033) 
School Zone -.132 
(.166) 
.332 
(.375) 
.061** 
(.024) 
-.115** 
(.032) 
Past Violations -.009 
(.020) 
-.014 
(.027) 
-.008 
(.017) 
-.005 
(.011) 
Another Less Severe Ticket .145** 
(.060) 
-.062 
(.072) 
-.038 
(.044) 
.072 
(.058) 
Another More Severe Ticket .635** 
(.051) 
.051 
(.040) 
.030 
(.022) 
.139* 
(.076) 
Judge A .021 
(.026) 
.040 
(.030) 
.022 
(.017) 
.045* 
(.023) 
Lafayette Resident .048 
(.067) 
.006 
(.086) 
.031 
(.042) 
-.053 
(.040) 
High School/Some College 
 
-.086 
(.343) 
.994** 
(.477) 
.532** 
(.248) 
.334 
(.299) 
College Degree or Higher .046 
(.557) 
.956 
(.794) 
.521 
(.415) 
.728 
(.478) 
Log Per Capita Income -.116 
(.228) 
-.553* 
(.332) 
-.307* 
(.170) 
-.261 
(.198) 
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Table 3.5 continued 
 I II III IV 
 Selection Model: 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
Selection Model: 
Stage2 
Stage 3  
Miles from Courthouse .000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
Drive to the Courthouse is 
45-90 Minutes  
-.040 
(.064) 
-.158 
(.135) 
-.113 
(.091) 
-.046 
(.032) 
Drive to the Courthouse is 
Longer than 90 Minutes 
-.071 
(.079) 
.078** 
(.025) 
.042** 
(.014) 
.109 
(.130) 
Forced Arraignment .475** 
(.164) 
 
 
  
Driver is from a Small City 
(less than 10,000) 
.079 
(.068) 
   
In State License .023 
(.117) 
.327 
(.300) 
.194 
(.235) 
 
Received Ticket in Home 
Zip Code 
.017 
(.036) 
-.092 
(.059) 
-.064 
(.040) 
 
Eligible for Driving Class -.112* 
(.064) 
-.103** 
(.025) 
-.063** 
(.017) 
 
N 1476 485 485 444 
ln L -849.48 -228.98 
Rho .908 
(.291) 
.719 
 (.789) 
Probit marginal effects are listed, with robust standard errors.  Conditional marginal effects are 
reported for Columns II and IV.  The likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null of independent 
equations for either model (P-values of 0.404 and 0.296 respectively). 
 
3.5. Additional Questions 
3.5.1. Are Driver Behavioral Differences Driven by Differences in Fines Issued by Judges? 
 As was seen in the previous section, individuals alter their behavior based on which judge 
they face at arraignment (which is the same judge that will preside during the trial).  This is 
intriguing, and the next step is to determine if this behavior is a response to differential fine 
issuance by judges and whether those differences are motivated by race or gender.  Fines in 
traffic court are determined by a fee schedule, based on severity of the violation and the driving 
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record of the ticketed individual.  However, judges have the ability to alter fines of drivers who 
attend arraignments and/or trials.
43
  Previous literature has found that judges alter sentences 
and/or fines based on the race and gender of the offender as well as the race and gender of the 
victim (Schanzenbach 2005, for example). 
 The fine schedule is officially based on the speed traveled over the limit, whether the 
ticket was in a school zone, and the number of previous violations the driver has on his record.  
The fine schedule is not public information, and the court will not release the actual rule for 
assigning fines.  However, controlling for the factors which determine fines should provide the 
information necessary to investigate the extent that judges deviate from the fine schedule.   
To limit the impact of unobservable factors and investigate the accuracy of fine 
determinance information provided by the court, Table 3.6 includes only individuals who paid at 
the window initially.  The severity of the speed violation is the main component of the fine 
amount: someone traveling 5 to 10 miles over the limit would receive a fine that was $55 dollars 
less than a severe speeder (who travelled more than 20 miles over the limit).  Similarly, 
individuals who were speeding in a school zone pay about $9 more on average.  Past violations 
are not significant.  A control is included for individuals who owe the court money for prior 
charges, and individuals’ fines increase by approximately the amount of those previous charges 
(eg. a prior charge of $20 increases the fine by $20.21).  Column II controls for the race, gender, 
and the age of the driver, but only the age of the driver is statistically significant (at a 10% level).  
None of these controls should be significant if the fines are truly determined by a fixed schedule.   
Column III adds an identifier for which of the two traffic court judges was assigned the 
case.  The coefficient on judge is insignificant as expected.  The judge never encounters drivers 
                                                 
43
 This information was obtained from a representative of Lafayette City Court, but the fine schedule itself is not 
publicly available information. 
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included in this sample since they pay at the window or by mail.  Similarly, drivers are unaware 
which judge they have been assigned to at this point.  Overall, it seems that fines are determined 
in a straightforward manner, in accordance with a fine schedule as reported by the court.  
 
Table 3.6:  Explaining Fines: OLS Estimates for Individuals Who Pay at the Window and 
Did Not Receive Any Other Tickets 
 I II III 
5 to 10 Miles Over -55.45** 
(5.39) 
-55.70** 
(5.44) 
-55.74** 
(5.43) 
11 to 15 Miles Over -46.80** 
(2.63) 
-46.67** 
(2.68) 
-46.65** 
(2.68) 
16 to 20 Miles Over -29.15** 
(2.47) 
-29.02** 
(2.50) 
-28.96** 
(2.50) 
School Zone 9.07** 
(1.82) 
8.62** 
(1.86) 
8.54** 
(1.86) 
Past Violations -.10 
(.80) 
.173 
(.86) 
.20 
(.86) 
$10 Prior Charge 9.47** 
(2.74) 
9.28** 
(2.77) 
9.58** 
(2.78) 
$20 Prior Charge 20.21** 
(6.00) 
20.16** 
(6.08) 
20.11** 
(6.07) 
$30 Prior Charge 28.78** 
(10.17) 
28.83** 
(10.28) 
28.47** 
(10.27) 
African-American  -1.37 
(1.79) 
-1.45 
(1.79) 
Female  1.85 
(1.73) 
1.85 
(1.73) 
Age in Years  -.56* 
(.32) 
-.53* 
(.32) 
Age Squared  .01 
(.00) 
.01 
(.00) 
Judge A   -2.27 
(1.69) 
N 428 421 421 
R² .503 .506 .509 
Coefficients estimated by OLS are reported, along with robust standard errors in (parentheses). 
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 Table 3.6 provides a general understanding of fine determinants, but we must consider 
fines assigned to drivers who face the judge in order to investigate whether judges impose fines 
differentially.  These results are presented in Table 3.7.  The coefficients in Column I are nearly 
identical to Column I in Table 3.6, despite the different samples being estimated.  Columns II 
and III add controls for other violation characteristics which may influence the fine in court, as 
well as demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.  In these specifications, African-
Americans pay about $3 less in fines than white individuals.  This is statistically significant; 
however, the average fine is $145.77, so this racial difference amounts to about 2%.  Similarly, 
older individuals pay significantly less, but only by about 60 cents per year.
44
   
The final column adds the indicator for judge assignment, and the coefficient is 
insignificant, implying that drivers who face Judge A do not receive significantly different fines 
than those who face the other judge, all else equal.  We previously saw that individuals who face 
Judge A are more likely to continue to trial, which seems to imply they expect a better outcome 
from Judge A.  Since the fine amounts do not differ based on the judge, some unobservable 
judge characteristics may explain this behavior.  If Judge A is less intimidating or more friendly, 
then individuals may not experience as much discomfort in having to face Judge A and thus may 
be more willing to attend trial.
45
   
 Table 3.8 provides another insight into judge behavior: does fine issuance differ based on 
gender or race by judge?  Thus far I have shown that the judges as a whole do not discriminate, 
however, perhaps one judge does behave in a discriminatory manner.  Table 3.8 presents fine 
                                                 
44
 One possible explanation for this age difference is that the court may wish to punish young violators more 
severely in an attempt to prevent recidivism.  This has been cited as a common influence in the court system (ex. 
Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite (2004)). 
45
 The current paper excludes individuals who received the maximum deal from the prosecutor (where the ticket was 
completely dropped), but even when these individuals are considered, there is no difference in receiving the 
maximum deal based on the judge you were assigned to for trial. 
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Table 3.7:  Explaining Fines: Individuals Who Attend a Hearing 
 I II III IV 
5 to 10 Miles Over -56.66** 
(5.19) 
-53.48** 
(5.59) 
-54.17** 
(5.71) 
-54.39** 
(5.78) 
11 to 15 Miles Over -48.49** 
(4.52) 
-45.53** 
(4.80) 
-45.40** 
(4.80) 
-45.48** 
(4.81) 
16 to 20 Miles Over -31.22** 
(4.49) 
-28.40** 
(4.72) 
-28.36** 
(4.76) 
-28.45** 
(4.77) 
School Zone 8.76** 
(1.90) 
8.89** 
(1.99) 
8.54** 
(2.10) 
8.48** 
(2.13) 
Past Violations -.14 
(1.68) 
-2.75 
(2.41) 
-2.51 
(2.59) 
-2.44 
(2.57) 
$10 Prior Charge 9.22** 
(3.43) 
8.65** 
(3.35) 
8.07** 
(3.36) 
8.20** 
(3.31) 
$20 Prior Charge 15.98** 
(5.40) 
14.02** 
(5.92) 
13.41** 
(6.15) 
13.45** 
(6.12) 
$30 Prior Charge 28.78** 
(4.84) 
25.59** 
(4.52) 
24.96** 
(4.86) 
24.86** 
(4.71) 
Another Less Severe 
Ticket 
 1.66 
(3.17) 
2.16 
(3.22) 
2.17 
(3.24) 
Another More Severe 
Ticket 
 .81 
(3.08) 
.71 
(3.06) 
.79 
(3.07) 
Eligible for Driving 
Class 
 -11.66** 
(5.16) 
-11.36** 
(5.14) 
-11.05** 
(5.05) 
High School/Some 
College 
 
 1.44 
(21.43) 
-2.77 
(21.36) 
-2.97 
(21.29) 
College Degree or 
Higher 
 25.41 
(28.49) 
23.55 
(28.29) 
24.20 
(28.59) 
Log Per Capita Income  -13.82 
(13.08) 
-15.30 
(12.80) 
-15.76 
(13.09) 
Miles from Courthouse  -.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
Received a Reduced 
Charge 
 -2.39 
(4.27) 
-3.28 
(4.15) 
-3.31 
(4.16) 
African-American   -3.18** 
(1.42) 
-3.20** 
(1.43) 
Female   .26 
(1.56) 
.27 
(1.56) 
Age   -.65** 
(.29) 
-.64** 
(.29) 
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Table 3.7 continued 
 I II III IV 
Age Squared   .01* 
(.00) 
.01* 
(.00) 
Judge A    -1.29 
(1.54) 
N 509 503 494 494 
R² .495 .509 .516 .517 
Coefficients estimated by OLS are reported, along with robust standard errors in (parentheses). 
 
determinants by race and gender to see if the assigned judge plays a role in the amount of the 
fine paid by these groups.  Again, there is no indication that either judge considers race or gender 
when assigning speeding ticket fines. 
3.5.2. Discrimination Theories 
The results in this paper provide contradicting evidence for the idea that police 
statistically discriminate against women and African-Americans in an effort to minimize the 
number of tickets which are contested in court.  Instead, African-Americans are more likely to 
fight their speeding tickets, and there is no gender difference in individuals’ decision to pay or 
fight their tickets.  Therefore, no “advantage” exists in targeting either gender when issuing 
speeding tickets and a higher ticket frequency for African-Americans actually uses more court 
resources.  Though extensive evidence has been provided against the existence of statistical 
discrimination for this reason, police may still be statistically discriminating on the basis of 
something else.  Otherwise, this difference in ticketing may be the result of preference-based 
discrimination.   
One other possible reason police may be statistically discriminating against women and 
African-Americans is if these groups are believed to be more dangerous drivers, or more likely to 
speed again in the future.  However, when looking at the current data, the evidence is mixed and 
this does not seem to be a plausible explanation.  When considering the number of prior 
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Table 3.8:  Explaining Fines by Race and Gender 
Sample: African-
Americans 
Other Races Females Males 
 I II III IV 
5 to 10 Miles Over -51.38** 
(6.52) 
-56.60** 
(8.01) 
-47.21** 
(6.17) 
-62.88** 
(8.26) 
11 to 15 Miles Over -41.39** 
(3.08) 
-47.30** 
(7.00) 
-45.18** 
(5.06) 
-45.94** 
(7.24) 
16 to 20 Miles Over -24.83** 
(3.03) 
-30.22** 
(7.02) 
-26.78** 
(4.68) 
-29.63** 
(7.75) 
School Zone 13.56** 
(1.17) 
5.64* 
(3.08) 
5.09* 
(2.62) 
10.21** 
(3.70) 
Past Violations -1.69 
(1.27) 
-2.97 
(3.98) 
4.68 
(4.12) 
-4.39 
(3.12) 
$10 Prior Charge 10.05** 
(2.34) 
6.15 
(5.24) 
10.40** 
(2.18) 
5.36 
(6.84) 
$20 Prior Charge 14.63** 
(5.69) 
12.90* 
(7.42) 
.16 
(6.49) 
20.79** 
(8.37) 
$30 Prior Charge 31.26** 
(4.44) 
22.39** 
(4.64) 
- 27.68** 
(5.83) 
Another Less Severe 
Ticket 
-1.89 
(1.94) 
4.99 
(5.94) 
-8.23** 
(3.30) 
6.43 
(5.37) 
Another More Severe 
Ticket 
-.12 
(1.27) 
.72 
(4.52) 
-.70 
(2.39) 
.89 
(4.37) 
Eligible for Driving 
Class 
-7.48* 
(4.24) 
-13.31 
(8.12) 
-3.89 
(4.96) 
-13.39 
(8.22) 
High School/Some 
College 
 
-7.18 
(19.48) 
-4.06 
(33.20) 
38.76* 
(21.47) 
-39.21 
(32.35) 
College Degree or 
Higher 
-8.48 
(24.71) 
39.69 
(42.18) 
7.23 
(28.19) 
57.37 
(47.34) 
Log Per Capita Income 3.65 
(11.53) 
-25.04 
(18.66) 
-4.94 
(12.43) 
-32.97 
(23.44) 
Miles from Courthouse -.01 
(.04) 
-.004 
(.013) 
.01 
(.03) 
-.01 
(.01) 
Received a Reduced 
Charge 
-4.14 
(6.94) 
-3.72 
(5.12) 
-2.20 
(4.82) 
-5.01 
(7.10) 
African-American   -.80 
(1.44) 
-5.49** 
(2.11) 
Female .86 
(1.47) 
-.66 
(2.06) 
  
Age -.12 
(.23) 
-.87** 
(.36) 
-.006 
(.27) 
-1.78** 
(.56) 
Age Squared .001 
(.003) 
.01** 
(.005) 
.001 
(.004) 
.02** 
(.007) 
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Table 3.8 continued 
Sample: African-
Americans 
Other Races Females Males 
 I II III IV 
Judge A .358 
(1.31) 
-1.60 
(2.18) 
-.71 
(1.54) 
-1.78 
(2.46) 
N 170 324 248 246 
R² .821 .462 .637 .525 
Coefficients estimated by OLS are reported, along with robust standard errors in (parentheses). 
 
violations, women have an average of .351 prior violations, while men have an average of .59.  
This difference is statistically significant, and implies that men are more likely to commit 
multiple speeding violations.  Conversely, African-Americans have a higher number of past 
violations compared to drivers of other races (.584 compared to .427), but this could be a result 
of the higher likelihood of being ticketed by police despite no difference in speeding frequency. 
When considering more dangerous violations; high speeds, receiving multiple tickets 
with a speeding ticket, and speeding in a school zone, some differences by race and gender exist.  
Women are more likely to speed in a school zone, but less likely to receive multiple tickets.  
There is no difference by severity of the speeding violation by race or gender.  African-
Americans are less likely to speed in a school zone and slightly more likely to receive an 
additional ticket which is more severe than the speeding violation.  These statistics cast further 
doubt on the plausibility of statistical discrimination in terms of gender, but is less clear about 
race. 
If police are not engaging in statistical discrimination, then they are issuing a greater 
proportion of speeding tickets to women and African-Americans as a result of preference-based 
discrimination or for some other unknown reason.  Further analysis is required to determine if 
preference based discrimination is the motivating factor, but the current work has provided initial 
supportive evidence that this is the case.   
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3.6. Conclusion 
 The primary goal of this paper is to determine whether statistical discrimination or 
preference-based discrimination is the motive behind police issuing a greater proportion of 
speeding tickets to African-Americans and women.  The existing research on police 
discrimination in traffic stops, searches, and ticketing finds inconsistent results regarding racial 
as well as gender based discrimination (Blalock et al. 2007, Makowsky and Stratmann 2009, 
Knowles and Todd 2007, Grogger and Ridgeway 2006).  For example, Knowles et al. (2001) 
show that police engage in statistical discrimination when searching vehicles for drugs, however, 
using the same data Antonovics and Knight (2009) provide evidence that police are actually 
discriminating based on preferences.   
The present paper expands upon Quintanar (2011), which found police issue a greater 
proportion of speeding tickets to African-Americans and women than automated sources.  Using 
the same police ticket data, appended with individual court outcomes and two additional months 
of data, I investigate whether police are engaging in statistical discrimination based on a driver’s 
likelihood to pay a speeding ticket as opposed to fighting the ticket through several stages of the 
court process.  If police have an interest in saving the court money and eliminating their 
requirement to attend a hearing, the officers should ticket individuals who are more likely to pay 
their tickets outright.  This would be statistical discrimination; however, by analyzing individual 
driver behavior throughout the court process of dealing with a speeding ticket, I find evidence to 
the contrary.  African-Americans are less likely to pay their tickets immediately, and more likely 
to fight their tickets through the entire court process by attending a trial.     
Relatedly, there is no significant difference between women and men’s behavior in 
fighting tickets.  Again, statistical discrimination does not coincide with women being more 
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likely to receive tickets (Quintanar 2011).  While this evidence does not prove that police are 
engaging in preference-based discrimination, it does diminish the likelihood of statistical 
discrimination as a viable explanation for police behavior.   
 The unique dataset employed in this paper allows the researcher to account for many of 
the variables which influence driver and prosecutor behavior in the court process.  It does not 
seem to be the case that unobservable variables are driving both individual and prosecutorial 
choices at different stages, and in fact, evidence has been provided to illustrate that these 
decisions are actually independent.  This is the first paper to explore individual choices in 
dealing with a speeding ticket throughout the entire court process, along with prosecutorial 
decisions and judge behavior.  Similarly, due to the uniqueness of the dataset, this research does 
not suffer from two of the most common issues in this realm of literature: nonreporting and post-
lawsuit data.  The data were collected directly from the courthouse database without the prior 
knowledge of police and thus there is no reason to suspect ticketing behavior was altered as a 
result.  Similarly, the data include all police issued-speeding tickets during the sample time 
period, and therefore, nonreporting is not a concern.   
Similar to research investigating discrimination by judges and prosecutors in the criminal 
justice system, the present paper investigates prosecutor decisions as well as judge sentencing.  
African-Americans are generally less likely to receive a deal than white defendants, both when 
initially meeting with the prosecutor and when meeting with the prosecutor a second time at trial.  
It is tempting to interpret this finding as prosecutorial discrimination based on race, but as a 
result of the data structure this finding may simply illustrate a racial difference in the rate of 
asking for deals.  The data indicate only whether an individual attended a hearing, and not if they 
spoke to the prosecutor and requested a deal.  The question of prosecutorial discrimination is 
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beyond the scope of this paper, but its implications for present and future work should be 
considered.   
If the prosecutors in Lafayette City Court have a widespread pattern of discriminatory 
behavior against certain groups, ticketed drivers may have some knowledge of this and will form 
expectations about the likelihood of receiving a deal with this behavior pattern in mind.  Because 
African-Americans are less likely to receive a deal, they may be less willing to invest time and 
effort into contesting the ticket, and thus may be more likely to pay.  If this were the case, police 
would be aware that African-Americans were more likely to pay, and may statistically 
discriminate for this reason.  However, as the results show, African-Americans are actually less 
likely to pay, and thus this story does not coincide with the findings.  If discrimination by the 
prosecutor exists, it should not alter the implications for the current result that statistical 
discrimination does not seem to explain why police target women and African-Americans for 
tickets.
46
 
The determinants of speeding fines are a useful way to analyze judge behavior, since 
judges in Lafayette City Court are able to change fines based on their discretion.   Though 
violation characteristics are very important in determining the amount of a speeding fine, older 
individuals receive lower fines both when paying without attending a hearing (with no judge 
influence) and after facing a judge and prosecutor.  African-Americans pay lower fines after 
facing a judge or talking to the prosecutor, but not when paying without attending a hearing.   
Interestingly, individuals seem to behave differently depending on which judge they face 
in traffic court, but their motives for doing so are unclear.  There is no difference in driver 
                                                 
46
 One related theory is that African-Americans fight their tickets, knowing that prosecutors behave discriminatorily, 
because they expect fairness from the judge at trial.  African-Americans who do not pay initially do pay a 
statistically significantly lower fine than other races of drivers, all else equal (though the monetary difference is 
quite small).  This theory cannot be fully investigated due to the structure of the data, since we cannot distinguish 
whether the prosecutor is behaving in a discriminatory manner. 
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outcomes based on which particular judge is faced in court, so this differing driver behavior does 
not seem to be a result of leniency by any one judge.  For example, if one judge is more pleasant 
or less intimidating, the perceived cost of continuing to trial is lower, and therefore people may 
be more willing to attempt to get a lower fine.  Even if this is the underlying cause for 
differences in decisions of ticketed drivers, I show that it appears judges are behaving fairly and 
there is no difference in the case outcomes based on which judge presides during the trial.  The 
true motive for driver behavior in regards to the judge is a question for future research, since for 
now we can only determine that the judges are not behaving discriminatorily, yet we cannot 
explain the different choices individuals make depending on the judge.   
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CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECT OF AUTOMATED TRAFFIC 
ENFORCEMENT ON CRIME RATES  
4.1. Introduction 
 In 1994 New York became the first city in the United States to implement an automated 
traffic enforcement system in an attempt to decrease the number of traffic accidents resulting 
from red-light running.  Today there are over 500 cities and counties utilizing some type of 
traffic camera enforcement (Insurance Institute of Highway Safety, 2010).  This technology has 
sparked a heated controversy regarding its legality, which is strikingly evident due to the 
existence of many passionate websites and countless newspaper articles covering city adoption 
of these techniques.
47
  In fact, fifteen states since 1995 have outlawed its use.  Opponents claim 
the cameras are an invasion of privacy.  Advocates of these programs rely on statistics that show 
the most dangerous accidents decrease when the cameras are utilized, despite that in some cities 
less dangerous rear-end collisions do increase as drivers slam on their brakes to avoid running a 
red light.
48
   
 Although the purpose of this technology is to improve traffic safety, many companies and 
cities cite another selling point: they claim that the traffic programs actually decrease crime rates.  
For example, the red-light cameras website for Boulder, Colorado explains that the automated 
technology “achieves these safety benefits without having to dedicate extra police resources to 
enhance traffic enforcement.  Instead, police officers can devote their time to other priorities, 
                                                 
47
 There are hundreds of examples, but here are a select few: New York Times article, which appeared in print on 
August 8,2010:  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/us/08traffic.html?_r=1&scp=16&sq=Cleveland&st=nyt 
ABC news article, August 23, 2010 by Vic Lee: 
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/peninsula&id=7625213 
CBS news article, December 20, 2010 taken from Chicago AP: 
http://cbs2chicago.com/local/red.light.cameras.2.1198531.html 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-05-13-traffic-cameras_N.htm?csp=obinsite 
48
 For examples of such studies see http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersection/redlight/research/ and Rajiv Shah at the 
University of Illinois at Chicago http://www.rajivshah.com/index.html 
  
106 
 
including focused law enforcement, neighborhood problem solving, and crime prevention.”49  
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), a strong advocate for the use of automated 
traffic enforcement, also claims that the cameras allow police to focus on other city needs.
50
  
These automated traffic systems are not implemented with the intention of reducing crime, but 
crime may be impacted if having an automated traffic system allows police to concentrate on 
more serious offenders.  In this way, the automated system may reduce crime by increasing the 
marginal productivity of police officers.  This is the first paper to investigate these claims. 
Using a city level panel, I investigate the effect of red light camera systems on nine 
different crime rates: violent crimes including murder and nonegligent manslaughter, forcible 
rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and property crimes including burglary, larceny, and motor 
vehicle theft.  I find that red light camera programs in general decrease some crime rates, but if 
the red light camera program is overseen by the police department there is a stronger crime 
reduction for certain types of crime.  Non-violent crimes (property crimes, motor vehicle theft, 
and larceny) seem to be impacted the most, perhaps because police can be more visible in the 
right areas to deter criminals.   
 There is an extensive literature which attempts to explain factors that influence crime as 
well as the effect of perceived deterrence measures on crime rates.  For example, Gittings and 
Mocan (2003) use state-level data and find that executions and removals from death row 
decrease and increase crime rates, respectively.  Levitt (1996) investigates the effect of recent 
large increases in the prison population on crime rates, and Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) 
investigate unemployment rates’ effect on crime.  Numerous studies have also investigated the 
                                                 
49
 http://www.bouldercolorado.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10671&Itemid=3536 
50
 The IIHS describe themselves as “an independent, nonprofit, scientific, and educational organization dedicated to 
reducing the losses- deaths, injuries, and property damage- from crashes on the nation’s highways.”  They are 
supported by a group of auto insurance companies.  http://www.iihs.org/default.html.  Examples of such research 
can be found at: http://www.iihs.org/research/qanda/rlr.html. 
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impact of right to carry laws and gun ownership on crime rates (Lott 1997, Marvell 2001, 
Duggan 2001, etc.) with mixed findings depending upon the specification and data used.   
 A more specific area of the vast crime literature investigates the role of police on crime 
rates.  This is a particularly difficult relationship to measure due to the simultaneous nature of the 
size of the police force and crime (Levitt 2002).  For example, cities which have high crime rates 
generally will hire a larger number of police officers in an attempt to lower those crime rates.  
Researchers try to overcome this issue by taking advantage of natural experiments and using 
unique datasets with innovative instrumental variables (for example, Levitt 2002 and Di Tella 
and Schargrodsky 2004).  Thus, the size of the police force is an important factor to account for 
in crime analyses. 
 My analysis does not suffer from a problem generally present in identifying a causal 
relationship: simultaneity between crime rates and deterrence measures (Levitt 1996).  Because 
the policy being analyzed did not begin in an effort to reduce crime, this simultaneity does not 
exist.  Instead, red light programs can be thought of as exogenous to crime, since they are 
implemented by cities concerned about driving safety.  This is similar to Donohue and Levitt 
(2001), who find that the legalization of abortion reduced crime rates.  Nevertheless, I account 
for potential endogeneity.  
4.2. Automated Camera System Background 
 There are two types of automated traffic enforcement cameras: red light cameras and 
speed cameras.  The focus of this paper is red light camera enforcement, where red light cameras 
automatically photograph vehicles which illegally enter an intersection after the signal has turned 
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red.
51
  Though the technology itself is the same, some cities and states have laws governing 
specific use of the cameras, so individual programs differ slightly.  This will be controlled for in 
the model by using city fixed effects.  Due to the difficulty of quantifying speed camera use, the 
current paper will not address the effects of speed programs.
52
 
States and cities implement these programs in an attempt to improve safety, by 
decreasing the number of red light runners and therefore decreasing the number of accidents.  
Generally police departments take the role of implementing and overseeing the automated traffic 
systems, but sometimes the city government itself takes this role.  Much research has been 
conducted to investigate if these programs are effective in improving traffic safety, with the main 
results implying that side collisions decrease, while rear-end collisions increase.
53
 
Another automated technology designed explicitly to fight crime is being utilized in cities 
across the United States, but is important to distinguish from the programs analyzed in this 
paper.  These crime (or public surveillance) camera systems are being used mainly by large cities 
with crime problems.  They provide an additional tool for the police department to monitor risky 
areas before a crime is committed as well as provide evidence after a crime has occurred.  In the 
analysis, I control for cities that adopt these programs. 
4.3. Data 
The sample of cities using red light camera programs was taken from an Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) list of cities that use automated traffic enforcement for red 
                                                 
51
 The red light cameras are connected to both the traffic signal and sensors either in the crosswalk or stop line, and 
only photograph violators after the light has turned red.  However, speed cameras may continuously monitor traffic 
when the signal is green or red. 
52
 Speed camera technology is available in either a fixed or mobile form.  Fixed speed cameras may function as red 
light cameras, or may be portable.  Mobile cameras, however, are attached to a vehicle, which can be moved easily 
around the city.   
53
 IIHS provides numerous examples: http://www.iihs.org/research/topics/rlr.html. 
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light running and/or speeding.
54
  Many cities have official websites detailing their use of 
automated enforcement.  When this information was not accessible, I collected data through 
email correspondence with the city or police department, and if that was not possible, through 
local online newspaper articles.  The variables collected include: the month and year a red light 
program was implemented and how many intersections were initially equipped with cameras, the 
number of intersections with cameras in 2009, the fine for a red light violation, whether the 
program was run primarily by the police department, and if there was a period of time when the 
program was inactive.
55
  In interim years after initial installation and before 2009, I also keep 
track of the number of intersections with cameras, to use as an alternative control.  When this 
data is not available, the number of intersections is linearly extrapolated.
56
   
Generally automated traffic enforcement programs are highly publicized, but there are 
some instances where no information could be found.  I exclude these cities along with those 
who do not have consistent crime data.  The remaining sample consists of 136 cities.  Table 4.1 
lists the cities included in this analysis which used automated traffic enforcement, as well as the 
year the first program in the state was implemented.
57
   
Data is also collected for cities which never used automated enforcement systems.  These 
cities provide a comparison group to those with systems, to more strongly understand the impact 
of these camera systems on crime.  Some of these cities were on the initial IIHS list, but did not  
  
                                                 
54
 This was the main list (obtained in September 2010) however, some cities were augmented based on a history of 
contracts with Redflex, which is published yearly by the company.  The entire sample began with 540 cities and 
counties throughout the United States.  Counties are not included in the sample because of their overlap with city 
utilization. 
55
 In some instances programs were suspended as a result of pending legal action, and in some cases the program 
ended before the end of the time period investigated. 
56
 In many instances cities keep the same number of intersections with cameras for numerous years, so extrapolating 
is actually not necessary even though there is “missing” data. 
57
 Appendix B lists each individual city, the dates when the program was operational, and the rounded average, 
maximum, and minimum number of covered intersections during the duration of the program. 
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Table 4.1:  Sample of Cities with Red Light Photo Enforcement 
State Cities 
Initial Program 
Began 
AL Montgomery 2008 
AZ Mesa, Chandler, Phoenix, Glendale, Peoria, Sierra Vista 1996 
CA El Cajon, San Francisco, Beverly Hills, Oxnard, San Diego, Culver City, Fremont, San 
Buenaventura, Fresno, Bakersfield, Pasadena, Inglewood, El Monte, Hawthorne, Whittier, 
Stockton, Escondido, San Mateo, Union City, Oceanside, Berkeley, Modesto, San Leandro, 
Cathedral City, Rocklin, Baldwin Park, Newark, Riverside, Covina, Santa Maria, Glendale, 
Redwood City, Daly City, Menlo Park, Redlands, Hayward 
1996 
CO Fort Collins, Boulder, Northglenn, Aurora, Denver 1997 
DC Washington DC 1999 
DE Wilmington, Dover, Newark 2001 
FL Orlando 2008 
GA Savannah, Marietta, Rome, Atlanta, Brunswick, Griffin, Tifton 2002 
IL Chicago, Naperville 2003 
LA Baton Rouge, Lafayette 2008 
MD Frederick 1999 
MN Minneapolis 2005 
MO Arnold, Florissant, St. Peters, Hazelwood, Springfield, Hannibal, Bridgeton, Grandview 2005 
NC Wilmington, Raleigh, Cary 2000 
NM Albuquerque, Rio Rancho 2005 
NY New York 1994 
OH Toledo, Dayton, Middletown, Cleveland, Columbus 2001 
OR Beaverton, Portland, Medford, Albany, Salem 2001 
PA Philadelphia 2005 
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Table 4.1 continued 
State Cities 
Initial Program 
Began 
RI Providence 2006 
SD Sioux Falls 2004 
TN Gallatin, Knoxville, Kingsport, Cleveland 2006 
TX Garland, El Paso, Richardson, Plano, Rowlett, Denton, Frisco, Houston, McKinney, Dallas, 
Farmers Branch, Grand Prairie, Corpus Christi, Harlingen, Irving, Arlington, Duncanville, 
Lufkin, Humble, Lake Jackson, Sugar Land, Fort Worth, North Richland Hills, Mesquite, 
Baytown, Bedford, Austin, Killeen, Amarillo, Tomball, Haltom City, Round Rock 
2003 
VA Alexandria, Virginia Beach 1997 
WA Auburn, Seattle, Lynnwood, Tacoma, Bremerton, Puyallup, Lacey, Spokane 2005 
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begin programs until 2010, after the sample period.  The sample includes one hundred and forty-
five non-system cities.  This results in a final sample of 281 cities.  
Data pertaining to crime rates was obtained from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting 
Program (UCR), including: violent crime as a whole, murder and manslaughter, forcible rape, 
robbery, aggravated assault, property crime as a whole, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larceny 
theft.  Annual city-level population was also taken from the UCR.   
 As previously mentioned, some cities have begun using crime (also known as public 
surveillance) cameras, which is an automated technology used by police to monitor and 
prosecute criminals.  For each city, I know whether they utilized these programs and if so, the 
year the program went into effect.  These programs are adopted by cities with the intention of 
reducing crime, and thus it is important to control for this in the analysis.   
The use of a surveillance camera system is related to the broken windows hypothesis.  
The broken windows hypothesis, first discussed by Wilson and Kelling (1982), is the idea that a 
strong focus on small crimes will in turn decrease the number of more serious crimes committed.  
A common example is used where one broken window on a building will inevitably lead to many 
broken windows because, “one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so 
breaking more windows costs nothing” (Wilson and Kelling 1982).  Researchers have found 
support for this in practice, for example, Corman and Mocan (2005) analyze New York City 
crime rates and find that economic factors, deterrence measures including the size of the police 
force, and also increased police focus on misdemeanors decreases some crime rates.  The 
surveillance camera systems are generally used to protect property, observe gang activity and 
drug patterns, and prevent or provide evidence of robberies and burglaries and thus act in the 
same way as increased police presence in the broken windows hypothesis (Nieto 1997). 
  
113 
 
 City-level employment data was collected from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Government 
Annual Employment and Payroll Survey; from 1992 to 2009.
58
  I use the number of full-time 
police protection officers and payroll of government full-time employees.
59
  City salaries provide 
a proxy for the fiscal health of the city government, while the number of police officers is 
directly relevant to crime rates, as found by previous researchers (Levitt 2002; Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky 2004).  County specific variables include the unemployment rate, per capita 
income, percentage of the population between 18 and 34, between 35 and 44, between 45 and 54, 
and 55 and up, and the percentage of the population that is African-American.  This information 
is not available at the city-level for a large number of cities in the sample, and thus county-level 
data must be used.  These variables have also been shown to impact crime rates in prior research 
(Gittings and Mocan 2003, Corman and Mocan 2005, for example).    
 Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics of the data, weighted by city population.  The 
mean and standard deviations for the first three variables include only cities which have a red 
light camera system, in years when the program is operational.  The average red light program 
started with about 23 equipped intersections, and had approximately 41 intersections with 
cameras on average by 2009 (or by the program’s end).  From 1992 to 2009 two intersections per 
100,000 people, on average, were equipped with cameras in cities utilizing automated traffic 
enforcement systems.
                                                 
58
 The survey was not conducted in 1996, so estimates for this year were extrapolated. 
59
 Police protection is defined by the census as: “all activities concerned, with the enforcement of law and order, 
including coroner’s offices, police training academies, investigation bureaus, and local jails, “lockups”, or other 
detention facilities not intended to serve as correctional facilities.” But here I include Police Protection- Officers 
only.  Full-time pay is defined as: “Gross payroll amounts for the one-month period of March for full-time 
employees…includes all salaries, wages, fees, commissions, and overtime paid to employees before withholdings 
for taxes, insurance etc.  It also includes incentive payments that are paid at regular pay intervals.  It excludes 
employer share of fringe benefits like retirement, Social Security, health and life insurance, lump sum payments, and 
so forth.”  This data was extrapolated for missing years, but only cities which had at least 6 years of data are 
included. 
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Table 4.2:  Weighted Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
N 
Red Light Cams: 
Start 
Number of intersections with red light cameras 
when the programs began. 
23.69° 
(22.01) 
681 
Red Light Cams: 
End or 2009 
Number of intersections with red light cameras 
when the programs ended (or in 2009 if they did 
not end previously). 
41.11° 
(39.65) 
649 
Intersections Number of intersections equipped with cameras, 
divided by city population, multiplied by 
100,000. 
1.97° 
(2.59) 
654 
Crime Camera A dummy variable =1 if the city utilized crime 
surveillance cameras, =0 otherwise. 
.08 
(.28) 
5058 
Population City population. 1744141 
(2663669) 
5058 
Violent Crime Rate Number of violent crimes (the combined value of 
all murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, 
forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) 
divided by city population, multiplied by 
100,000. 
877.81 
(506.48) 
5004 
Murder Rate Number of murders and nonnegligent 
manslaughters divided by city population, 
multiplied by 100,000. 
11.54 
(9.80) 
5058 
Forcible Rape Rate Number of reported forcible rapes divided by 
city population, multiplied by 100,000. 
43.57 
 (26.34) 
5004 
Robbery Rate Number of robberies divided by city population, 
multiplied by 100,000 
375.17 
(278.27) 
5058 
Agg. Assault Rate Number of aggravated assaults divided by city 
population, multiplied by 100,000. 
498.89 
(301.79) 
5058 
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Table 4.2 continued 
Variable Description Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
N 
Property Crime 
Rate 
Number of property crimes (the combined value 
of all burglary, larceny theft, and motor vehicle 
theft) divided by city population, multiplied by 
100,000. 
5332.72 
(2142.73) 
5058 
Burglary Rate Number of burglaries divided by city population, 
multiplied by 100,000. 
1091.14 
(557.78) 
5058 
MV Theft Rate Number of motor vehicle thefts divided by city 
population, multiplied by 100,000. 
802.38 
(485.98) 
5058 
Larceny Rate Number of larceny thefts divided by city 
population, multiplied by 100,000. 
3487.83 
(1414.8) 
4777 
Population 18 to 34 Percentage of the county population between the 
ages of 18 and 34. 
.25 
(.03) 
5058 
Population 35 to 44 Percentage of the county population between the 
ages of 35 and 44. 
.16 
(.01) 
5058 
Population 45 to 54 Percentage of the county population between the 
ages of 45 and 54. 
.13 
(.01) 
5058 
Population 55 and 
up 
Percentage of the county population aged 55 or 
older. 
.20 
(.03) 
5058 
Real Income per 
Capita 
Real county income per capita. 22236.38 
(10954.63) 
5022 
Unemployment 
Rate 
County unemployment rate. 5.92 
(2.24) 
5040 
Percent African-
American 
Percentage of the county population that is 
African-American. 
.17 
(.13) 
5058 
Police Officers Number of full time police officers in the city, 
divided by city population times 100,000. 
280.21 
(154.48) 
5058 
City Salary per 
Capita 
Real full time pay of workers in the city 
government, divided by city population. 
42.44 
(38.04) 
5058 
Descriptive statistics are weighted by city population. ° Statistics are calculated only for cities with cameras, in years when the 
programs were operational. 1  
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The remaining descriptive statistics are calculated based on the entire sample.  Few cities 
utilize crime/surveillance camera technology (only 8% of the sample).  Crime rates are reported 
as the number of crimes per 100,000 people.  Larceny theft is most recurrent, with an average of 
3,487 thefts annually, while murders are the most infrequent (11.54).  The average number of 
full-time police officers in the city per 100,000 people is 280, and about $42 per person is spent 
on government salaries. 
4.4. Model 
 In order to investigate the impact of a red light program on crime rates, I estimate the 
following reduced form equation: 
                                             
where         is the crime rate of interest: violent crime, murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault, property crime, burglary, motor vehicle theft, or 
larceny theft.                  is a dummy variable =1 if the city was utilizing a red light 
camera enforcement program in period    , and 0 otherwise.  The dummy is lagged to lessen 
any possibility of simultaneity between implementation of the camera program and crime rates 
(Levitt 1996).  It is also theoretically likely that police behavior and patrol locations do not 
change immediately when the cameras are installed.  For example, it takes at least six months to 
increase the size of the police force (Corman and Mocan 2005).  In later specifications, I also use 
a measure of the number of intersections with cameras per 100,000 people, with a one year lag.  
This provides further insight into the effects of camera programs; whether the scope of the 
program plays a role in its impact on crime. 
The vector     contains control variables which may impact the crime rate in a specific 
year: the number of police officers per capita (scaled by 100,000), the real salary of city 
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employees per capita, whether the city used a surveillance/crime camera system, the percentage 
of African-American residents, the unemployment rate, and per capita income.
60
  The equation 
controls for fixed effects at the city level (  ) as well as year effects (  ), and city-specific time 
trends (   ).  City level fixed effects control for time-invariant factors, while year fixed effects 
control for shocks in crime rates over time.   
Standard errors are clustered by county, and the regressions are weighted by city 
population.  Clustering by county is motivated both by the inclusion of county-level explanatory 
variables in the model and because unobservables in the city error term may be correlated across 
cities within a county.  Some counties have regulations regarding how programs can be 
implemented and run, which may be driving adoption of the programs.  Alternatively, clustering 
at the city-level does not alter the results. 
4.5. Results 
 Table 4.3 presents the results where the control of interest is an indicator of whether the 
city had a red light camera system in the previous year.  If crime rates are impacted by these 
camera systems, individuals likely have an adjustment period shortly after the cameras are 
installed.  Similarly, the police department will have to take time to adjust shift and patrol 
patterns.  Overall, it seems that having an automated traffic system decreases the violent crime 
rate, murder rate, robbery rate, property crime rate, burglary rate, motor vehicle theft rate, and 
larceny theft rate.  The effect differs in magnitude depending upon which crime rate is of 
interest, but there seems to be a greater quantitative impact for property crimes.  A larger police 
force increases crime for forcible rape and aggravated assault, but seems to decrease the murder 
rate and motor vehicle theft rate.  In general these estimates are very small and can be considered 
                                                 
60
 The percentage of African-American residents, the unemployment rate, and per capita income are all at the county 
level.  This aggregation is one motive for clustering at the county level. 
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Table 4.3:  Regression Results: Having a Camera System vs. Not 
 Violent 
Crime Rate 
Murder 
Rate 
Forcible 
Rape Rate 
Robbery 
Rate 
Agg. 
Assault 
Rate 
Property 
Crime Rate 
Burglary 
Rate 
MV Theft 
Rate 
Larceny 
Rate 
Lagged Red 
Light Camera 
-107.03** 
(37.14) 
-1.74** 
(.59) 
-1.11 
(1.02) 
-71.30** 
(22.43) 
-22.45 
(16.06) 
-466.23** 
(141.82) 
-51.81** 
(25.26) 
-134.36** 
(45.32) 
-281.44** 
(84.71) 
Crime Camera -35.44 
(56.63) 
-.18 
(.78) 
2.63 
(3.22) 
26.95 
(27.82) 
-59.02** 
(29.18) 
-117.63 
(198.33) 
-2.85 
(49.54) 
-83.32 
(63.36) 
-32.05 
(131.54) 
Real Income per 
Capita  
.002 
(.003) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
-.0002* 
(.0001) 
-.0004 
(.002) 
.004 
(.002) 
.02 
(.01) 
.004 
(.003) 
.009 
(.007) 
.008 
(.01) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
5.95 
(6.98) 
-.20 
(.13) 
-.72** 
(.26) 
3.86 
(4.13) 
-.117 
(5.28) 
1.98 
(37.60) 
8.42 
(9.31) 
-8.62 
(9.71) 
2.71 
(23.91) 
Percent African-
American 
620.97 
(3837.97) 
-36.76 
(46.30) 
199.10 
(131.11) 
-1948.36 
(2399.93) 
1461.99 
(1952.87) 
11129.86 
(12774.38) 
-171.76 
(3775.96) 
2997.31 
(3566.39) 
8290.17 
(7644.55) 
Police Officers  -.02 
(.19) 
-.02** 
(.005) 
.02** 
(.01) 
-.23 
(.16) 
.32** 
(.13) 
-.34 
(.81) 
.12 
(.19) 
-.52* 
(.26) 
.06 
(.57) 
City Salary per 
Capita 
1.52* 
(.84) 
.09** 
(.03) 
-.003 
(.05) 
.43 
(.49) 
1.53 
(1.03) 
14.63** 
(6.25) 
3.25* 
(1.69) 
2.77** 
(1.33) 
8.59** 
(4.18) 
N 4950 5004 4950 5004 5004 5004 5004 5004 5004 
R² .95 .93 .90 .97 .93 .94 .95 .91 .94 
All models include year fixed effects, city fixed effects, and city-specific time trends.  Models also include controls for percent of the 
population that is in the following age ranges: 18-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55 and up.  Standard errors are clustered by county and are in 
parentheses.  Each regression is weighted by the city population.  
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economically insignificant (one additional police officer per 100,000 people decreases the 
number of motor vehicle thefts per 100,000 people by .52, for example).  Similarly, higher city 
salaries are related to higher crime rates, though their economic impact is also small. 
 Interestingly, it seems that automated traffic camera systems have a greater impact on 
non-violent crime than violent crime.  This is intuitive if police presence is more effective in 
deterring non-violent crimes.  For example, motor vehicle thefts must occur outdoors, generally 
in a public area on a street or driveway.  If a police officer is located nearby, these crimes are 
much less likely to occur assuming criminals are aware of police presence and the increased 
likelihood of being caught.  This result is similar to Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), where 
additional police staffing reduced the number of motor vehicle thefts in Argentina.  Conversely, 
many violent crimes do not occur in public places, and police presence may not have as much of 
an impact.  If automated traffic systems allow police to locate in areas to focus on more serious 
crimes, then we would expect to see a larger decrease in crimes where police presence is a large 
deterrent (like non-violent crimes).   
 Table 4.4 presents similar results, however, instead of using a dummy for the presence of 
a camera system, I use a count of the number of intersections equipped with cameras per 100,000 
people.  In general, the sign is still negative; however, it is only significant for motor vehicle 
theft.  The magnitude is still relatively small as in Table 4.3, where one additional intersection 
will decrease motor vehicle thefts by about 18.  
 Though it is most common for the police department to be responsible for 
implementation and decisions regarding the automated system, in some areas the city 
government actually takes this role.  Depending upon which entity takes charge of the automated 
system, there may be a different effect on crime rates, particularly if police are better able to use
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Table 4.4:  Regression Results Using Lagged Intersection Counts 
 Violent 
Crime Rate 
Murder 
Rate 
Forcible 
Rape Rate 
Robbery 
Rate 
Agg. 
Assault 
Rate 
Property 
Crime 
Rate 
Burglary 
Rate 
MV Theft 
Rate 
Larceny 
Rate 
Lagged 
Intersections 
-6.31 
(6.08) 
-.04 
(.10) 
-.07 
(.33) 
-.54 
(4.94) 
1.02 
(4.15) 
-32.91 
(27.33) 
-1.84 
(5.47) 
-17.87* 
(10.32) 
-13.40 
(15.07) 
Crime Camera -62.91 
(65.59) 
-.75 
(.83) 
2.39 
(3.28) 
3.29 
(30.90) 
-67.04** 
(31.02) 
-263.97 
(206.79) 
-20.07 
(51.73) 
-123.03* 
(65.89) 
-121.88 
(130.85) 
Real Income per 
Capita  
.002 
(.003) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
-.0002* 
(.0001) 
-.0009 
(.002) 
.003 
(.002) 
.02 
(.01) 
.004 
(.003) 
.01 
(.007) 
.006 
(.01) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
7.96 
(7.13) 
-.16 
(.13) 
-.71** 
(.26) 
5.39 
(4.68) 
.36 
(5.12) 
11.17 
(39.71) 
9.61 
(9.45) 
-6.45 
(10.10) 
8.58 
(25.30) 
Percent African-
American 
-341.96 
(4436.34) 
-54.34 
(51.94) 
186.31 
(132.24) 
-2725.02 
(2771.79) 
1240.13 
(2029.56) 
6181.27 
(14905.80) 
-761.64 
(3949.38) 
1736.00 
(4252.26) 
5183.14 
(8876.09) 
Police Officers  -.18 
(.28) 
-.02** 
(.006) 
.02* 
(.01) 
-.36 
(.22) 
.28** 
(.12) 
-1.14 
(1.18) 
.04 
(.21) 
-.74** 
(.31) 
-.44 
(.81) 
City Salary per 
Capita 
1.78* 
(.96) 
.09** 
(.03) 
.00001 
(.05) 
.67 
(.63) 
1.60 
(1.03) 
16.32** 
(6.36) 
3.44** 
(1.64) 
3.30** 
(1.50) 
9.57** 
(4.27) 
N 4860 4914 4860 4914 4914 4914 4914 4914 4914 
R² .95 .93 .90 .96 .93 .94 .95 .91 .94 
All models include year fixed effects, city fixed effects, and city specific time trends.  Models also include controls for percent of the 
population that is in the following age ranges: 18-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55 and up.  Standard errors are clustered by county and are in 
parentheses.  Each regression is weighted by the city population. 
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the camera system to improve their own marginal productivity.  Tables 4.5-4.8 illustrate the 
difference in programs based upon who is responsible for decisions regarding implementation 
and operation.  Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 use the lagged program dummy to see its effect on 
violent and property crime respectively.  City-run programs have no impact on any violent crime 
rate.  Conversely, if the automated traffic program is run by the police department, there is a 
significant reduction in the murder rate as well as the robbery rate (and violent crime as a whole).   
The results for non-violent crime, in Table 4.6, are similar.  City run programs still have 
no impact on any crime rate.  However, police run programs decrease property crime, motor 
vehicle theft and larceny.   
 Tables 4.7 and 4.8 utilize intersection counts (per 100,000 people) instead of the program 
dummy, and the results are slightly different.  An additional intersection per capita does not have 
an impact on violent crime for either city run or police run programs.  Similarly, if additional 
intersections are equipped with cameras there is no impact on any crime rate except motor 
vehicle theft in cities with a police run program.  This provides further evidence that police run 
programs have an impact on crime because they are better able to directly substitute cameras for 
police, allowing police to focus on more serious offenses instead of traffic violations.   
4.6. Investigating Endogeneity 
 Thus far I have assumed that adoption of an automated traffic camera system is 
exogenous, but perhaps adoption is driven by something unobservable in the error term.  In order 
to address this concern, I implement two-stage least squares to instrument for whether a city has 
a traffic camera system.  To be valid, the instrument must be strongly correlated with adoption of 
a program, but unrelated to crime rates.  For this reason, I use the number of fatal car crashes in 
each state as my instrument.  The main goal of this technology is to reduce dangerous collisions 
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Table 4.5:  Regression Results: Having a Camera System vs. Not and Violent Crime 
 Violent Crime Rate Murder Rate Forcible Rape Rate Robbery Rate Aggravated Assault 
Rate 
 City Run Police 
Run 
City 
Run 
Police 
Run 
City Run Police 
Run 
City Run Police 
Run 
City Run Police 
Run 
Lagged Red Light 
Camera 
-47.52 
(55.90) 
-87.10** 
(34.52) 
-.69 
(1.14) 
-1.65** 
(.62) 
-4.27 
(4.69) 
-.46 
(1.04) 
16.32 
(21.36) 
-76.19** 
(20.59) 
-10.44 
(28.83) 
-7.89 
(16.49) 
Crime Camera -50.90 
(73.42) 
38.55 
(52.19) 
-.57 
(.77) 
-.25 
(.85) 
2.46 
(6.30) 
5.89 
(4.22) 
-10.79 
(12.06) 
32.68 
(37.42) 
-77.37 
(47.34) 
4.48 
(24.71) 
Real Income per 
Capita  
.01 
(.02) 
.001 
(.003) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
-.0004 
(.0007) 
-.0003** 
(.0001) 
.001 
(.007) 
.00004 
(.001) 
.02 
(.01) 
.002 
(.002) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
11.22 
(9.30) 
3.53 
(5.95) 
-.16 
(.12) 
-.18 
(.13) 
-.74* 
(.41) 
-.79** 
(.26) 
5.92 
(5.52) 
2.07 
(3.05) 
1.63 
(7.44) 
2.58 
(4.55) 
Percent African-
American 
4836.75 
(3602.33) 
-4256.64 
(2829.78) 
3.10 
(55.15) 
-64.36 
(53.34) 
326.70** 
(159.46) 
48.59 
(117.81) 
682.02 
(2167.19) 
-3470.87* 
(1766.35) 
2913.17 
(2562.72) 
-796.25** 
(1467.19) 
Police Officers  .30 
(.28) 
-.24 
(.17) 
-.009 
(.006) 
-.02** 
(.01) 
.04** 
(.02) 
.01 
(.01) 
.09 
(.11) 
-.38** 
(.15) 
.30 
(.20) 
.14 
(.09) 
City Salary per 
Capita 
2.66 
(3.86) 
1.35* 
(.81) 
.12** 
(.05) 
.07** 
(.02) 
.16 
(.22) 
-.002 
(.04) 
-1.49 
(1.49) 
.82* 
(.45) 
4.77 
(2.93) 
.47 
(.49) 
N 2826 4608 2862 4644 2826 4608 2862 4644 2862 4644 
R² .93 .96 .93 .93 .85 .91 .96 .97 .92 .92 
All models include year fixed effects, city fixed effects, and city specific time trends.  Models also include controls for percent of the 
population that is in the following age ranges: 18-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55 and up.  Standard errors are clustered by county and are in 
parentheses.  Each regression is weighted by the city population.  
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Table 4.6:  Regression Results: Having a Camera System vs. Not and Property Crime 
 Property Crime Rate Burglary Rate Motor Vehicle Theft Rate Larceny Theft Rate 
 City Run Police Run City Run Police Run City Run Police Run City Run Police 
Run 
Lagged Red 
Light Camera 
-246.85 
(236.53) 
-437.41** 
(148.35) 
-59.02 
(66.64) 
-29.05 
(26.89) 
-35.61 
(56.41) 
-149.57** 
(47.21) 
-151.43 
(133.59) 
-260.41** 
(90.22) 
Crime Camera -175.26 
(174.86) 
69.24 
(266.00) 
-11.57 
(45.72) 
82.74 
(74.23) 
-45.49 
(41.20) 
-116.30 
(106.79) 
-118.19 
(127.86) 
101.00 
(191.09) 
Real Income per 
Capita  
.02 
(.05) 
.02* 
(.01) 
.01 
(.02) 
.004 
(.003) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.007) 
-.008 
(.04) 
.009 
(.01) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-8.29 
(41.00) 
-1.67 
(35.74) 
10.06 
(10.73) 
6.57 
(8.58) 
-6.00 
(7.65) 
-7.83 
(10.74) 
-12.36 
(28.61) 
.19 
(22.54) 
Percent African-
American 
21766.58 
(13772.09) 
1361.15 
(11796.09) 
-105.53 
(4436.72) 
-2728.67 
(3233.11) 
8109.60** 
(2984.48) 
1904.58 
(4234.47) 
13744.97* 
(8088.09) 
2136.46 
(7399.83) 
Police Officers  .68 
(.96) 
-.69 
(.99) 
.46 
(.34) 
-.07 
(.20) 
-.21 
(.16) 
-.53 
(.33) 
.44 
(.65) 
-.09 
(.71) 
City Salary per 
Capita 
35.74** 
(12.63) 
9.47** 
(4.22) 
8.63** 
(2.59) 
2.20* 
(1.19) 
4.82 
(3.03) 
1.54 
(1.16) 
22.29** 
(8.43) 
5.72* 
(3.24) 
N 2862 4644 2862 4644 2862 4644 2862 4644 
R² .93 .95 .93 .95 .92 .91 .92 .94 
All models include year fixed effects, city fixed effects, and city specific time trends.  Models also include controls for percent of the 
population that is in the following age ranges: 18-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55 and up.  Standard errors are clustered by county and are in 
parentheses.  Each regression is weighted by the city population. 
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Table 4.7:  Regression Results: Lagged Number of Intersections and Violent Crime 
 Violent Crime Rate Murder Rate Forcible Rape Rate Robbery Rate Aggravated Assault 
Rate 
 City Run Police Run City 
Run 
Police 
Run 
City Run Police 
Run 
City Run Police Run City Run Police 
Run 
Lagged 
Intersections 
-5.05 
(7.45) 
-6.59 
(5.84) 
.18 
(.17) 
-.07 
(.11) 
-.55 
(.64) 
-.03 
(.38) 
17.39 
(14.75) 
-4.63 
(3.73) 
16.43 
(11.31) 
-2.00 
(2.98) 
Crime Camera -70.50 
(75.28) 
36.73 
(55.33) 
-.90 
(1.06) 
-.32 
(.91) 
.74 
(5.28) 
5.88 
(4.21) 
-4.17 
(21.62) 
30.43 
(40.82) 
-83.24** 
(40.69) 
5.07 
(24.77) 
Real Income 
per Capita  
.01 
(.02) 
.001 
(.003) 
-.00002 
(.0003) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
-.0003 
(.001) 
-.0003** 
(.0001) 
-.0003 
(.006) 
-.001 
(.002) 
.02 
(.01) 
.002 
(.002) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
11.59 
(9.26) 
4.72 
(609) 
-.15 
(.12) 
-.15 
(.13) 
-.70* 
(.41) 
-.79** 
(.26) 
5.91 
(5.88) 
3.35 
(3.66) 
1.90 
(7.06) 
2.43 
(4.44) 
Percent 
African-
American 
5115.74 
(3441.14) 
-5820.82* 
(3154.08) 
9.19 
(52.56) 
-94.55 
(58.58) 
351.86** 
(168.23) 
35.39 
(116.87) 
780.36 
(1960.26) 
-4861.36** 
(2150.27) 
3159.35 
(2457.98) 
-908.81 
(1451.64) 
Police Officers  .30 
(.28) 
-.40 
(.26) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.02** 
(.01) 
.04** 
(.02) 
.01 
(.01) 
.06 
(.11) 
-.53** 
(.24) 
.25 
(.20) 
.13 
(.08) 
City Salary per 
Capita 
2.76 
(43.80) 
1.59* 
(.95) 
.13** 
(.05) 
.08** 
(.03) 
.17 
(.22) 
-.001 
(.04) 
-1.45 
(1.56) 
1.03 
(.61) 
4.92* 
(2.87) 
.50 
(.50) 
N 2826 4554 2862 4950 2826 4554 2862 4590 2862 4590 
R² .93 .96 .93 .92 .85 .91 .97 .96 .92 .92 
All models include year fixed effects, city fixed effects, and city specific time trends.  Models also include controls for percent of the 
population that is in the following age ranges: 18-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55 and up.  Standard errors are clustered by county and are in 
parentheses.  Each regression is weighted by the city population.  
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Table 4.8:  Regression Results: Lagged Number of Intersections and Property Crime 
 Property Crime Rate Burglary Rate Motor Vehicle Theft Rate Larceny Theft Rate 
 City Run Police Run City Run Police Run City Run Police Run City Run Police Run 
Lagged 
Intersections 
1.75 
(57.33) 
-38.82 
(27.77) 
10.27 
(17.27) 
-4.32 
(4.90) 
-10.56 
(14.81) 
-19.56* 
(10.57) 
2.28 
(30.21) 
-15.07 
(15.83) 
Crime Camera -291.12 
(202.11) 
60.36 
(280.50) 
-39.86 
(47.06) 
82.50 
(74.47) 
-61.56 
(40.06) 
-116.83 
(111.22) 
-189.34 
(142.24) 
92.84 
(197.59) 
Real Income per 
Capita  
.02 
(.05) 
.02 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.003 
(.003) 
.02 
(.01) 
.01 
(.007) 
-.009 
(.04) 
.007 
(.01) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-5.75 
(41.99) 
5.21 
(37.10) 
10.76 
(10.97) 
6.92 
(8.57) 
-5.74 
(7.56) 
-5.69 
(11.21) 
-10.79 
(29.13) 
4.62 
(23.45) 
Percent African-
American 
23250.04* 
(13465.27) 
-6544.40 
(12598.05) 
359.64 
(4361.04) 
-3298.55 
(3220.82) 
8202.26** 
(2971.32) 
-581.37 
(4884.95) 
14668.57* 
(7910.23) 
-2740.75 
(7697.41) 
Police Officers  .51 
(.96) 
-1.51 
(1.37) 
.39 
(.32) 
-.12 
(.20) 
-.20 
(.16) 
-.81** 
(.38) 
.33 
(.65) 
-.58 
(.97) 
City Salary per 
Capita 
36.80** 
(12.56) 
10.76** 
(4.50) 
8.94** 
(2.52) 
2.31** 
(1.14) 
4.91 
(3.00) 
2.02 
(1.43) 
22.95** 
(8.42) 
6.42* 
(3.43) 
N 2862 4590 2862 4590 2862 4590 2862 4590 
R² .93 .95 .93 .95 .92 .91 .92 .94 
All models include year fixed effects, city fixed effects, and city specific time trends.  Models also include controls for percent of the 
population that is in the following age ranges: 18-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55 and up.  Standard errors are clustered by county and are in 
parentheses.  Each regression is weighted by the city population. 
  
126 
 
resulting from individuals running red lights.  Therefore, it is very reasonable to assume that 
adoption will be strongly related to the number of fatal crashes per year.  Reliable data is not 
available at the city or county level for the entire sample, but I am able to use state level crash 
counts.  This aggregation is actually somewhat of a benefit, because it is even less likely that 
state level crashes are correlated with city-level crime rates. 
 The results are presented in Table 4.9, and are slightly different than the estimates in 
Table 4.3 which did not correct for endogeneity of having a red light camera program.  Though 
the same crime rates are impacted by having a red light camera program (except that having a 
red light camera program significantly decreases aggravated assault in Table 4.9), the impact is 
much larger once I control for endogeneity.
61
  If red light camera systems are reducing crime, but 
cities with higher crime rates choose to adopt these programs, then the OLS estimates would be 
biased upwards as is seen here.  In other words, there seems to be a negative relationship from 
red light cameras to crime, but a positive relationship from crime to red light cameras. 
4.7. Conclusion 
 Automated traffic enforcement has been the focus of extensive debate, where advocates 
say the programs reduce the number of fatal traffic accidents as a result of running red lights, but 
others argue that the loss of privacy and increased incidence of rear-end collisions outweigh any 
slight positive effects.  Companies who supply the technology, and in some cases the cities that 
adopt the technology, claim that there is an additional benefit to installing such programs: crime 
reduction.  Because police are able to focus on more serious offenses instead of traffic violations,  
                                                 
61
 Notice that because of data limitations, since fatal crash data was only available from 1994 to 2009, these are 
estimated on different samples than Table 4.3.  However, if Table 4.3 regressions are run with only data from 1994 
to 2009, the results are the same as presented in the text and still significant.  These results can be provided upon 
request. 
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Table 4.9: Two Stage Least Squares: Fatal Crashes as an Instrument for Having a Red Light Program 
 Violent 
Crime 
Rate 
Murder 
Rate 
Forcible 
Rape Rate 
Robbery 
Rate 
Aggravated 
Assault Rate 
Property 
Crime Rate 
Burglary 
Rate 
MV Theft 
Rate 
Larceny 
Rate 
Lagged Red 
Light Camera 
-624.37** 
(185.01) 
-8.30** 
(3.57) 
8.17 
(6.14) 
-392.66** 
(100.23) 
-386.18** 
(183.75) 
-1951.90** 
(516.43) 
-316.38** 
(155.55) 
-645.80** 
(206.52) 
-975.58** 
(314.60) 
Crime Camera 97.03 
(81.75) 
2.93 
(1.90) 
-1.87 
(4.01) 
116.83* 
(61.78) 
61.23 
(79.43) 
392.19 
(271.78) 
87.45 
(68.46) 
74.70 
(114.59) 
226.29 
(156.93) 
Real Income per 
Capita  
.007 
(.006) 
.0003 
(.0002) 
-.0003 
(.0002) 
.005 
(.004) 
.006 
(.004) 
.04** 
(.02) 
.009* 
(.006) 
.013 
(.009) 
.01 
(.01) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-9.97 
(11.91) 
-.13 
(.16) 
-.46 
(.35) 
-4.88 
(6.26) 
-5.12 
(11.51) 
-27.28 
(33.93) 
6.50 
(7.17) 
-22.18* 
(12.27) 
-11.42 
(20.25) 
Percent African-
American 
-.0006 
(.0004) 
.00001 
(.00001) 
-.00004** 
(.00001) 
.0004** 
(.0002) 
-.0002 
(.0003) 
-.003** 
(.001) 
-.0005* 
(.0003) 
.0005* 
(.0003) 
-.003** 
(.001) 
Police Officers  .84** 
(.35) 
.01 
(.01) 
.02 
(.02) 
.44 
(.32) 
.82** 
(.35) 
2.77** 
(1.21) 
.63 
(.42) 
.58 
(.65) 
1.53** 
(.70) 
City Salary per 
Capita 
.99 
(1.53) 
.06* 
(.03) 
.02 
(.05) 
-.09 
(.68) 
1.87 
(1.27) 
9.77 
(6.63) 
3.53* 
(1.87) 
1.05 
(1.82) 
5.14 
(3.83) 
N 4400 4448 4440 4448 4448 4448 4448 4448 4448 
R² .90 .91 .89 .89 .85 .92 .94 .86 .93 
All columns also control for year and city fixed effects, and city-specific time trends.  Also controls for percent of the population that 
is in the following age ranges: 18-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55 and up.  Standard errors are clustered by State.  Due to collision data 
constraints, this sample is estimated from 1994 to 2009.
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other crime rates decrease.  This is the first paper to investigate these claims, and finds 
supportive evidence. 
Using a city level panel, I investigate the effect of red light camera systems on nine 
different crime rates: violent crimes including murder and nonegligent manslaughter, forcible 
rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and non-violent crimes including burglary, larceny, and motor 
vehicle theft.  I find that implementing a red light camera program reduces the murder and 
robbery rate, but has a greater negative impact on non-violent crimes like burglary, motor vehicle 
theft, and larceny theft.  Relatedly, the number of intersections equipped with cameras reduces 
property crimes, but not violent crimes.  However, these reductions are modest when considering 
their economic implications. 
  Crime rates may decrease as a result of these programs’ installation because police 
become more productive by allocating time and resources more effectively.  The impact is larger 
on non-violent crimes than violent crimes, and cities with programs run by the police department 
experience greater crime reductions than cities where the government runs the program.  This 
implies that police-run programs are better able to substitute cameras for police, thus increasing 
their marginal productivity.  Similarly, non-violent crimes (motor vehicle theft) are perhaps 
impacted the most because police can be more visible in the right areas to deter criminals.   
 I also control for potential endogeneity in adopting red light camera programs by 
instrumenting with the number of fatal car crashes in each state.  The coefficients actually 
become more negative, implying that cities with higher crime rates are more likely to adopt a red 
light camera program.  However, even when controlling for endogeneity, adoption of an 
automated traffic enforcement program decreases violent crime, murder, robbery, aggravated 
assault, property crime, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larceny theft. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation exploits original datasets to investigate police discrimination in issuing 
speeding tickets and unproven claims of automated traffic enforcement systems as crime 
reducers.   
Using speeding tickets issued by automated cameras as a measure of the speeding 
population in Lafayette, Louisiana, I find that a ticketed driver is more likely to be female and 
African-American if the speeding ticket was issued by a police officer.  This implies that police 
officers are not ticketing individuals objectively, and instead, consider race and gender when 
issuing speeding tickets.  Their motives for discrimination cannot be determined in this context, 
but evidence is provided implying that one motive in issuing tickets is to maximize fine revenue 
by ticketing more extreme speeders. 
Next, I use additional data which tracks individuals’ decisions throughout the court 
process in dealing with their speeding ticket.  I find that African-Americans are more likely to 
fight their ticket all the way to trial, but there is no difference in contesting based on gender.  
This contradicts a potential motive of statistical discrimination: police do not ticket individuals 
based on their likelihood to immediately pay a ticket, instead, they actually issue a 
disproportionate number of tickets to individuals who will utilize more court resources.   
 Despite a difference in driver behavior based on the judge to whom they are assigned for 
court, judges behave no differently in issuing fines.  There is also no evidence of discrimination 
based on gender or race in fine issuance. 
 Lastly, I investigate an unfounded claim that automated traffic enforcement increases the 
marginal productivity of police.  I find little evidence supporting this claim, but the reduction in 
crime is stronger for property crimes where police visibility would theoretically have a larger 
deterrent effect. 
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APPENDIX A: CHAPTER 4 DATA APPENDIX 
City 
 
Crime Rates and Population: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
Uniform Crime Reports (various years). Available at http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/ 
 
Police Employment and City Salaries: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,  
Government Annual Employment and Payroll Survey (1992 to 2009).  Available at 
http://www.census.gov/govs/apes/. The employment count is the number of full-time 
police protection officers and payroll is full-time government employees. 
 
County 
 
Income per Capita: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Local Area  
Personal Income” (CA1-3) (electronic file), (various years).  Available at  
http://www.bea.gov/regional/reis.  The data are given nominally and were converted to  
82-84 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
 
Unemployment Rate: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area  
Unemployment Statistics. Available for download at http://www.bls.gov/lau/#data.  
 
Population (Proportion by Age and Race): U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,  
“County Estimates by demographic characteristics- age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin”  
(electronic files). Available at http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html. 
 
State 
 
Population: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports  
(various years). Available at http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/ 
 
Number of Fatal Crashes: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Fatalities and  
Fatality Rates by State, 1994-2009. Available at www- 
fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/States/StatesFatalitiesFatalityRates.aspx 
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APPENDIX B: DETAILED SAMPLE OF CITIES WITH RED LIGHT 
ENFORCEMENT 
State City Program Time 
Period 
Average 
Number of 
Intersections 
Maximum 
Intersections 
Minimum 
Intersections 
AL Montgomery April 2008- 8 9 7 
AZ Chandler 2001 8 12 4 
AZ Glendale August 2007- 3 6 3 
AZ Mesa 1996 20 26 1 
AZ Peoria February 2008 2 4 1 
AZ Phoenix 2003 10 10 10 
AZ Sierra Vista 2011 . . . 
CA Bakersfield 2003 6 9 2 
CA Baldwin Park July 2007 5 6 4 
CA Belmont 2008 2 2 2 
CA Berkeley June 2005 3 5 3 
CA Beverly Hills June 1997 5 6 3 
CA Cathedral City March 2006 1 1 1 
CA Covina April 2007 3 3 3 
CA Culver City January 2000 8 12 2 
CA Daly City April 2008 1 1 1 
CA El Cajon 1996 6 7 6 
CA El Monte November 2003- 
October 2008 
2 2 2 
CA Escondido October 2001 5 7 2 
CA Fremont August 2000 8 10 1 
CA Fresno 2002 2 3 1 
CA Glendale February 2008 3 4 2 
CA Hawthorne April 2004 3 5 1 
CA Hayward August 2008 3 4 3 
CA Inglewood October 2003 7 13 6 
CA Marysville June 2005 3 3 3 
CA Menlo Park June 2008 4 4 4 
CA Modesto June 2005 4 4 4 
CA Montclair June 2006 2 2 2 
CA Newark September 2006 3 5 1 
CA Oakland September 2008 6 10 1 
CA Oceanside January 2005 3 4 2 
CA Oxnard July 1997 10 11 8 
CA Pasadena May 2003 1 1 1 
CA Rancho Cucamonga September 2008 - 2 - 
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APPENDIX B continued 
State City Program Time Period Average 
Number of 
Intersections 
Maximum 
Intersections 
Minimum 
Intersections 
CA Redlands June 2008-2009 1 1 1 
CA Redwood City February 2008 1 2 1 
CA Riverside December 2006 16 18 15 
CA Rocklin March 2006 2 2 1 
CA San Buenaventura 2001 - 17 - 
CA San Carlos November 2008 1 1 1 
CA San Leandro January 2006 5 5 3 
CA San Mateo 2005 2 3 1 
CA San Diego 1998 3 7 15 
CA San Francisco October 1996 18 23 5 
CA Santa Maria July 2007- November 
2009 
2 1 1 
CA Stockton July 2004 10 13 6 
CA Union City 2005 6 8 5 
CA Whittier April 2004- March 
2009 
2 2 2 
CO Aurora May 2005 4 4 4 
CO Boulder August 2008 5 6 3 
CO Denver February 2008 4 4 4 
CO Fort Collins 1997 1 2 1 
CO Northglenn July 2003 2 2 2 
DC Washington August 1999 20 49 4 
DE Dover February 2004 5 7 1 
DE Newark 2005 2 2 2 
DE Wilmington April 2001 18 29 5 
GA Alpharetta June 2005 7 7 7 
GA Atlanta December 2005 6 8 5 
GA Brunswick 2006 2 3 1 
GA Decatur September 2002 1 1 1 
GA Duluth March 2005- March 
2009 
1 1 1 
GA Griffin November 2006 1 1 1 
GA Marietta June 2004 2 3 1 
GA Rome July 2004 2 2 1 
GA Savannah October 2003 2 3 1 
GA Snellville September 2005- 
March 2009 
1 3 1 
GA Tifton 2007 2 2 2 
IL Chicago 2003 80 171 10 
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APPENDIX B continued 
State City Program Time Period Average 
Number of 
Intersections 
Maximum 
Intersections 
Minimum 
Intersections 
IL Naperville December 2008 3 4 2 
LA Baton Rouge January 2008 10 15 5 
LA Lafayette January 2008 5 7 4 
LA New Orleans March 2008 20 36 4 
MD Baltimore February 1999 30 47 6 
MD Frederick May 2005 7 7 7 
MN Minneapolis July 2005- April 
2007 
1 2 2 
MO Arnold October 2005 3 4 2 
MO Bridgeton September 2008 2 2 2 
MO Florissant May 2006 4 6 1 
MO Hannibal February 2008 2 2 2 
MO Hazelwood April 2007 6 10 2 
MO Springfield June 2007 14 16 11 
MO St. Peters December 2006 4 5 3 
MO St. Ann 2008 2 2 2 
MS Columbus June 2008-February 
2009 
1 1 1 
NC Cary January 2004 8 15 2 
NC Raleigh 2003 13 14 11 
NC Wilmington April 2000 10 10 10 
NM Albuquerque May 2005 10 20 2 
NM Las Cruces 2009 1 1 1 
NY New York 1994 50 60 50 
OH Cleveland December 2005 10 20 4 
OH Columbus March 2006 10 18 2 
OH Dayton March 2003 8 10 1 
OH Middletown April 2005 8 8 7 
OH Toledo January 2001 15 21 10 
OH West Carrollton December 2008 5 5 5 
OR Albany December 2007 1 1 1 
OR Beaverton January 2001 3 4 1 
OR Medford May 2002 2 2 2 
OR Portland October 2001 4 5 3 
OR Salem February 2008 2 3 1 
PA Philadelphia 2005 8 13 3 
RI Providence April 2006 7 15 1 
SD Sioux Falls June 2004 1 1 1 
TN Cleveland October 2008 4 5 3 
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APPENDIX B continued 
State City Program Time Period Average 
Number of 
Intersections 
Maximum 
Intersections 
Minimum 
Intersections 
TN Gallatin 2006 4 6 2 
TN Kingsport April 2007 6 8 6 
TN Knoxville April 2006 8 15 3 
TN Red Bank January 2006 3 3 2 
TX Amarillo June 2008 5 5 5 
TX Arlington June 2007 10 14 2 
TX Austin May 2008 4 6 1 
TX Baytown March 2008 8 13 3 
TX Bedford March 2008 2 3 1 
TX Burleson March 2008 4 4 4 
TX Cedar Hill April 2007 5 5 5 
TX Coppell July 2007 3 3 3 
TX Corpus Christi April 2007 10 13 9 
TX Dallas January 2007 37 60 17 
TX Denton May 2006 4 4 4 
TX Duncanville July 2007 4 6 2 
TX El Paso 2006 20 27 11 
TX Farmers Branch January 2007 5 7 4 
TX Fort Worth January 2008 20 25 7 
TX Garland September 2003 6 12 4 
TX Grand Prairie January 2007 6 9 1 
TX Haltom City July 2008 2 2 2 
TX Harlingen May 2007 5 5 5 
TX Houston September 2006 60 70 10 
TX Humble December 2007 4 5 3 
TX Irving May 2007 6 9 2 
TX Killeen May 2008 5 5 2 
TX Lake Jackson December 2007 3 3 3 
TX Lufkin October 2007 11 11 11 
TX Marshall September 2007 5 5 5 
TX McKinney 2007 1 1 1 
TX Mesquite February 2008 2 2 2 
TX North Richland 
Hills 
January 2008 7 7 7 
TX Plano March 2006 10 14 4 
TX Richardson January 2006 7 7 7 
TX Round Rock October 2009 1 1 1 
TX Rowlett March 2006 3 4 1 
TX Sugar Land December 2007 4 4 3 
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APPENDIX B continued 
State City Program Time Period Average 
Number of 
Intersections 
Maximum 
Intersections 
Minimum 
Intersections 
 TX Terrell March 2008 3 3 3 
TX Tomball June 2008 2 2 2 
VA Alexandria November 1997- 
2005 
3 3 3 
VA Virginia Beach July 2004- 2005 12 13 11 
WA Auburn December 2005 3 3 3 
WA Lacey July 2008 1 1 1 
WA Lynnwood July 2007 8 8 8 
WA Puyallup June 2008 4 4 3 
WA Renton May 2008 4 4 4 
WA Seattle July 2006 14 21 4 
WA Spokane November 2008 5 7 3 
WA Tacoma September 2007 6 7 3 
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